Book review: Kevin Roose – The AGI Chronicles: The Inside Story of the Race to Create an Artificial Superintelligence

This book has been published quite recently and basically re-tells the last 10 years of developments with a focus on LLMs and the few dozen people, most located in the area of San Francisco, who are the main players in this “game”. The companies that are covered are mostly OpenAI, Google and Anthropic.

It does not really cover the 50 or 60 years of AI research before that.

The author, Kevin Roose is a relatively well known SF based tech journalist who seems to have pretty good access to many of the main players. He also hosts a very interesting podcast called “Machine Gods” together with Casey Newton

I found it quite an interesting read. A few things that stood out to me were the following:

  1. If you want to pinpoint one guy who has maybe contributed the most to develop ChatGPT then Ilya Sutskever would be my choice. He actually had the idea to combine the Transformer logic developed by Google with a neural network trained on speech. A rather well known artifact is that actually Google invented this but didn’t really understand its significance. The flip side is that Sutskever was not very successful in kicking out Sam Altman during the OpenAI palace coup.
  2. What I find the most perplexing aspect of this all is, that even the super experts like Sutskever don’t really understand how these models suddenly develop capabilities that they were not explicitly trained for. Andrej Karpathy once described it as “summoning a ghost from the machine”. I guess that also might be one of the reasons why some of the people involved developed quasi religious feelings about these models.
  3. However, what the experts understood early on is that more compute makes these models more capable. Later on, they also discovered that more data for training has the same effect. So the “more compute” mantra has been there since quite some time.
  4. Another really fascinating aspect of the book is, how small the group of people actually is who is behind this now world changing technology. Essentially, it is a few hundred people who mostly know each other, maybe even hated each other and often have lived in the same house for some time as “AI researcher houses” seem to have been a big thing some years ago,
  5. Equally interesting is how the author describes that Google almost lost the race. As many big companies there was a lot of infighting at Google. The main issue seems to have been that Google researchers are mostly working for themselves with no real coordination. So for quite some time, they lacked the computational resources to improve the LLMs because they could not pool enough internal capacity.  There was Google Brain and Deep Mind who both worked on certain aspects of AI, but didn’t fully understand the significance of Chatbots.

    Google management was also cautious because they feared for their cash cow, the  search business. According to the book, the return of founder Sergey Brin changed things dramatically. Although he officially only worked as a programmer, one phone call from him would suddenly make things happen. But I think Google was really close to becoming another Microsoft (which almost missed the internet and fully missed mobile)….
  6. The book also shines a light on the two main “faiths” in the AI race: Amodei & Co who are more on the Doomer side and campaigning for “pacing the frontier” and the “Accelerationists” who claim that this technology needs to be pushed forward as quickly as possible to create “heaven on earth” and 10% GDP growth p.a.. The accelerationist were headed (among others) by none other than Jensen Huang, the just fired CEO of Nvidia. With the results of the midterms and Jensen’s firing, one could expect that now the more cautious people prevail at least for some time.
  7. The book doesn’t try to predict the future, which I find very good. It is clearly a chronicle and doesn’t try to predict something that cannot be predicted.

Overall, I think the book allows a unique view into the ecosystem of AI experts, their beliefs and also their sometimes significant personal shortcomings.

Tf you want to read this book, now is probably the time , as already a lot of stuff is happening and history is moving fast these days.


The chapter of that history will be written most likely by the end of this week when Anthropic goes public.

What a time to be alive.

Some links 30/2026

Rob Vinall’s latest “Postcard from China” is worth reading

The Outsider’s Corner Substack with an interesting write-up on Swedish HoldCo Spiltan AB

Andreq Brown with a look into Softbank’s current “sum of part” value and some bizarre special effects

Alex from Slow Compounding has sold Dino Polska and explains why in great detail

John Hempton shares how AI has (negatively) disrupted hiring and other similar activities which so far have depended on a manageable amount of qualified inquiries

Jeremy’s (Fox Castle Holding) 31 things he has learned over his investing career

Interesting story about a quasi secret “weight growth” drug that makes american cows bigger but also more sick and with unknown effects on Beef consumers

Wise Plc – Short update after one year

1 year since investing/writing

A little bit more than a year ago, I wrote up and invested into Wise Plc. In general, I do think it makes sense to review an investment a little bit more “formally” after one year which so far, I haven’t done on a regular basis.

