Category Archives: Short

Update Gronlandsbanken – result and annual report 2014 & Danish interest rates

Gronlandsbanken

Gronlandsbanken has just released 2014 numbers and its 2014 annual report. 2014 results look solid: ~50 DKK profit per share, roughly 6% more than in 2013. The dividend remains at DKK 55 (dividend is paid out of pretax income). ROE has remained high at 16,3%. The result would have been even better if Gronlandsbanken would have not increased reserves. This is the quote from the annual report:

The result before value adjustments and write downs of DKK 148,6 million is the Bank’s best basis result so far. This is of course satisfactory. It is at the same time above the last announced results expectation of a result before value adjustments and write downs in the upper end of the range DKK 125 – 145 million. The result before tax returns 16.3% on year start equity after dividend.

This was achieved against a slight drop in Greenland’s GDP which I find quite remarkable. The stock market seemed to have “anticipated” those results to a certain extend as the stock price shows:

The balance sheet is still super rock solid with an equity ratio of 19% (of total balance sheet, not risk weighted assets or some similar shenanigans).

My initial investment thesis 2 years ago was the following:

– as it is the only bank in Greenland, its margins are around twice as high as the best global banks and the balance sheet is rock solid. One could call this a natural moat
– even based on the current state, current valuation implies significant upside to fair value
– the Greenland resource story could add significant growth going forward, even with maybe other banks entering Greenland
– finally, Management has started to buy shares after surprisingly good Q3 numbers
– although there is no direct catalyst, an indirect catalyst could be if some of the projects proceed well and Greenland will move into the spotlight. Gronlandsbanken is the easiest (and only) way to invest into Greenland without project specific risk

One of the issues of course is that most of the natural resources projects look a lot less likely to happen than 2,5 years ago.The annual report is as always a great resource to see what is going on in Greenland. Most projects seem to be on hold or cancelled, the only remaining interest is from China:

Among the larger projects, it has become obvious that virtually only Chinese investors continue to show a certain interest. The BANK of Greenland considers it likely and quite naturally, that the funding can come from China. Chinese enterprises are often the leaders in processing for further use in either Chinese, American, or European industry.

Especially the oil sector has been hit hard:

The prospects of the oil area are more dismal than of the mineral area. After Cairns test drilling in 2010 and 2011, oil exploration in Greenland is now greatly reduced, see Figure 8. The stagnation of the exploration in both the oil and the mineral area is expected to continue over the next few years, even though new licenses have been issued and the preparatory work is continuing in 2014 as well.
The declining interest in oil exploration is a.o. due to large oil and gas discoveries in other places, and the fall in the oil price . Of importance can possibly also be the administration and regulation of the area so far have not been regarded as sufficient by several persons in the industry.

So the bad news is that within my initial time frame of 3-5 years, I will not see any large mining or oil projects in Greenland. The upside might be that the incentive for other banks to enter Greenland will be most likely quite low.

Interest rates

However, another thing happened which was not on my radar screen: Denmark went from having low-interest rates to negative interest rates. This is how 3 month local swap rates developed:

dkk ir

Just as a reminder: Swap rates are “unfunded”, that means based on contracts where no principal changes hands. If we look at “funded” rates, so how much money Danish banks pay for actual deposits, the situation is much more dramatic:

dkk fund

So just to put this in context: If you want to deposit money for 3 months at a Danish bank for 3 months in DKK, they charge you -1,6% p.a. for this “service” !!!!

Impact on Gronlandsbanken:

One thing about Gronlandsbanken which I liked initially but what could be a problem going forward is the following: Gronlandsbanken has a significantly higher deposit base than loans outstanding. While this is good from a liquidity and risk point of view, it is bad because those excess funds have to be invested somewhere and in local currency.

I am not sure if Gronlandsbanken could actually charge for deposits locally, so the risk is there that they get squeezed on the amounts not loaned out to customers. They seem to have anticipated this and increased their bond holdings, but still, at year end 2014, roughly 20% of the balance sheet is potentially exposed to this potential “Negative carry” problem.

