Category Archives: Accounting Tricks

Birkenstock – Cheap enough to be interesting or is it the next Dr. Martens “Fashion Fiasco” ?

Management Summary:

This is a more superficial look into Birkenstock, a much hyped IPO from 2023 which now trades at 12,5x NTM P/E. Despite still growing at “mid teens”, I could not build up the conviction to start a position, as it is really hard to judge for how much longer the “Birkenstock hype” will continue. I also took a quick look at Dr. Martens, which is a prime example for a broken fashion trend. Maybe not directly comparable to Birkenstock, but still a warning sign.

The 2023 IPO “flip”

Birkenstock, the famous German “health sandal” maker went public 3 years ago. The IPO price was USD 46 (upper end of the range) and already on day 1, the stock dropped to around 40 USD.

Interestingly, the PE investor L. Catterton only bought Birkenstock in 2021. Back then it was estimated that the purchase price was ~4 bn EUR. So IPOing in 2023 is a pretty “quick flip” in PE terms.

In between, things looked a little bit better and the stock reached ~60 USD in 2024. Fast forward to today, and the stock trades at around 32 USD at quite cheap multiples:

TIKR says next year’s P/E is only 12,5x. Looking at the financials, we can see that since 2023, both sales and profits increased significantly, however, things have been slowing a little bit lately.

L. Catterton, the Private Equity arm of LVMH owner Bernard Arnault still owns 43% and Arnault’s family holding, Financiere Agache another 6%, but they have been selling shares. A few weeks ago in August, L. Catterton sold shares for around 1 bn EUR, of which Birkenstock bought back a relevant amount.

Looking at the shorter term share price, this sale by L. Catterton clearly did not infuse a lot of confidence in other Brikenstock shareholders which leaves the share price very close to all time lows:

Interestingly, according to their latest investor update, sales are still strong and growing in the “mid teens”, both in their own retail channel (DTC) and wholesale:

In contrast to other more high end luxury brands, the exposure to Asia and specifically China seems to be rather limited.

One point one has to give L. Catterton is that they managed to increase sales by +50% within 2 years as this chart from the IPO prospectus shows:

The problem of course was that the valuation at IPO which, in true PE fashion was north of 20x EV/EBITDA, was clearly too high. Now, at a much compressed 8x NTM EV/EBITDA, this looks more reasonable.

This Chart from TIKR nicely shows how multiples have been compressed since the IPO:

Will the Birkenstock “Fashion Trend” continue ?

A big issue is clearly if the “Birkenstock fashion trend” will run out of steam at some time.

Originally, Birkenstocks were nerdy “health sandals” often worn by office workers in technical professions like engineers or programmers.

When I was a student, I did an internship at Siemens and I remember that a lot of the engineers had (white) Bikenstocks at their desks in which they changed in the morning and would walk around all day in the office. That looked quite odd especially with those who actually wore a suit.

This is a picture of a classic Birkenstock sandal:

And if you ever were on vacation with a lot of Germans in the summer, this look might be familiar to you:

Birkenstock became fashionable in the Mid 2010s. Before that, especially in the US, Birkenstocks were considered “hippie style” but that changed when Birkenstock teamed up with famous design labels to create more fashionable versions.

Interlude: Dr. Martens – the famous example for a footwear fashion brand that is not so fashionable anymore

A famous example for an explosive run-up and spectacular drop of an iconic shoewear brand is UK footwear brand Dr. Martens.

Dr. Martens was IPOed in January 2021 by PE shop Permira, which owned the company for 7 years. As we can see in the chart, after the first day “pop”, the stock went south pretty much soon thereafter and has now lost -85% from the initial IPO price:

Looking at the financials, we can see that Dr. Martens only managed to show 2 more years of double digit growth after the IPO before sales declined significantly and profits even more so:

That’s clearly not enough if you IPO a company at 20x EV/EBITDA which Permira did. Interestingly, Permira still owns ~38% of the company.

Reading the 2022 annual report, where they show 18% sales growth, the growth story still seems to be intact:

In 2023, lower than anticipated growth was blamed on the botched transfer of a US distribution center:

In 2024, the sales decline was blamed on cautious wholesale customers:

However, looking at the previous year report, one could already see that wholesale had declined and the brand only grew by opening a lot of new stores.

There are a couple of articles on why Dr. Martens became unpopular especially in the US. Overstocking after Covid and heavy discounts is one reason, but also moving the production from the UK to Asia is often mentioned (although that seemed to have happened long time ago in the early 2000s).