The investment thesis back then was that Wise is a fast growing specialist payment/remittance company that also had a kind of short term catalyst in the form of an additional US listing.

After around 1 year, Wise doesn’t look like a big winner and the US listing turned out to be a doozie after a short run up just before the listing:

The Half year 2027 numbers:

Business has done quite well. Yesterday, Wise published official half year numbers for their FY 2027. Customers, deposits, volumes are all up between 21-33%:

Guidance for the full year was decent, despite significant investments into the business:

If we assume revenue growth would be 20% and EBT is 25%, I would actually end up with an EPS of 0,56 USD / 0,42 GBP or an P/E of 22 in a positive case. If we assume Which is kind of OK but not cheap yet (Edit: The initial post had mixed up USD and GBP and a lower P/E, sorry).

However, if we look at the actual net income development, we can see that operating costs increased significantly quicker in the first 6M than revenue which leads to an “only” single digit EPS increase despite a share buyback program:

That’s only an 8% EPS increase which, compared to the headline number looks quite slim.

My French intern also pointed out that last year’s first half had a negative one-off charge of ~28 mn for transaction costsOn the other hand, there also seems to have been a 15 mn USD one off for the US listing.

What is especially surprising in my opinion are the pretty drastic increases in “Servicing” and “G&A”. These two categories do not necessarily look like investments in contrast to technology & Marketing and sales. As we see later, the increase in servicing costs seems to be driven by increased compliance cost, whereas the increase of G&A was attributed to “Compliance costs with the US listing”:

Another point to watch is the Tech spend. Increasing the tech spend by 51% is very significant and a little bit puzzling, as many other players claim that using LLMs (Claude Code &Co) is increasing productivity dramatically. They mention that they shipped much more updates, but overall, there doesn’t seem to be a lot of scaling at the moment. Maybe this is by design, maybe not.

Potential explanations for the rather disappointing performance

So what were the reasons for that mediocre share price performance despite a slightly disappointing EPS development ? In my opinion, these three factors negatively affected the share price:

  1. The EU fraud investigation
  2. the non-approval of the US Banking license
  3. the relatively disappointing development of the whole payment sector

1) I wrote about that incident some months ago.  The good news is that this has been resolved.

The not so good news is that this seems to have driven up costs especially in the “servicing” costs:

My French intern also mentioned that initially there were two streams: An investigation by the Belgium prosecutor and a process started by the National Bank of Belgium. It is not clear if the second part is also resolved.

2) There is no news on the US banking license. They plan to re-apply but we don’t know if they made any progress. Interestingly however they spoke of winning to major US banks as clients for the “infrastructure” business for which they don’t need the banking license.

3) Peers:

I collected a few peers and only Remitly, the US based remittance specialist did relatively well. Whereas especially Adyen and Klarna did really badly.

But overall, the payment sector was clearly not a sector that was very popular over the past 12 months which clearly didn’t help Wise.

Interestingly, Payoneer, which is maybe the closest listed competitor, did quite well, too. The reason here was a take over offer from another company called Nuvei.

Nuvei itself was a listed Canadian payments firm that was taken private by PE giant Advent in 2024. So at least the PE guys still see some future for this kind of business.

It needs to be seen if a combined Nuvei/Payoneer entity becomes a more serious competitor for Wise or not.

Interesting Blog Post from Reimar Scholz

Reimar Scholz is a Munich based investor who got quite rich by buying struggling private companies for 1 EUR. He has now turned into a listed securities investor and writes a pretty decent Substack.

Just recently he wrote about payments and Wise.

For Wise, his argument is that the stock is too expensive and that there are some initiatives underway (Project Nexus, direct Link  Europe to India) that could make life harder for Wise:

Project Nexus seems to have started by the BIS and now handed over to some South East Asian National Banks. The last official announcement of this project according to Claude is from 2026 and it is rumored that something should go live in 2027.

