Category Archives: Private Equity

Private Equity Series (7): Secondaries – The Magic Money Machine for the PE industry 

Previous Episodes of the Private Equity (Mini) Series:

Private Equity Mini Series (1): My IRR is not your Performance
Private Equity Mini series (2) – What kind of “Alpha” can you expect from Private Equity as a Retail Investor compared to public stocks ?
Private Equity Mini Series (3): Listed Private Asset Managers (KKR, Apollo & Co)
Private Equity Mini series (4) : “Investing like a “billionaire” for retail investors in the UK stock market via PE Trusts
Private Equity Mini Series (5): Trade Republic offers Private Equity for the masses (ELTIFs) -“Nice try, but hell no”
Private Equity (Mini) Series 6: Private Equity for the masses – Y2K edition

Background:

Maybe a quick word why I am doing this series on Private Equity: 

I have to admit that I am fascinated by the PE industry as such and whatever happens there has a definite impact on the stock market, either through take-privates or IPOs or other more indirect developments (Private Credit boom etc.).

In addition, as Private Equity is now targeting more and more retail investors, I want to provide some background information as currently these products are sold on a very “asymmetric” basis. There is very little objective information available about these products besides the glossy sales pitches.

I am very much afraid that many retail investors will regret putting money into Retail structures in a few years from now.

What are PE “Secondaries” anyway ?

There are two things that I really do really admire from the Private Equity industry: First, that they managed to keep their 2/20 fee schedule since their beginnings in the 1980s and never shared any “scale economics” with investors. And second, that they are very creative in finding new ways to sell their product.

I have been discussing the relatively new retail products already but a similar big trend in Private Equity are socalled “Secondary Funds”.

Secondary funds come in many flavors but the main one is to buy Private Equity assets from unhappy investors and sell them to new investors. There are two different “flavours” of this:

  1. Secondary LP Fund stakes

Here, existing investors want to sell their Fund stakes (“Limited Partner”, LP) for one reason or the other. As these are illiquid and often intransparent vehicles, buyers will only buy them for a certain discount. 

  1. GP Led secondaries / Continuation vehicles

In those cases, the PE manager (“General Partner”, GP) cannot exit an investment inside a fund via the normal route of an IPO or M&A transaction and is looking for new LPs to which he can sell these company stakes to, also often at a discount to the last valuation in the fund..

The FT had a recent article that both types of secondary transactions are booming. 

The article speculates that in 2026, the total volume of secondary deals could be up to 50% higher:

This is even more remarkable as fundraising for “primary” i.e. new funds has declined significantly in 2025. So secondaries are the only bright spot for PE firms at the moment.

The big question is of course: Who is selling all these stakes and who is buying it ? The first question is rather difficult to answer, as those transactions are mostly private.

The second question is much easier to answer: The Private Equity industry is buying all these stakes and “repackaging them” as Secondary funds and selling them again to institutional investors, quite often to those who were selling those primary stakes in the first place.

But why would institutional investors do this ? The answer is surprisingly simple: 

It’s an accounting trick.

I had linked to a Morningstar post already last year where this was nicely explained:

So just to compare this with a listed stock fund. Italian Holding company Exor SPA (famous for its stake in Ferrari) has currently an NAV of around 180 EUR per share but only a share price of 70 EUR.

If a portfolio manager buys a share of Exor, he might think that the share is worth more than 70 EUR, but the share will be valued at 70 EUR in his portfolio. The actual share price will need to rise in order to be able to show a positive performance.

If he would be a PE guy and Exor would be a secondary stake in an unlisted portfolio company,, he could mark up that share immediately from 70 to 180 EUR and show more than 150% profit without the market price moving a cent. This sounds crazy, right ?

But this is exactly what Private Equity is doing with secondaries:

You buy the asset as a discount and (almost always) on day one, you can actually write-up the asset to the NAV stated by the Fund Manager and show a so-called “day one profit”.

The higher the discount, the better and the better the “performance” of the Secondary fund.

Interestingly, in the current environment, both Private Equity Managers and investors love it.

The PE managers obviously because they can “recycle” their old stuff and in many cases can earn an additional fee layer on top of the existing fees in the underlying funds.

Investors love it because the performance looks so good right from (and especially from) the start. In traditional PE, you normally have to wait a few years until you see significant positive performance as a lot of the initial costs drag down Fund performance (J Curve).

So buying into these secondary funds looks like a brilliant investment decision despite the double layer of Private Equity fees that these investors are often paying.

This is wath Gemini Nano Banana came up with when I asked it to illustrate the mechanics and I think it’s absolutely brilliant:

But can it last ?

The main argument and the “story” of the PE industry is that those discounts are purely “liquidity discounts”, i.e. the sacrifice that “forced sellers” of these stakes have to endure and therefore presents more or less a “free lunch” for buyers.