On the other hand, as a EUR investor being invested into a DKK security exposes me to a “positive Black Swan” similar to the CHF/EUR move in January. If something goes horribly wrong in the EUR zone, there might be some upside in holding DKK denominated securities.

Addtitionally, any Danish pension fund and Insurance company will struggle to find income producing assets in DKK. With a dividend yield of (gross) of around 8%, Grondlandsbanken should be not unattractive and therefore support the share price in the short term.

Summary:

The underlying business of Gronlandsbanken has done surprisingly well in 2014 despite a lackluster economy. Due to the carnage in natural resource prices, the implied “resource option” has been postponed some years into the future, making the investment case less attractive compared to 2,5 years ago.

Ultra low and negative interest rates could make it more difficult for deposit-rich banks like Gronlandsbanken to maintain their interest margins. As there are not that many alternatives at the moment I will continue to hold the stock for the time being, as it also functions as a kind of “Euro Black Swan” hedge. If I find other interesting finaincial service stocks, Gronlandsbanken would be the first one to be replaced as I think that my other financial holdings (Kasbank, Van Lanschot, NN, Admiral) have a better risk/return ratio.

I will also monitor closely if and how the negative rates will feed through Grondlandsbanken’s Q1 results.

Short Cuts: Flughafen Wien, Alstom, Trilogiq, Sberbank

Flughafen Wien

A quick update on my “Christmas-special situation” investment Flughafen Wien:

82,2% of the tendered shares have been accepted at the offer price of 82 EUR. With the current share price of ~ 77,5 EUR, the overall return results (pre costs and taxes) are :

(0,822*(82-79,25) + 0,178*(77,50-79,25))/79,25= +2,46% For the portfolio I assume that I would be able to close the position (sell the rest) at 77,50 EUR. Privately my broker DAB was not yet able to “release” the tendered shares.

Alstom

Back in August this year, I looked at Alstom as a potential “sum of parts” play following the GE deal announcement. One open point was the issue of pending corruption charges. I had written the following:

A second big issue is that at the moment no one knows exactly how much of the liabilities will get transferred to GE. Especially with regard to operating leases (nominal ~830 mn EUR), litigation liabilities (528 mn EUR) and pension liabilites (gross 5,2 bn) there is no definitive answer how much will be transferred to GE and what remains at Alstom. In a sum of part calculation, any of those remaining liabilities will have to be deducted from the extra assets as they are economically equivalent to debt.

I had some discussion and the consensus was that litigation liabilities would be transferred to GE, although I was sceptical. It turned out that I was right in this case. Alstom pleaded guilty and agreed to pay 772 mn USD fine. For the valuation, the most important sentence is this one:

In June, Alstom agreed to sell most of its energy business to General Electric. The French company said it would not be able to transfer its fine over bribery allegations to G.E.

Due to the strong dollar, in EUR the fine is actually 100 mn USD higher han the reserves. Overall, for anyone assuming GE taking over those liabilities, this reduced the value of Alstom by 2 EUR per share.. It will be interesting to see how the transport business is actually doing once Alstom publishes annual results. So far, I do not see any reason to buy the stock from a fundamental point of view.

Trilogiq

A few days before Christmas, Trilogiq reported 6m figures (30.09.2014). For some reason, the report is not on Trilogiq’s homepage, so one has to look at secondary sources like this one. Sales were slightly lower, gross margins more or less equal to last year. Net income was significantly lower but still positive.

They attribute the lower result to special marketing expenses and new hires:

la hausse de 13% des autres achats et charges externes, notamment du fait de la multiplication des actions marketing destinées à faire connaitre la nouvelle gamme GRAPHiT à travers le monde, l’augmentation de 12% des charges de personnel qui ont été grevées par d’importantes indemnités de départ et par de nouveaux recrutements

Cash is till around 22 mn EUR or 6 EUR per share. If Trilogiq manages to return at leat to 2/3 of the old profitability, (earnings were between 1,45 EUR per share and 1,75 EUR from 2008 to 2013), the stock would be priced at 6-8 times earnings. It remains to be seen if the temporary effects are in fact temporary. A friend forwarded me this equity research piece on Trilogiq where they expect 1 EUR EPS in 2016/2017 which to me looks quite conservative. Nevertheless, I think the further fundemental downside for Trilogiq at the current stock price is rather limited.