There seem to have been challenger brands like Solovair and Blundstone. Solovair boots interestingly seem to be manufactured in Dr. Marten’s old factory in the UK.

Their latest report from May 2026 still shows a decline in sales but a certain recovery in (adjusted) profits:

So turning around a once hyped but then struggling footwear brand is clearly not that easy.

It doesn’t help that a lot of other footwear brands have very weak stock charts, too, with the exception of Crocs:

Back to Birkenstock:

Overall I find Birkenstock quite interesting but it is clearly not an easy stock. For full transparency, I am not a “Birkenstock person”, I have never owned a pair and will most likely never own one. But still, it could be a potentially interesting “broken IPO” story as long as growth remains in the mid teens.

My gut feeling tells me that Birkenstock is less “fancy” than Dr. Martens and compared to Dr. Martens for instance, Birkenstocks are still produced in Germany, not in Asia.

However, there are already a lot of similar smaller brands that sell similar shoes for much lower prices than Birkenstock, for instance this one or even Sandals that are manufactured in German prisons.

Dr. Martens clearly shows that when a trend breaks, it can take a very long time to recover, if at all.

The comparison of Dr. Martins and Birkenstock is also a great use case for an AI analysis/report. In this case, I asked Claude to research the similarities and differences between Birkenstock and Dr. Martens and I have to say that the result was quite interesting.

This is Claude’s summary:

I would certainly not base any investment decision on this, but it confirms my feeling that Birkenstock is not exactly on the same trajectory as Dr. Martens a few years earlier. But clearly there is a risk that they might not grow at 15% for many more years, which the current share price seems to expect as well.

A big learning in any case is (and this is no surprise) that you should avoid investing into PE sponsored IPOs of some hot footwear brands at a valuation of 20x EV/EBITDA or more.

The PE guys definitely know when to sell and as an investor, you should not try to outsmart PE guys at an IPO. Maybe there is one out of 10 that is doing really good, but the probability is slim.

When you look at Private Equity portfolios which often have average valuations of 16-18 x EV/EBITDA, it is clearly not a surprise that IPOing or selling them at these valuations are not easy.

For Birkenstock, I will watch the company but at the time of writing, I could not build enough confidence to start a position despite the quite attractive valuation.

I think especially the massive sales of L. Catterton just a few weeks ago does not create a lot of confidence that growth will remain at mid teens levels for that long.

Rubis SCA: Interesting French listed Special Situation with a Corporate Restructuring catalyst

DISCLAIMER: This is not investment advice. PLEASE DO YOUR OWN RESEARCH !!!!

Management Summary:

Rubis, the French listed Fuel distribution company, represents a potentially interesting Special Situation investment, despite (or because of) the current negative sentiment towards French stocks.

On the back of strong earnings momentum (6M earnings +18%), Rubis has almost no exposure to France and has recently announced to undergo a structural transformation from a disadvantageous SCA structure (similar to a German KGaA) to an ordinary stock corporation.

For normal shareholders, this is hugely positive despite a planned compensation for the former controlling shareholders. In addition, this opens up M&A opportunities which had been rumoured about for some time.

The share price so far has not reacted, most likely because of the perceived problems in France which in my opinion creates an opportunity for the opportunistic investor. The time that will be required until a potential M&A transaction will occur, will be nicely compensated through a 6% dividend yield.

Rubis Background

Historically speaking, Rubis is a rather young company, having been founded only in 1990 by a gentlemen called Gilles Gobin and then grew rapidly through many acquisitions, often buying small subsidiaries of large international energy companies.

Rubis is  a company that I came across several times in the past. It has a very interesting mix of businesses and geographies, but due to corporate structure issues (SCA, more similar to a GP/LP structure than a normal stock corporation) I never considered investing.

Effectively, the heirs of the founder through a 2,3% share holding were controlling the board and on top of that was able to charge a significant royalty on Rubis’ profit (in 2025 this was approx. 30 mn or 10% of Rubis net profit). The formula seems to give them a percentage of the annual share price increase but capped at 10% of the net income.

At the time of writing, Rubis is valued at around 3,6 bn market cap and trades at a relatively modest ~10,7 x NTM P/E which is clearly impacted by this unusual arrangement:

Looking at the long term chart, Rubis shareholders have done Ok including the dividend but the share price is significantly below the peak of around 60 EUR from 2018.