On the other hand, it is no secret that many market participants think that stated NAVs and valuations of most PE funds are not realistic. 

I have personally witnessed a situation where the valuation of a PE fund dropped from 130% of invested capital to 60% (i.e. -50%) in 9 months due to “structural changes” at the PE firm.

Personally, I do think that “true” liquidity discounts only represent a small minority of the deals and that a much larger share of those discounts are more realistic assumptions on the actual values of PE funds and their constituents.

Many of the sellers are rather sophisticated addresses that will not sell a really good fund at a large discount.

Maybe a big rebound for “Value” and “Old Economy” stocks will narrow the over-valuations. On the other hand, the current carnage in Saas stocks creates new problems for funds exposed to that sector (Thomas Bravo for instance) which used to be one of the few bright spots.

In any case, the “Day one game” only works as long as “fresh money” is coming into a product. Once the fresh money stops, there are no new “day one gains”.

What’s the take away for private investors ?

As those secondary transactions are also quite popular to juice up returns in the short run for retail PE structures (ELTIFS etc.), this is one more reason to stay away from those fee laden, intransparent structures.

This is for instance from the July report of the EQT ELTIF (sold by Trade republic):

Boosting the “performance” just by buying a new asset is a great thing to have if you are a Private Equity retail fund.

And of course, some “smart” people are trying to play this game in public markets, too. Swiss liste company Matador for instance does exactly the same. Buying secondary stakes at a discount and then marking them up right away.

If you are an institutional investor, you should check if the fund prospectus contains information on what percentage of the performance is generated through “one day gains” and what is generated through actual performance.

Especially those secondary funds that contain the most overvalued PE funds might see a very “rude awakening” in the coming months/quarters when those NAVs might be revised downwards and those “day one gains” disappear.

Until then, the music is still playing…..again illustrated nicely by Nano Banana:

Bonus Song: Let the music play – Barry White

Barry White – Let The Music Play (Official Music Video)

Private Equity (Mini) Series 6: Private Equity for the masses – Y2K edition

Previous Episodes of the Private Equity (Mini) Series:

Private Equity Mini Series (1): My IRR is not your Performance
Private Equity Mini series (2) – What kind of “Alpha” can you expect from Private Equity as a Retail Investor compared to public stocks ?
Private Equity Mini Series (3): Listed Private Asset Managers (KKR, Apollo & Co)
Private Equity Mini series (4) : “Investing like a “billionaire” for retail investors in the UK stock market via PE Trusts
Private Equity Mini Series (5): Trade Republic offers Private Equity for the masses (ELTIFs) -“Nice try, but hell no”

Time Machine: Y2K

Some of the older readers of my blog might have active memories about the year 2000. There was the so-called “2YK Scare” in the late 1990ies, the fear that computer systems (and planes) would crash when the year 2000 would start. Of course it didn’t happen, the Dot.com bubble got pumped up once more and the rest is history.

Another event that got less attention was the that back in the year 2000, the now long gone Dresdner Bank issued a Certificate (which is a popular structure in Germany to give retail investors exposure to anything) that was actually a bond linked to the long term returns of an underlying Private Equity Portfolio managed by Swiss PE manager Partners Group. The very same Partners Group that now has teamed up with Deutsche Bank to run an ELTIF.

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Private Equity Mini Series (5): Trade Republic offers Private Equity for the masses (ELTIFs) -“Nice try, but hell no” 

Previous episodes in this series:

Private Equity Mini Series (1): My IRR is not your Performance
Private Equity Mini series (2) – What kind of “Alpha” can you expect from Private Equity as a Retail Investor compared to public stocks ?
Private Equity Mini Series (3): Listed Private Asset Managers (KKR, Apollo & Co)
Private Equity Mini series (4) : “Investing like a “billionaire” for retail investors in the UK stock market via PE Trusts

Management summary:

In this post of the “Private Equity Mini series”, I look a little bit deeper into a Retail Private Equity offering (ELTIF) that has been distributed to 10 mn clients of German Neo Broker Trade Republic since last week (including myself).

There were a lot of articles in the German press trying to explain the product and the associated fees, which in my opinion were mostly wrong. Not surprisingly, as it is extremely difficult to find out what these vehicles actually charge in fees and costs. I’ll therefore concentrate only on the fees and expected returns.

As a spoiler, I do not think that the return expectations of 12-15% p.a. net after fees and costs are anywhere close to reality. I would go as far and even call this “miss selling” as these levels would be “best case” outcomes in my opinion.

Fees and cost based on my estimates will be between 4-7% p.a. (for the deal that I analysed) depending on the performance of the underlying assets and overall returns are dragged further down by the required cash allocation.