Sberbank

Over the holidays, I decided that I will exit my Sberbank position still within the old year at today’s prices. In the private account this also leads to “tax loss harvesting”. For the portfolio it became clear to me that my investment decision now has been invalidated 2 times. First, I estimated that the Ukraine conflict would be over quickly which was clearly wrong. Secondly, I did not account for the drop in oil prices and the ruble. I have honestly no idea how exposed Sberbank is directly or indirectly to oil and the ruble, but the prudent decision is to sell now and look at the stock (and the Russian market) again next year.

It might look very pro-cyclical selling near the low, on the other hand, if an investment case has deteriorated as much as in this case one should better exit before “behavioural biasis” such as “breaking even” etc. kick in.

MIFA Bond (ISIN DE000A1X25B5) – Distressed debt & Restructuring “German Style”

I had covered the case of MIFA several times in the last few months (part 1, part 2, update, update 2).

Over the week-end, finally some news emerged with details about the restructuring.

If I understood the filing correctly, the following will happen:

1. Existing shareholders will be diluted 1:100
2. Bondholders will accept a “haircut” of 60% plus the coupon will be reduced to 1% (from 7,5%) and the maturity will be extended to 2021 (from 2018)
3. Hero cycles will inject (up to) 15mn EUR via a capital increase
4. Bondholders will get 10% of the new company for the 15 mn haircut and a subscription right for additional shares

Interestingly, the advisor nominated by the bondholders also made a press release. Some additional info from this release:

– the advisor estimated a recovery rate of only 15% for bondholders in the case of bankruptcy
– technically, bondholders will own 91% of MIFA equity before Hero cycle invests
– bondholders get subscriptions right and could, if they want to invest new money, own up to 30% of MIFA including those shares they get via the debt equity swap

As some details are still missing (price of new shares) etc., it is hard to correctly say how much the bonds are worth and if bondholders were treated fairly compared to Hero. However current prices at ~38% seem to imply most of the upside.

My 5 cents on this

For me, the following aspects of this whole episode are interesting:

– How can be the recovery rate of bond issued twelve months ago only be 15% ? Where did the 21,5 mn EUR disappear ? In my opinion, MIFA was a fraudulent company for quite some time and was already insolvent when they issued the bonds.

– Will there be any law suits by bondholders ? Why did Hero take the risk and didn’t wait for insolvency ? Are there any special provisions for Hero to back out if law suits come up ?

“Senior bonds” under German law should not be treated and priced as senior bonds. As this example shows, one can “haircut” bond holders under German law (“Schuldverschreibungsgesetz”) without even going into bankruptcy procedures. German Bonds are much more similar to potentially perpetual, deeply subordinated bonds or “Genußschein” than a senior bond under international law. Any covenants written into the prospectus are worth nothing as it is so simple to just restructure the bonds.

such a restructuring can be decided with only a small percentage of the bondholders. Only 28% of the MIFA bondholders were present when the advisor, who can commit to binding changes, was elected. So in theory, 14% of the bondholders can decide what happens to the remaining 86% of the bondholders with very little chance for any “hold outs”. Maybe Greece and Argentina should issue their future bonds simply under German law. Tha would make life much easier for them.

. why does the MIFA share (1% of the future company) trade at 80 cents or 6 mn EUR market cap ? Do shareholders think that the company is worth 600 mn EUR ? This is a clear “short zo zero” situation if one could actually borrow the shares

– one could argue that the restructuring makes sense because MIFA will be able to continue to operate and now jobs are lost. However I think it would be naive to believe that Hero will operate MIFA they way they worked before. Hero wants the brands and the distribution, not the production. I am pretty sure that they will not guarantee a lot of jobs.