The Europe India project is also expected to go live in 2027. This is what Claude summarized for me:

Importantly, there will still be a bank involved on both sides which will charge fees and most likely screw you on the Exchange rate.

I agree with Reimar Scholz that there are a lot of moving targets in the payment sector, but my take away is that the biggest losers will be the traditional banks, not the new players like Wise.

Summary/Conclusion:

So what is now the conclusion for me ? Should I buy more, sell or do nothing ? After some intense discussion with my French intern, I came to the conclusion that I will do nothing.

My triggers for selling have not been hit, however, business wise the number are also not good enough to increase the position despite the lower valuation. Especially the rather slow growth of EPS due to the increase in costs is something that needs to be monitored closely.

For the next quarters, it will be especially important to see if and how the expenses develop and if they may rise a little less than in the first 6M.

Quick updates: Rubis, Fielmann, Auto Trader & Rightmove

As I was on vacation last week, here is a quick summary of some quarterly updates that were released last week for companies in my portfolio:

Rubis:

Rubis reported a Q3 trading update early last week. As to be expected, the numbers continued to be quite good.

While revenue is influenced by the current oil prices, the more important numbers are volumes which are up +8% and Gross margins which are up +14%.

If we compare volumes and Gross margins with the 6M numbers, we can see that growth has decreased a tiny little bit:

But Rubis has confirmed the increased guidance from mid year.

They have also published the full set of documents for the December 9th special Shareholder meeting, so it seems that this is going according to plan as well.

The “Governance Roadshow presentation” nicely summarizes the new Managment and Supervisory board structure and Management incentive plans.

So from my perspective, the Rubis case is developing according to plan.

Fielmann:

After EssilorLuxottica published decent Q3 numbers already in October, Fielmann came out with their Q3 numbers early last week.

Organic sales growth recovered from the low 6M numbers:

Interestingly, the Hearing aid products showed the largest growth, followed by Sunglasses:

The only negative aspect here is that the US business didn’t grow and profitability declined as they are investing into new store concepts.

Filemann’s share price is now back to flat YTD while Essilor has still some way to go to reach the level from the beginning of the year:

For Fielmann, it seems that they will most likely reach their 2026 targets, but the US business still seems to be in a turn-around mode, which maybe explains the exit of the US business head earlier this year.

Auto Trader

My “Portal Pain Basket” member Auto Trader released HY numbers last week. The results are only “so so” at a first glance:

Revenues slightly declined, margins stayed constant but EPS went up due to massive buy backs. In their outlook they mention that they expect revenue growth in the second half of their financial year.

On the plus side, they report that they bought back a lot of stock at a decent price:

“During the period, a total of 55.7 million shares (H1 2026: 12.6 million) were purchased for a consideration of £269.6m (H1 2026: £100.2m) before transaction costs of £1.3m (H1 2026: £0.5m). The average price per share was 483.4p “

With a NTM P/E of 13,6x, Auto Trader is still cheap but of course without any visible growth, the upside is also limited. If they can actually return to growth in the second half, then this could get more interesting.

Rightmove

Rightmove issued a Trading update last week. The good news is that revenues have been growing at 7%, however operating profit was lagging revenue growth:

In 2027, they see similar revenue growth as in 2027 and improving operating results:

For 2027, reflecting the challenging and uncertain macro backdrop, we currently expect:

Revenue growth similar to 2026 as the current end-market dynamics are expected to continue into next year. This reflects the full-year impact of fewer New Homes developments and a subdued Estate Agency market. We expect: ARPA growth of £100-£110 Broadly flat Core membership Strategic Growth Areas growth of 20-30%

An increase in underlying operating profit growth to 4-7%. This will be driven by product launches, productivity gains and cost discipline alongside ongoing investment in

the initiatives announced in November 2025, with a margin of at least 67%

Underlying earnings per share growth of at least 10%

Considering the overall environment in the UK, this was a pretty decent trading update for Rightmove. As a (still) growing company, the slightly higher valuation compared to Auto Trader seems justified.

Some links 29/2026

A really good summary from John Huber on the current state of the AI Data Centre build out

Goldman Sachs is significantly restricting access to AI tools for its employees. Also Apple is limiting token usage for most employees.

