Monthly Archives: May 2012

Update DJE Real Estate, SEB and CS Euroreal

DJE Real Estate

Thanks to a friend a received the link to the recording including the slides.

Most important points:

– cash payment of ~17-20% of NAV in Juli (1.30-1.50 EUR)
– however overall cash flow to fund holders much slower than initially thought

In the original post I wrote the following

A) around 2/3 of the fund’s investments (based on NAV) are relatively liquid. It should be no big problem for DJE to return 5 EUR or more within the next 12 months or so. This would mean that at current prices, the investment itself should flow back pretty soon and the discount to intrinsic value could decrease equally soon

This seems to be have been overly optimistic. As far as I understood, a couple of funds have extension options from the side of the fund and some of the still open funds need at least 12 months notice to get the money.

According to management, the secondary market for those funds seem to be very illiquid with large discounts.

So for the portfolio, I will start selling the fund from today on, as my investment case which implied signifcant cash flows in the next 12 months does not really hold.

SEB & CS Euroreal

As now already widely known, the SEB has closed for good beginning of last week.

The CS Eurreal is trying its luck now with Monday, May 21st as the last day where investors can ask for redemptions.

Current price action and price to NAV for the CS indicates a very low propability of reopening:

So potential real estate buyers will see a large pipeline of real estate offers from all those funds with sometimes quite similar objects.

One thing which is interesting is that as far as I know, the funds do not really have to sell all obejcts within the communicated timeframe (i.e. SEB 5 years, AXA 3 years). If they don’t manage to sell, the deposit bank has to take over.

As the deposit banks most likely will not want to be involved in those cases (there will be a wall of law suits along the way) they most likely will directly auction off the properties.

So the end could be quite ugly in the worst case. On the other hand, if prices fall further, the run off funds could become interesting again.

SIAS SpA – Deutsche Bank “buy” recommendation and risk free rates

Normally I tend to ignore any sell side ratings for the stocks I am interested in.

However, this time with the Deutsche Bank “buy recommendation” for portfolio Stock SIAS (target 7,70 EUR) I find it interesting how they justify their valuation in the summary:

Our target price of E7.7 is based on an SoTP, which values each concession with an individual DCF based on an 8.5% WACC (5.5% risk-free, 5.0% risk premium and beta of 1.3x). We subtract net debt and provision and we then apply a 20% discount to reflect lower liquidity than peers and risk of value destructive M&A. Sias trades at a 30% discount to the European peers: 2012E EV/EBITDA is 4.5 (vs. 7x for the sector) and 2012E PE is 7.4x (10x). Downside risks are regulatory changes, more negative traffic performances, capex delays and value-destructive M&A (see page 32).

This is highly interesting. As I have written in an earlier post about risk free rates, the CAPM requires to use the default free risk free rate in the currency of the issuer.

It is difficult to determine an “undisturbed” risk free rate in the EURO anyway and maybe the 10 Year rate for Bunds at 1,46% is too low, but using 5.5% as a EUR risk free rate is defintiely wrong. Even more as the Bonds outstanding from SIAS yield 4.9 and 5.4%, which is below the assumed risk free rate.

In my opinion, the Deutsche Bank assumptions double counts the Italian risk because they use a high Beta and a “risky” rate to discount rate. Just as another interesting point: SIAS beta relative to the Italian FTSE MIB is only 0.8.

Nevertheless it is interesting, that even with double counting Italian risk they still end up with a price target of 7,70 EUR which would imply a 65% upside from the current 4.70 EUR.

This shows how undervalued some of the PIIGS shares are at the moment.