– but at least, the order that existing equity gets wiped out before the senior bonds still holds, even under German law. I had some serious doubts about this.

The most important lesson: As I have written before, new corporate bonds under German law should be avoided at all cost. Especially the “Mittelstandsanleihen” are in principal similar 20 EUR bills issued at 100 EUR with a tiny little option to receive 100 EUR. The “lipstick on this pig” is the high coupon. But German investors seem to buy anything with a high coupon these days anyway. No surprise maybe if you have to pay for holding 2 year treasuries at the time of writing.

Kabel Deutschland & Vodafone reloaded

One of my two remaining short position gets “smoked” today. Kabel Deutschland is up ~7% to a new ATH:

The reason is once again the (now somehow confirmed) rumour that Vodafone wants again to take over KAbel Deutschland:

It started (again with the “rumour” as last time:

(Reuters) – Vodafone Group Plc has made an informal takeover bid within the past week for Germany’s biggest cable company, Kabel Deutschland Holding AG, Bloomberg reported, citing people with knowledge of the matter.

In the meantime, to my surprise, Vodafone confirmed the talks:

LONDON—Vodafone Group PLC said it has approached Germany’s biggest cable operator Kabel Deutschland Holding AG about a possible takeover, a move that would mark the U.K. mobile-phone company’s largest acquisition in Europe in more than a decade and add more customers to its triple-play offering of TV, mobile and broadband.

“There is no certainty that any offer will ultimately be made, nor as to the terms on which any such offer might be made,” Vodafone said in a brief statement Wednesday.

Kabel Deutschland confirmed it has received a preliminary approach from Vodafone, but also said there is no certainty an offer will be made.

So this is clearly against my expectations when I made the short. I have to admit that I don’t understand Vodafone. Why would they start such talks again with the danger of a leak again when the exact same thing happened a few months ago.

My only explanation is that they are either extremely desperate or extremely stupid. Or both.

Vodafone shareholders didn’t seem to be too enthusiastic either. So lets wait and see what happens. One first lesson is clear: Never underestimate the stupidity of others. Vodafone has done already one horrible overpriced German acquisition (Mannesmann) in the past. However, most likely most of those people who did this back then were already fired and now they make the same mistake again.

Clearly I also made a mistake here. It is definitely much more risky to short stocks with no majority shareholder in an industry which is famous for overpaying for M&A transactions.

EDIT: Real time comment for a quite “famous” Vodafone investor:

Vittorio Colao the urbane but seemingly incompetent CEO of Vodafone is the new Sir Fred Goodwin.

Kabel Deutschland (DE000KD88880) – Short again !!

Kabel Deutschland is a stock which I have written about quite often. I was short the stock but closed out with a quite significant loss (-53% to be exact).

I am still following the stock out of interest because I think it is a prime example of a modern day high quality “stock promotion”.

Clearly, the performance of the stock since its IPO is outstanding. Without many setbacks, the stock has tripled since its MArch 2010 IPO, making it one of the most succesful German stocks in that time period:

Also the advantages of Kabel Deutschlands business model are clear:

– the business seems to be a “natural moat” business. Effectively, Kabel Deutschland makes contracts with the administers of multi family homes, so all those people become automatically clients of Kabel Deutschland and have to pay a base fee via their monthly rent bill. With this guaranteed inflow, Kabel Deutschland is then able to sell aggressively phone services, internet etc. to those clients

As a result, Kabel Deutschland is supposed to be a free cash flow machine with still significant growth potential, the rare exception in the European TelCo market. So it doesn’t matter that Kabel Deutschland has negative equity and the debt is mostly covered by goodwill and intangible assets.

Markets are clearly paying a premium for that. With a trailing EV/EBITDA of 11.4, Kabel Deutschland is ~30% more expensive than even the comparable cable operators in Europe and the US.

Recent developements

Telecolumbus acquisition

Kable Deutschland was on track to take over Telecolumbus, another regional cable operator. Taking over other regional cable operators is of course a no brainer for any aspiring cable company. Economics of scale is what counts in cable. However 3 days ago, the german antitrust office finally rejected the request from Kabel Deutschland due to anti trust concerns.