Recommended: Dave Waters takes a look at the Belgian Expert Market (Note to myself: Check with my All Belgium Shares Series)

Prof. Damodaran with a follow up on his Anthropic valuation and some must read stuff on cost of capital

The Slow Compounding substack with a decent write-up on Nordic Serial acquirer Berner

Paraguay’s leading online bank seems to have gone under over the weekend

Moringstar with an interesting analysis on what happened to Nr.1 market cap stocks in the US over the last 100 years

Some links 28/2026

VC Legend (and future fiction author) Brad Feld on the 6 bn Binance Crypto hack (Spoiler: He thinks that Crypto is fuxxed)

Some deep thoughts on how AI will influence and change White Collar work

Prof. Damodaran with an attempt to value Anthropic (at a CoC of 9,73%)

Some deep thoughts from Ben Thompson on the future of the internet

Fundamental Value with a look at US “Mega Compounder” TransDigm

The big Music Labels (including Universal Music) are Toast according to this post from “the Honest Broker

Reimar Scholz, a very successful Munich based investor shares his mistakes and what he learned from them: Part 1 & Part 2

Verisure and Swiss Marketplace – Two more “busted IPOs” worth a second glance ?

DISCLAIMER: This is not investment advice. PLEASE DO YOUR OWN RESEARCH.

Management summary:

Following my post on the disappointing IPO of Birkenstock, I decided to look at 2 more “busted IPOs” that happened more recently, both in Autumn 2025:

Swedish listed Verisure (IPO early October 2025) and Swiss Marketplace Group (IPO mid September 2025). I actually found both of them interesting enough to justify smaller positions.

“Busted PE IPO” from Sweden: Verisure Plc

Verisure, the European leader of Home Security and Alarm systems IPOed in Stockholm in late 2025 and initially looked like a great success with a 20% “first day pop”.

This however also marked the peak of the share price so far, since then the stock has been going down:

The low was reached in the beginning of October with around 8 EUR per share when the initial lock downs expired.

Verisure was IPOed at around 16x EV/EBITDA and is now trading at ~8 NTM EV EBITDA .

This seems to be attractive enough that a few days ago, the FT leaked that another PE, this time CVC is interested in taking the company private again after only 12 months of being a listed company.

Verisure itself looks like a potential “Compounder stock” and has been written up already on a few Substacks, for instance on “Best Anchor Stocks”.

With the CVC rumour however, Verisure for me is rather an early stage “Special Situation” opportunity than a longer term investment.

Shareholder Structure:

One interesting aspect of the current shareholder structure is that the Pre-IPO shareholders are still the dominating shareholder Group. Best Anchor stocks has summarized this quite well:

Verisure is still controlled by its pre-IPO owners. The company listed on 8 October 2025 at €13.25 per share, but only around 26% of the company was sold in the IPO. As of 31 December 2025, the largest shareholders were:

  • Hellman & Friedman: 43.7%
  • Eiffel Investment (linked to Singapore’s GIC): 16.0%
  • Alba (Corporación Financiera Alba): 6.3%
  • Securholds: 5.4%. This is the vehicle of Luis Gil, a long-time Verisure executive and current board member. It bought about €185 million of shares in the IPO at €13.25, and the lock-up specifically allowed it to pledge its shares as collateral for the debt used to finance that purchase. This is a stake worth watching with the stock around 40% below the IPO price: share-backed loans usually come with loan-to-value covenants, so a further drop could force a sale regardless of what the fundamentals say.
  • Management and former employees: about 3% (the CEO alone holds about 1%)

The above simply shows that roughly 70% of the shares are held by investors who will, sooner or later, want to sell (or at least have the option to). At today’s share price, H&F’s stake alone is worth around €3.7 billion, close to half of Verisure’s market cap. The lock-up calendar looks like this:

  • 180 days for the large shareholders (H&F, Eiffel, Alba, Securholds): expired in early April 2026, so they can already sell. It’s a “known issue” by now.
  • 365 days for board members and senior management: expires right about now (October 2026), with other management shares released in phases over the following 3-12 months.
  • Orderly marketing agreement until October 2027 (extendable in six-month increments up to October 2029): sales by existing investors need H&F’s consent and are typically coordinated through block trades.