Rubis is French listed but has very little exposure to France

As there is “blood in the streets in Paris”, it is worth mentioning that Rubis sales have a pretty unique breakdown:

~50% of sales are in Africa

~40% in the Carribean

~0nly around 10% in Europe

The business as such is a mixture of fuel and LPG distribution, Renewable Energy and interestingly Bitumen distribution. Bitumen is a byproduct from refining oil and is used among others to create asphalt by mixing bitumen with sand and stones.

Rubis is the biggest Fuel distributor in Kenya which according to some sources is their biggest single market. This is a split of the fuel distribution business from their website:

This chart from the 2025 annual results nicely shows the extremely unique geographical  footprint of RUBIS:

The Renewables Energy business is a result of the 2022 acquisition of a French Renewables company called Photosol, which was widely criticized as too expensive.

Rubis also owned a terminal business, but sold that in 2024 to JV Partner and Infrastructure fund I Squared capital.

So in a nutshell, Rubis is not impacted much by the current situation in France.

Financing wise, they seem to have restructured their debt financing “just in time” in late 2025 with a syndicated loans facility that seems to have a 5 year term.

As the business is very cash generative, it looks like that they are also not affected by the recent widening of French spreads as they don’t have to issue debt for the next few years.

The catalyst: Corporate structure change

Now however, things seem to change and quite quickly: Rubis intends to become a “normal” company, most likely under the pressure of some prominent investors, such as the Bollore Group. My friend Graouilly has written about it here.

From a technical perspective, the former “GP” will receive an extra 12% of newly issued shares as compensation for giving up his special rights that included a royalty on Rubis’ net profit.

Rubis has scheduled an extraordinary shareholder meeting for December 9th where these changes including the capital increase shall be approved.

There seems to be some resistance among the larger shareholders that the compensation is too generous, but any lower compensation amount will be a positive for shareholders.

Share price:

Looking at the share price, we can see that Rubis is up ~11% YTD, which is in line with earnings growth that had been +18% for the first 6 months:

What I find interesting is that the share price didn’t react a lot on Monday’s surprise announcement, although all in all, this is quite positive for shareholders:

Similar cases in the past:

There was a very similar case in the past in France: Lagardere underwent the “same procedure”, also driven by behind the scenes activism from Boloré. The GP in that case got compensate by a share capital increase of ~8% but the shares jumped 10-15% after the announcement.

Subsequently, Lagardere was taken over by Vivendi by Vivendi and Lagardere Shareholders did quite well.

A somehow similar case was  Fresenius Medical Care, where Fresenius transformed FMC from a KGaA to a normal AG because they wanted to deconsolidate FMC and FMC subsequently performed quite well.

One can only speculate why Rubis didn’t move at all, but my guess is that the current riots in France and general Caution with regard to French stocks clearly plays a role here.

Good earnings momentum

Higher fuel prices are almost always good news for distributors and Rubis is no exception here. After  decent Q1, 6M numbers looked really good an dthe increased their guidance for 2026 significantly:

Investor base

Over the past few years, some prominent investors have disclosed stakes in Rubis:

The largest shareholder, Patrick Molis is  a French Business man active in logistics who started a first position in 2023/2024. He had been openly activist in the company for some time, demanding among other things a complete overhaul of the board.

At the same time, Vincent Boloré disclosed a 6% stake. Boloré is especially experienced in African businesses. He also seemed to have been involved in Rubis in the 1990ies and seems to know Molis from a couple of previous interactions.

The billionaire Dassault family seems to own its stake already a little bit longer since 2017 or 2018. I didn’t find a lot about Ronald Sämann but he also seems on board since 2023/2024 and was actually part of the supervisory board until early this year.

Graoully has some more information on this eclectic group of shareholders in his post.

In any case, I assume that those shareholders will most likely not just sit around and be happy to collect dividends but they will continue to press for change and even more so once the structure is cleaned up.

What would a PE buyer do with Rubis

Already in September last year, there were relatively specific rumours that PE firm CVC and energy trader Trafigura were interested in taking over the company.

As we have seen with my previous portfolio company DCC, especially LPG and fuel distribution are highly attractive businesses for PE companies as these businesses are stable, can be leveraged and there is still ample room for consolidation.

In Rubis’ case, those two businesses would be clearly the main targets. The Renewable business would most likely be sold to a more specialised renewable fund or energy company, although right now, there are quite some renewable assets on the market.

That leaves us with the Bitumen business for which the natural buyers would most likely be competitors like Colas or the Swedish guys

My “sum of parts” estimate for such a scenario would be at least 50 EUR per share based on recent transaction multiples including DCC. Although one has to mention that Rubis’ geographic footprint makes this analysis a little bit more difficult. For those more exotiv locations, the number of buyers is clearly smaller, however potential growth in these countries is also much higher than in saturated markets.