So this significantly reduces growth opportunities for Kabel Deutschland. Yes, they might be able to sell more internet etc. to existing clients but I am not sure if this really warrants the extra price paid for Kabel Deutschland

9m results

The official release came out with an encouraging dividend increase from 1.50 EUR to 2.50 EUR per share. Also all their self defined funky KPIs look fantastic.

However if you really look into the cash flow statement, one can see that 9 months free cashflow is only ~50 mn EUR, to significantly increased investments. The company even announced an “accelerated network investment” plan:

In order to enable accelerated growth, the Company intends to pull forward network investments of €300 million to be spent over the course of the next two fiscal years in addition to the Company’s existing investment plans.

Interestingly, the “operating cashflow” does not include interest charges. In my opinion, interest charges are operating, as they have to be paid regularly and there is no discretion like dividends. So in my view Kabel Deutschland currently runs free cashflow negative and dividends are paid out from the increase in debt.

All in all, one might think that those two issues might lead to a decrease of the valuation premium for Kabel Deutschland. Fat chance, because just by pure coincidence, the following story appeared in the Newspapers last week (before the other two events mentioned bacame public):

According to “insiders”, Vodafone is contemplating to take over Kabel Deutschland.

The reason seems logical: Vodafone needs to offer “quad play” services (Televison, Internet, fix line phone, mobile phones) and has already purchased in a similar fashion Cable and Wireless UK fixed line operations in 2012. So a clear no brainer.

Kabel Deutschland directly jumped more than 20% and the following bad news (Telecolumbus, 9 months earnings) were mostly ignored.

Vodafone Cable and Wireless UK acquisition

It is absolutely correct, that Vodafone acquired Cable and Wireless UK operations last year. However, what many “analysts” did not mention was the fact that Vodafone was very disciplined here.

When Cable and wireless split in two companies in 2011, there was always the rumour that Vodafone would be interested. However the waited a long time until the price was right before they came out with an announcement in April last year.

According to Bloomberg, Vodafone finally paid the following multiples:

P/S 0.3
EV/EBITDA 2.5
EV/EBIT 6.7

So Vodafone actually bought here at “rock bottom prices”. In my opinion, the days are over when Vodafone would move in and pay any price for Cable Deutschland.

In my opinion, there are also no other natural buyers for Kabel Deutschland. Liberty has already bought Kabel BW and will not be allowed to buy Kabel Deutschland. The big Telcos have enough problems already and for a PE buyer, Kabel Deutschland is already too “bootstrapped” to be interesting.

I am pretty sure that Vodafone knows that and will not rush into a Kabel Deutschland deal, if at all.

Conclusion

In my opinion, the “Vodafone Insider story” was a prime example of stock promotion, making the stock jump with a somehow plausible story and making people forget about the rather sobering underlying picture.

I am therefore once again, going to establish a short position in Kabel Deutschland, betting against a take over by Vodafone at a premium. As always with shorts, I will start with a 1% position.

At current prcies, I believe the risk/return ratio is quite good, as I don’t believe that Vodafone will buy at current prices (or even pay a premium) and there is a good chance that Kabel Deutschland’s valuation will approach average levels at some point in time.

Edit:
In my “home forum” benny_m posted a interesting link regarding potential cable regulation in Germany:

http://www.teltarif.de/kabelnetz-regulierung-bundesnetzagentur-homann/news/49249.html

That might be a game changer…….

Interesting short idea from Bronte (and a free course in forensic accounting): Focus Media (Chinese RTO)

For those who don’t read the outstanding Bronte Capital blog regularly, I can ony recommend: put it on your priority reading list.

After his not so well timed Richemont short, he has now set his eyes on Chinese company Focus Media from China.

Focus Media is a (on paper) fantastically profitable company from China wich was already subject of a Mudddy Waters report.

John Hempton has now a real series of very detailed posts about the company:

Read more

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