So basically CVC can negotiate with H&F for 70% of the shares which makes it a rather simple process. A very likely outcome of an negotiation would be that H&F and the other shareholders will need to “roll” part of their exposure into a new deal with CVC which will reduce the required cheque size-

Simplified Special situation calculation

Now one can speculate at what price H&F and the others would be willing to sell. A very simple assumption would be that they want to see the IPO price of 13,25 EUR.

This would equal a premium of around 40% to the price before the “rumour leak” and in line what one has seen in similar Nordic PE buy-outs in the past.

Based on this assumptions, we can calculate a very simple “expected fair value” for Verisure:

Assuming a 50% probability for a deal at 13,25 EUR and a 50% non-deal probability with the stock going back down to 9 EUR, the expected value of the stock would be 0,5*13,25+ 0,5*9 = 11,13 EUR or ~11% higher than the current share price at the time of writing.

One can now try to make more elaborate scenarios but in principle this looks quite attractive, especially as under Swedish rules, a deal could happen rather quickly if the parties agree.

Summary Verisure

For that reason, I established a 1,5% position for my “special Situation” bucket at a share price of slightly below 10 EUR per share. I sized this rather small as it is not clear if a deal is actually happening. If CVC officially calls the deal off, I will sell. If a formal offer is made, I will revisit the position.

Swiss Marketplaces AG

Following my “UK Portal Pain basket” post from late September, one reader actually suggested in the comment to look at Swiss Marketplaces AG (SMG).

After a second look, I actually got more excited about the stock. SMG is the clear number 1 in Switzerland, both, for Real estate and Cars (so like an Autotrader and Rightmove combined), plus they own some smaller comparison sites in Switzerland.

Interestingly, the origin of the two main portals, Immoscout24 Schweiz and Autoscout24 Schweiz was the German Scout Group that sold these two portals in 2014 to Swiss publisher Ringier.

In 2021 then, these two portals merged with their main Swiss competitor TX Markets (owned by listed TX Group) to the Swiss MArketplaces Group.

As mentioned in the beginning, SMG IPOed in autumn 2025 and looking at the stock chart we can see that similar to Verisure, the IPO was the peak of the price range so far:

Compared to the “old parent” Scout24 Group, SMG has performed significantly worse over the past 12 months:

And this despite very solid operating numbers. for the first 6M in 2026, sales were up +11% and EBITDA +17%:

This chart from the 6M results presentation shows how dominant they are in virtually every area in Switzerland:

AI threat

As mentioned in my “Portal Pain basket” post, I think that especially real estate and car portals will not be disrupted by AI agents or similar tools any time soon.

I am more sceptical about travel, but SMG has no exposure to travel.

Shareholder structure:

As in Verisure’s case, the Pre-IPO owners are still the majority owners of SMG:

The biggest investors are the two Swiss publishing Groups TX Group and Ringier. In a recent transaction, Swiss Insurer Mobiliar sold ~7,5% of SMG’s shares at 28,50 CHF per share. Interestingly, TX Group bought ~3% of MSG and SMG itself bought back 1%. According to this article, Mobiliar has agreed to a further lock-up until March 2027 following the placement.

TX Group is now at 34,9%. According to the Articles of Association of SMG, the crossing of the 35% threshold would trigger a mandatory take over offer by TX Group.

So with Mobiliar selling down, there is clearly fear of a stock overhang in the market which might explain the relative underperformance to Scout24. I also assume that General Atlantic, a US based PE investor will not stay forever. Interestingly, also Ringier reduced its stake before and during the IPO from initially 29,5% to the current 19%. Only TX Group seems to have not sold shares, but as mentioned above, bought more.

As a result, the valuation of SMG is for a Swiss stock, quite moderate. At ~19x NTM P/E, SMG is valued in line with Scout24. Leverage is quite low (below 1x Net Debt/EBITDA) and with ~3,4% the stock has an attractive dividend yield for a Swiss stock.

