One reader Emailed me that I had made a mistake in my initial post with regard to the book value and P/B ratio. This is what I wrote in December:
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 P/B Ratio 1,24 0,96 1,23 1,23 1,08 1,03 1,19 1,05 0,78 P/B Ratio adj. B Shares 1,48 1,15 1,46 1,47 1,29 1,23 1,42 1,25 0,93
For some reason, the official Bloomberg ratios do not include the class B shares held by David Einhorn, so I adjusted them accordingly.
Actually, the B shares are included in the stated Bloomberg Ratios despite showing the wrong number of shares, so the “true” P/B ratio is around ~0,79 which then of course makes the “mean reversion” story even more compelling.
Additionally, Greenlight already released the monthly investment return for December which was -0,1% against -1,6% for the S&P 500. So at least its going into the right direction.
Maybe one quick point on comparisons of Greenlight Re to Berkshire, Markel or Fairfax: Although it is true that the other companies have better track records, I do think that Greenlight has one big advantage: The company is transparent and relatively easy to value as the whole investment portfolio is marked-to-market. And as I pointed out, Greenlight for me is not a long-term compounding story but a mid-term special situation betting on a David Einhorn outperformance.
After Hornbach’s profit warning in December, a lot of people asked me: What are you going to do ? Are you selling now ? Why do you own Hornbach at all ?
First thing: I wil do nothing and watch. For me , the profit warning was very surprising as I thought that they are on a good track and have the right strategy, although the business they are in is very tough.
For me, Hornbach is a pretty low risk position. My expectation was that I can make around 10-12% p.a. with very little risk. Until Q3 2015, that was on track but now of course it looks like a clear underperformer.
One of the reasons for this is clearly the fact that in contrast to almost any other stock in Germany, Hornbach did not enjoy any multiple expansion over the last 5 years. For a capital intensive, real estate dominated business like Hornbach, book value is one of the relevant measures. If we look at this we can clearly see that Hornbach now is valued at the low end of the historical range of P/B which ranged from ~0,8 – 1,8 in the past 15 years:
Obviously, Hornbach does have some issues. Personally I think one needs to watch the E-Commerce issue most closely. So far I thought that DIY does not have big issues with Amazon & CO but this now needs to be tested.
Tgs Nopec released preliminary 2015 figures and a first outlook for 2016. Naturally, the outlook is rather subdued. Combined with the drop in oil prices, the stock got hammered. For shareholders, the only positive aspect is that TGS still is doing a lot better than its capital-intensive competitors, for instance PGS or CGG:
For the moment I will not do anything. Clearly the oil price went lower than I ever thought but TGS has net cash and will manage the cycle conservatively. So I don’t think one has to panic now.
Overall I think the best advice in such a situation is: Either you panic early or you don’t panic at all. For the early panic it is already too late for oil related stocks in my opinion, so the only alternative is to sit it out.