A quick win of any “activist” would in my opinion be to spin off the renewables business and leave the Fuel and bitumen business together which would be a veritable cash machine. This could also lead to a decent rerating of the stock.

Return expectations

Other than a direct M&A “arbitrage” situation, the current situation at Rubis is a little bit more fluent.

My base case looks as follows: I look at a time horizon of 18-24 months. Within this time horizon I expect to:

  • receive 2 dividends of ~6% each
  • expect that the stock will reflect the structural improvement after the AGM has approved the change in december which should lift the stock price between 10-20% (average based on similar situations in the past)
  • expect at least some discussions about potential bids from either strategic players (maybe Boloré himself) or Private Equity)

My estimate for a Pivate Equity “take out value” would be around 45-50 EUR per share.

So my overall return expectation for Rubis, including dividend would be in the range of +30% to +40% in the base case including dividends.

The bull case would be a little bit higher, the bear case would be the dividend yield only.

Pro’s & Cons

So let’s summarize the Pros and Cons for this special situation quickly:

  • Operational tailwind with 18% profit increase in the first 6M 2026
  • Clear catalyst with structural change but so far not priced in at all
  • Stock is relatively cheap and offers an attractive dividend yield of 6%
  • After the restructuring, high likelihood of “value accretive” M&A activities due to the presence of strong activist investors and already existing interest
  • almost no exposure to French economy as such and French bond spreads

+/-  in general negative sentiment towards French stocks which limits short term upside

  • exposure to FX fluctuations and Hyperinflationary jurisdictions
  • PV assets are maybe not so easy to sell at a good price right now
  • some residual risk that the restructuring will not happen or be delayed because of the amount of the proposed compensation

Summary & game plan

Overall, I find the set-up quite interesting as an “early stage” special situation, despite the exotic geographical footprint of Rubis.

The relevant dates are as follows:

From an operational perspective, Rubis will announce a Q3 trading update on November 3rd. I assume that this trading update will confirm the positive trajectory of the business. The upside case would be a further upwards revision of the expected 2026 profit.

The most important  step will be clearly the formal approval of the restructuring in the special AGM on December 9th. Maybe this triggers some revaluation already, especially if maybe the compensation for the former “GPs” can be reduced a little bit.

I would then expect over the course of 2027 that we see more discussions on how to “catalyze” the value of Rubis. Either through renewed negotiations with CVC and Trafigura or some other actions.

My “long stop” date for this will be Mid 2028. If nothing happens until then, I will get out in any case.

Overall, I find this set-up attractive enough to allocate a 2,5% position of the portfolio into Rubis at the current price of ~35,50 EUR per share.

I partially financed the position with further sales of STEF, which has much more exposure to France, high French interest spreads and high fuel costs.

Private Equity Mini Series (3): Listed Private Asset Managers (KKR, Apollo & Co)

Background:

After part 2 of the Private Equity Mini series a few days ago, I wanted to focus on how to access the asset class as a private investor via the “normal” capital markets.

Currently, the PE industry and the broader “Private Asset” industry is massively trying to lure private investors into its Fund offering via a variety of “NEW” and usually structured instruments, such as “ELTIFS” in Europe or lobbying hard in the US to get access to private investors.

In the past, Private Assets, including its subgroups like Buyout, Venture, Growth, Infrastructure and Private Credit were “exclusive” to larger institutional investors and Ultra High Net Worth individuals.

These days, with declining commitments from those traditional investors, the PE industry now tries to access the vast pools of money that smaller, private investors collectively own.

Often you hear the pitch that now is the time to “democratize” the asset class, which is an expression that should make the targeted investors extremely nervous. I had linked to the excellent Bain PE report already in one of the link collections.

A key slide of the report is the one that shows that for the Buy-out category, 2024 was the first year ever with declining AuM:

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The Social Chain Cash Flow Shenanigan- Could that one have been spotted ?

Disclaimer: This is not investment advice, just a tiny little bit of “forensic analysis”.

The Social Chain, an initially hot, but now busted “Social Media DTC” company was recently subject to an intervention from German regulator BAFIN, claiming the 2021 accounts contained a material error in the Cashflow statement.

In essence, BAFIN said that The Social Chain’s Operating Cashflow did contain ~60 mn EUR of non-operating cashflow items that should have classified either as Financing and Investing Cashflow.