What I find interesting is that SMG clearly has some runway to increase profitability. Scout24 for instance has an EBIT margin of ~50% whereas SMG “only” shows 35%. Especially the “other marketplaces” seem to have some room to improve profitability.

There is clearly the stock overhang especially from Mobiliar, but operationally SMG seems to perform quite well and the Swiss economy is doing better than many of their neighbours.

So the stock overhang “blues” might actually represent a good opportunity to get a quality asset at a reasonable price.

Summary:

Overall I find SMG quite attractive as a potential 4th member of my “Portal Pain basket”. Compared to Scout24 in Germany, I like the better diversification and the exposure to a country that performs much better economically.

Therefore I decided to allocate 2% of the portfolio into SMG at current prices of ~29,50 CHF per share.

I could actually think of making it an even bigger position if they continue to perform well operationally and the stock keeps being depressed because of more selling from some of the large shareholders.

Birkenstock – Cheap enough to be interesting or is it the next Dr. Martens “Fashion Fiasco” ?

Management Summary:

This is a more superficial look into Birkenstock, a much hyped IPO from 2023 which now trades at 12,5x NTM P/E. Despite still growing at “mid teens”, I could not build up the conviction to start a position, as it is really hard to judge for how much longer the “Birkenstock hype” will continue. I also took a quick look at Dr. Martens, which is a prime example for a broken fashion trend. Maybe not directly comparable to Birkenstock, but still a warning sign.

The 2023 IPO “flip”

Birkenstock, the famous German “health sandal” maker went public 3 years ago. The IPO price was USD 46 (upper end of the range) and already on day 1, the stock dropped to around 40 USD.

Interestingly, the PE investor L. Catterton only bought Birkenstock in 2021. Back then it was estimated that the purchase price was ~4 bn EUR. So IPOing in 2023 is a pretty “quick flip” in PE terms.

In between, things looked a little bit better and the stock reached ~60 USD in 2024. Fast forward to today, and the stock trades at around 32 USD at quite cheap multiples:

TIKR says next year’s P/E is only 12,5x. Looking at the financials, we can see that since 2023, both sales and profits increased significantly, however, things have been slowing a little bit lately.

L. Catterton, the Private Equity arm of LVMH owner Bernard Arnault still owns 43% and Arnault’s family holding, Financiere Agache another 6%, but they have been selling shares. A few weeks ago in August, L. Catterton sold shares for around 1 bn EUR, of which Birkenstock bought back a relevant amount.

Looking at the shorter term share price, this sale by L. Catterton clearly did not infuse a lot of confidence in other Brikenstock shareholders which leaves the share price very close to all time lows:

Interestingly, according to their latest investor update, sales are still strong and growing in the “mid teens”, both in their own retail channel (DTC) and wholesale:

In contrast to other more high end luxury brands, the exposure to Asia and specifically China seems to be rather limited.

One point one has to give L. Catterton is that they managed to increase sales by +50% within 2 years as this chart from the IPO prospectus shows:

The problem of course was that the valuation at IPO which, in true PE fashion was north of 20x EV/EBITDA, was clearly too high. Now, at a much compressed 8x NTM EV/EBITDA, this looks more reasonable.

This Chart from TIKR nicely shows how multiples have been compressed since the IPO:

Will the Birkenstock “Fashion Trend” continue ?

A big issue is clearly if the “Birkenstock fashion trend” will run out of steam at some time.

Originally, Birkenstocks were nerdy “health sandals” often worn by office workers in technical professions like engineers or programmers.

When I was a student, I did an internship at Siemens and I remember that a lot of the engineers had (white) Bikenstocks at their desks in which they changed in the morning and would walk around all day in the office. That looked quite odd especially with those who actually wore a suit.

This is a picture of a classic Birkenstock sandal:

And if you ever were on vacation with a lot of Germans in the summer, this look might be familiar to you:

Birkenstock became fashionable in the Mid 2010s. Before that, especially in the US, Birkenstocks were considered “hippie style” but that changed when Birkenstock teamed up with famous design labels to create more fashionable versions.

