Tag Archives: Banca Civica

Banca Civica – Take over Spanish style

A couple of months ago I looked at Spanish “Thrift conversions”, especially Banca Civica which was a potential take over candidate.

Now, the take over was finally announced by Barcelona based Caixabank, however with a significant discount to the prevailling market price:

The share valuation for Civica in the transaction is 27 percent lower than the 2.70 euro-per-share price of its initial public offering in July, in which it raised 600 million euros. CaixaBank has a market value of 12.1 billion euros

The offered 1.97 EUR is a 11% discount to the previous day closing price and equally an all time low for the Banca Civica stock since its IPO.

So this is something to keep in one’s mind: You can basically do takeovers/tender offers in Spain well below current market prices.

IPOs Bankia und Banca Civica – ein klassisches Seth Klarman Investment ?

Was bitte hat Seth Klarmann mit den IPOs von zwei Spanischen Sparkassen zu tun könnte man sich fragen ?

Die Antwort ist ganz einfach: In seinem 1991 erschienen Buch “The Margin of safety” (Pdf z.B. hier), gab es ein Kapitel dass ich nur oberflächlich gelesen hatte, aber irgendwo in meinem Hinterkopf hängen geblieben ist.

Konkret war es das Kapitel 11: “Investing in Thrift Conversions”. In diesem Artikel beschreibt er die Situation in den 80ern in den USA, wo während und nach der “S&L Krise” in USA, viele S&L oder Thrifts (im Deutschen klassische Sparkassen) in börsennotierte Gesellschaften gewandelt wurden.

Aus seiner Sicht wwar das eine besondere Situation und zwar aus diesem Grund:

So long as the thrift has positive business value before the conversion, the arithmetic of a thrift conversion is highly favorable to investors. Unlike any other type of initial public offering, in a thrift conversion there are no prior shareholders; all of the shares in the institution that will be outstanding after the offering are issued and sold on the conversion. The conversion proceeds are added to the preexisting capital of the institution, which is indirectly handed to the new shareholders without cost to them. In a real sense, investors in a thrift conversion are
buying their own money and getting the preexisting capital in the thrift for free.

Ein wichtiger Punkt den es zu prüfen gibt ist folgender:

Unlike many IPOs, in which insiders who bought at very low prices sell some of their shares at the time of the offering, in a thrift conversion insiders virtually always buy shares alongside the public and at the same price.

D.h. man sollte darauf achten, dass “Insider” an den entsprechenden Aktien beteiligt sind. Klar ist, dass man auch auf die Asset Qualität achten muss:

Many thrifts, of course, are worth less than their stated book value, and some are insolvent. Funds raised on the conversion of such institutions would pay to resolve preexisting problems rather than add to preexisting value.

Ein Grund für die damalige Unterbewertung war auch die fehlende Coverage durch Analysten:

Why were thrift stocks so depressed in the 1980s? The sell side of Wall Street has historically employed few thrift analysts, and the buy side even fewer. The handful of sell-side analysts on duty typically followed only the ten or twenty largest public thrifts, primarily those based in California and New York. No major Wall Street house was able to get a handle on all of the many hundreds of converted thrifts, and few institutional investors even made the effort. As a result, shares in new thrift conversions were frequently issued at an appreciable discount to the valuation multiples of other publicly traded thrifts in order to get investors to notice and buy them.

Als Beispiel bringt er noch die “Jamaica Savings Bank”, die anscheinend mit einem KBV von 0,47 emittiert wurde obwohl dem ein qualitativ hochwertiges Portfolio genenüber steht.

Sein Fazit dürfte generell auch auf Spanische Sparkassen zutreffen:

Thrift conversions, such as that of Jamaica Savings Bank, are an interesting part of the financial landscape. More significantly, they illustrate the way the herd mentality of investors can cause all companies in an out-of-favor industry, however disparate, to be tarred with the same brush.

Interessanterweise hat Klarman’s Firma Baupost gerade im Mai bekannt gegeben, das man ein Office in London eröffnen will um von den erwarteten “notverkäufen” zu profitieren:

Baupost Group LLC, a $24 billion Boston-based hedge fund run by Seth Klarman, will open its first overseas office in London this year as the sovereign deficit crisis prompts a wave of distressed debt sales, two people with knowledge of the plans said.

Jim Mooney, a managing director at Baupost, will oversee the operation to tap investments mainly in commercial real estate, structured products, corporate and debt that trades at distressed levels, said one of the people, who declined to be identified because the move hasn’t been made public.

Ich vermute mal nicht, dass Klarman in börsengelistete Aktien investieren wird, aber es zeigt doch, dass es hier eine größere Anzahl von möglichen Valueinvestments geben könnte.

Fazit: Die Privatitisierung der Spanischen Sparkassen könnte evtl. ähnlich den US Amerikanischen Vorbildern in den 80ern interessant sein. Allerdings muss man die einzelnen Unternehmen noch eingehend analysieren.

Fortsetzung folgt….

P.S.: Wer sich für (Deep) Value Investing interessiert und das Buch noch nicht gelesen hat, sollte das schleunigst nachholen. Viel Besseres gibt es zu dem Thema nicht….