Why is that important ? Many investors (myself included) consider “Free Cashflow” as a very important metric. Free cashflow consists of Operating Cashflow minus Capex and is generally considered to be less easily manipulated than accounting numbers (“Adjusted EBITDA before costs to build the product”).

Looking at the headline numbers from the 2021 annual report, we can see that despite the “adjusted pro-forma” numbers, the +22 mn Operating cashflow compares to -23mn EUR in EBITDA and -82 mn EUR Net income and seems to generate the impression that the underlying business is cash generating, as the investment cashflow was mostly M&A:

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Insurance vs. Inflation & Interest rates (Admiral, Sabre, DirectLine) – Part 1

Spoiler: Readers only looking for “actionable investment advice” might skip this post as this is about the basics. The short summary is: Inflation is not good for P&C insurers.

Background: Inflation is back

Last week, especially UK insurance stocks were rattled by news from Sabre Insurance that inflation was hurting them both, through rising claims but also rising reinsurance costs.

Sabre lost -40% that day Admiral and DirectLine were down double digits. On Monday, DirectLine, another UK direct insurer issued a very cautious Trading Update which again led to further losses. The whole disaster can be seen in this chart:

admiral comps

Inflation and Insurance

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More thoughts on Inflation (Linkers, Pension liabilities, highly indebted Countries)

As inflation is something that we haven’t seen for a few decades, I am still trying to get my head around this trying to understand how this could influence investments going forward.  In this posts I just wanted to touch three areas: Inflation linked bonds, pension liabilities and highly indebted countries. 

  1. Inflation linkers

When looking for assets that gain or at least compensate for inflation, one should not forget Inflation linked bonds. Per construction, they compensate at least fully for the officially measured inflation.

In addition, Inflation linked bonds function also as an instrument to observe “implied” inflation rates, I.e. the market price of an inflation linked bond contains the investor’s expectation for future inflation rate.

The German agency for debt has a good page (in German) that explains how these securities work. One thing to mention is that most bonds are linked to Eurozone inflation, not German inflation.

Looking at the detail page of the 2033 linker we can see that this bond carries a 0,10% coupon and trades at a yield of -1,73%.  Comparing this with the 2032 fixed rate bond (there is no 2033 fixed rate Bund) that yields around 1%, we can estimate that the difference between the two yields (1-1,73%)= 2,73% is the market’s current estimate for the inflation in the Eurozone for the next 10 years or so. (Remark: in reality, this is more complex, see for instance here, but for this exercise it is good enough).

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All Danish Stocks part 6 – Nr. 51-60

And another batch of 10 randomly selected Danish shares, this time, none of them made it onto the watch list. We have now covered almost 1/3 of all Danish stocks.

51. Ringkjøbing Landbobank A/S

Ringkjøbing Landbobank is a 3,3 bn EUR market cap bank active only in Denmark, that is surprisingly profitable with a ROE of ~15%. This is reflected in a very good share price performance and a rather high valuation at 20x trailing P/E.

ringbank

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All Danish Shares part 2 – Nr. 11-20

And on we go with the second post after kicking off last week. Two of the stocks already appeared in the blog some years ago and overall, these ten candidates yielded two “Watch list” candidates.

11. Conferize A/S

Conferize is a 15 mn EUR market cap company that seems to develop software for managing conferences. The company seems to be still “pre revenue”. I do not fully understand why a pre revenue Software company is public, but I’ll happily “pass” without further analysis.

12. Jobindex A/S

Jobindex is a 220 mn EUR market cap company that operates an online Job board which covers all Danish vacancies. The company has been growing nicely until 2018 but then stagnated already in 2019. The chart reflects this to a certain extent, the share price now is similar to the price during the “high growth” phase:

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Carvana: The Armchair Investor’s perspective & Could Auto1 become the “German Carvana” ?

Background/Introduction:

For some reason I ran into a “Twitter battle” about Auto1, with the main Bull case being that Auto1 is the German Carvana. In addition, some good investors that I follow have revealed Carvana as a position. 

Time to have an “Armchair investor” look into Carvana. The goal here is two fold:

  1. Understanding if Carvana as such is a good business (and maybe even interesting as investment)
  2. Finding out if Auto1 could indeed is or can become the “German Carvana”

Full disclosure: the guy who is writing this, lost significant money with investing into Cars.com, another US online car company. So as always: PLEASE DO YOUR OWN RESEARCH !!!

The Carvana Business “Bull Case”

important: Just as I was about to finish the post, Rob Vinall has released his 2021 letter to investors with a very convincing pitch for Carvana. I highly recommend to read it first.

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