Interlude: Dr. Martens – the famous example for a footwear fashion brand that is not so fashionable anymore

A famous example for an explosive run-up and spectacular drop of an iconic shoewear brand is UK footwear brand Dr. Martens.

Dr. Martens was IPOed in January 2021 by PE shop Permira, which owned the company for 7 years. As we can see in the chart, after the first day “pop”, the stock went south pretty much soon thereafter and has now lost -85% from the initial IPO price:

Looking at the financials, we can see that Dr. Martens only managed to show 2 more years of double digit growth after the IPO before sales declined significantly and profits even more so:

That’s clearly not enough if you IPO a company at 20x EV/EBITDA which Permira did. Interestingly, Permira still owns ~38% of the company.

Reading the 2022 annual report, where they show 18% sales growth, the growth story still seems to be intact:

In 2023, lower than anticipated growth was blamed on the botched transfer of a US distribution center:

In 2024, the sales decline was blamed on cautious wholesale customers:

However, looking at the previous year report, one could already see that wholesale had declined and the brand only grew by opening a lot of new stores.

There are a couple of articles on why Dr. Martens became unpopular especially in the US. Overstocking after Covid and heavy discounts is one reason, but also moving the production from the UK to Asia is often mentioned (although that seemed to have happened long time ago in the early 2000s).

There seem to have been challenger brands like Solovair and Blundstone. Solovair boots interestingly seem to be manufactured in Dr. Marten’s old factory in the UK.

Their latest report from May 2026 still shows a decline in sales but a certain recovery in (adjusted) profits:

So turning around a once hyped but then struggling footwear brand is clearly not that easy.

It doesn’t help that a lot of other footwear brands have very weak stock charts, too, with the exception of Crocs:

Back to Birkenstock:

Overall I find Birkenstock quite interesting but it is clearly not an easy stock. For full transparency, I am not a “Birkenstock person”, I have never owned a pair and will most likely never own one. But still, it could be a potentially interesting “broken IPO” story as long as growth remains in the mid teens.

My gut feeling tells me that Birkenstock is less “fancy” than Dr. Martens and compared to Dr. Martens for instance, Birkenstocks are still produced in Germany, not in Asia.

However, there are already a lot of similar smaller brands that sell similar shoes for much lower prices than Birkenstock, for instance this one or even Sandals that are manufactured in German prisons.

Dr. Martens clearly shows that when a trend breaks, it can take a very long time to recover, if at all.

The comparison of Dr. Martins and Birkenstock is also a great use case for an AI analysis/report. In this case, I asked Claude to research the similarities and differences between Birkenstock and Dr. Martens and I have to say that the result was quite interesting.

This is Claude’s summary:

I would certainly not base any investment decision on this, but it confirms my feeling that Birkenstock is not exactly on the same trajectory as Dr. Martens a few years earlier. But clearly there is a risk that they might not grow at 15% for many more years, which the current share price seems to expect as well.

A big learning in any case is (and this is no surprise) that you should avoid investing into PE sponsored IPOs of some hot footwear brands at a valuation of 20x EV/EBITDA or more.

The PE guys definitely know when to sell and as an investor, you should not try to outsmart PE guys at an IPO. Maybe there is one out of 10 that is doing really good, but the probability is slim.

When you look at Private Equity portfolios which often have average valuations of 16-18 x EV/EBITDA, it is clearly not a surprise that IPOing or selling them at these valuations are not easy.

For Birkenstock, I will watch the company but at the time of writing, I could not build enough confidence to start a position despite the quite attractive valuation.

I think especially the massive sales of L. Catterton just a few weeks ago does not create a lot of confidence that growth will remain at mid teens levels for that long.

Some links 27/2026

Morningstar with a list of potentially undervalued luxury stocks

Very interesting deep dive from Edelweiss Capital into the Question how AI Agents will influence OTAs (Booking etc.)

Abbott Laboratories is planning a major spin-off in 2027

Thoughtful Q3 letter from Greenkeepers Asset Management

Govro from Wintergems with an update on Champagne and other alcoholic spirit companies

Tomas Puyo with a fantastic deep dive on what’s wrong with French education

Jeremy from French Hidden Champions with a short “manifest to invest into French stocks”

« Older Entries