I also think that the regulator should here require a full and fair disclosure of Total Expense ratios (including all fees and costs) for different gross return scenarios. For a normal investor, it is close to impossible to gain this information, even for a professional it is hard to estimate based on the provided documentation.

Due to the effort of analyzing the fee structure, I did not have the motivation to look into issues like liquidity windows, early redemption panalties etc. as it just makes things worse for the retail investor.

In the case of the analyzed “Single Manager” EQT Nexus product, the whole purpose of giving private investors access to Private Equity is an actual waste of time, as investors can easily get a very similar exposure with a much better return/risk profile simply by investing into the underlying share of EQT.

In any case, a low cost, diversified Equity ETF will most likely outperform these retail Private Equity structures significantly in the mid- to long term. Although I have analysed only one fee structure, I do think that the main take-aways are applicable to most similar “Semi liquid” structures targeted towards retail investors.

Here is the “full monty” on 18 pages if you are interested in the details.

I have a link for the fee model in the pdf but you can also send me an Email/message if you like to receive it.

Private Equity Mini series (4) : “Investing like a “billionaire” for retail investors in the UK stock market via PE Trusts

Private Equity Mini series (4) : “Investing like a “billionaire” for retail investors in the UK stock market via PE Trusts

This is the 4th part of my Private Equity “mini” series. The previous posts can be found here:

Private Equity Mini Series (1): My IRR is not your Performance
Private Equity Mini series (2) – What kind of “Alpha” can you expect from Private Equity as a Retail Investor compared to public stocks ?
Private Equity Mini Series (3): Listed Private Asset Managers (KKR, Apollo & Co)

Background:

Not sure if this is mainly a German phenomenon, but you can’t listen to a German finance podcast without being quite aggressively advertised on how Private Equity is finally being democratized through some “revolutionary” retail offerings that almost always are quite complicated and contain another layer of fees on top of what the PE guys are charging.

The main pitch is that now even the small guy on the street can do what previously only billionaires could do: Invest into Private Equity and make boat loads of money.

The hard truth is that Private Equity has been democratized long ago in the UK but no one gives a sh** about it.

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Private Equity Mini Series (3): Listed Private Asset Managers (KKR, Apollo & Co)

Background:

After part 2 of the Private Equity Mini series a few days ago, I wanted to focus on how to access the asset class as a private investor via the “normal” capital markets.

Currently, the PE industry and the broader “Private Asset” industry is massively trying to lure private investors into its Fund offering via a variety of “NEW” and usually structured instruments, such as “ELTIFS” in Europe or lobbying hard in the US to get access to private investors.

In the past, Private Assets, including its subgroups like Buyout, Venture, Growth, Infrastructure and Private Credit were “exclusive” to larger institutional investors and Ultra High Net Worth individuals.

These days, with declining commitments from those traditional investors, the PE industry now tries to access the vast pools of money that smaller, private investors collectively own.

Often you hear the pitch that now is the time to “democratize” the asset class, which is an expression that should make the targeted investors extremely nervous. I had linked to the excellent Bain PE report already in one of the link collections.

A key slide of the report is the one that shows that for the Buy-out category, 2024 was the first year ever with declining AuM:

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Private Equity Mini series (2) – What kind of “Alpha” can you expect from Private Equity as a Retail Investor compared to public stocks ?

Management summary:

In this post I wanted to dig a little deeper on why I think that many currently offered Retail Private Equity offerings (e.g. ELTIFS) will most likely underperform public equity markets going forward. Despite some structural advantages of Private Equity as such, the double layer of fees and costs will be a huge drag on performance. On top of that, historic tailwinds for the PE industry (low interest rates and low purchase multiples) have most likely disappeared.

Introduction:

After the first installment of this mini series, where I tried to explain why stated PE IRRs should not be confused with actual performance, I wanted to briefly touch another important point in order to understand this “asset class” better:

Many Private Equity players claim that both, past returns and future returns of Private equity will be significantly better than comparable indices of listed equity. 

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Private Equity Mini Series (1): My IRR is not your Performance

These days, more and more offerings for Private Investors are popping up to participate in Private Equity, which until now was mostly exclusive for Institutional investors and very wealthy people. In Europe, the socalled ELTIF II format allows now fund companies to directly target individual investors from as low as a few thousand EUR.

Private Equity in my opinion has its place. The good Private Equity funds are indeed “value investors” that have a decent ability to identify undervalued assets. However, Private Equity Investing also is not directly comparable with investing into public markets.

In particular, any prospective investors should take any returns stated by PE funds with a grain of salt and I want to explain why these “PE IRRs” cannot be directly compared with Stock market performance. This is due to 2 main differences:

Critical point 1: IRR calculation – critical assumption: Reinvestment at the IRR is possible

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