Piquadro SpA valuation: Reasonably priced plus free growth option
Et voilá, after 3 preparing posts (part 1, part 2 and part 3) I finally try to come up with some kind of valuation for Piquadro.
The simplest approach and much liked by many I-bankers because you only need a simple Bloomberg sheet for this which even a M&A Banker can handle…
The most obvious comparable company is Samsonite, TUMI hasn’t listed yet. Due to its history, Samsonite’s numbers are quite a mess, but I tried to distill some numbers which we could use:
So appoximately, Samsonite is selling at around 11.5 x 2011 EV/EBITDA, 1.8 x sales and 14 times 2012 Earnings.
In order to have a few more data points, I looked up two other companies from the Piquadro matrix, which are not direct competitors but still somehow similar, namely Tod’s and Coach.
The Interesting aspect of Tod’s ist that they too, generate the majority of their sales in Italy and are majority held by the founder. Coach is a well known US based manufactorer of luxury leather goods.
Interestingly, EV/EBITDA is similar to Samsonite, with 12-13 (pre operating leases), PEs are significantly higher. P/B for Coach is extremely high, this reflects most likely the “aggressive” US approach to capital management.
The big question with “comparables” is always: Are those companies really comaprable or do we need to apply discounts etc.
For the time being, I will just use the averages to give one datapoint. For the valuation, I estimated Piquadros Earnings, EBITDA and Sales in line with half year results more or less unchanged compared to 2010:
|Piquadro||est. Mn EUR||Multiple valuation|
So either way, before any individual adjustements and subject to all issues with comparables, similar companies are trading at multiples which would justify prices for Piquadro in the range of 2.35 EUR – 3.51 EUR per share, a respective potential upside of ~ 70-150% from the current 1.40 EUR
As we have seen in part 3, Piquadro is currently much more profitable than TUMI and Samsonite. For a conservative DCF Valuation, I will assume that profitablity drops in 2011 to the “peer group” level of around 16% EBITDA Margin. As a proxy for free cashflow, I will use the historic average of FCF to EBITDA which is around 0.52. This would correspond with 0.10 EUR Free cashflow per share in 2011 (vs. 0.13 2010, 0.18 in 2009)
Side remark: For simplicity reasons, I decided against a “pseudo sophisticated” 2 or even 3 stage DCF model. The majority of the value with such “normal” shares lies anyway in the “terminal” value, so why bother and doing this unnecessary step.
Based on this we can calculate a relatively easy sensitivity analysis of DCF fair values against growth and discount rates:
We can clearly see that at the estimated European market growth rate of 4%, we need to have a discount rate of approx slighlty less than 8% to get into the lower range of the multiple valuation.
Howvwer, as a conservative value I would use the 10% discount and the market growth of 4% which would give us a value of 1.71 EUR per share in the conservative case.
In the normal case, I assume that Piquadro will be able to earn 20% EBITDA margin with corresponding Free cashflow as outlined above, which results in 0.13 EUR cashflow in 2011. Sensitivites are:
This results, if we use market growth of 4% and 10% discount rate, in a value of 2.14 EUR per share in the base case
Here I assume average past profitability level (25% EBITDA margin) and past EBITDA growth (~6%) as future growth rate based on the limited history since 2007.
Based on the sensitivity table with 25% EBITDA we end up with 4.02 EUR in the optimistic case per share.
To summarize the DCF valuation, we get a range of 1.71 EUR – 4.02 EUR based on the assumption on profitablity and growth.
This is somewhat outside the comparables range, most likely due to the fact that the current stock prices of companies like Samsonite, Coach and Tod’s either imply lower discount rates or higher growth rates.
So let’s summarize now what we know about Piquadro, its market, competitiors and valuation:
+ the market itself has no “hard” barriers of entry. However, Piquadro and its competitors seem to achieve quite high returns on capital and margins. This is most likely the effect of established brands and “aspirational branding”,it is therefore not unreasonable to expect above average rates of return in the future.
+ As a result, Piquadro’s competitors and similar (but larger) companies enjoy rich valuations which imply either relatively low cost of capital or high implied growth rates or both
+ A comparables valuation results in a fair value range of 2.35 ~ 3.51 EUR, which implies quite a large “penalty” compared to Piquadros current stock price of 1,40 EUR.
+ A DCF valuation using market growth and historical growth with either average peer profitablity or historical profitablity results in a range of 1.71 – 4.02 EUR per share
+ the reason for the current low valuation seems to be easy to identify: the market considers Piquadro’s exposure to the Italian consumer as very risky
+ from a “soft factor” point of view, Piquadro looks good: conservative balance sheet, fair dividend distributions, coherent management, CEO and founder’s interst is aligned with minority shareholders
+ however, Piquadro also showed in the first round of the crisis that it can earn money in difficult times and if they really manage to grow above market rate, the upside potential is significant
So in summary, I would describe Piquadro as a very profitable company with an potentially very attarctive business model, where a lot of headwinds are most likely priced in. It’s definitely not a “deep value” reversion to the mean kind of stock, but one doesn’t pay for the growth either.
The fact that makes Piquadro interesting for me is that currently no growth is priced in, but if Piquadro only manages to maintain its historical growth rate and profitablity, the upside would be large. So it is basically a very reasonably priced dividend stock with a very cheap growth option.
Risk of Value Trap
Compared to potential “Value traps” like Bijou Brigitte, which I kicked out last year, Piquadro has some advatages:
+ still relatively strong same store sales growth
+ expansion in the direct operated retail outlets only in the beginning phase
+ Piquadro might benefit from consumer growth in emerging markets. For an “aspirational goods”company, it might be easier to make business there than in the low cost sector
However, this aspect is always something one has to keep in mind. You don’t want to own a shrinking retailer working off the long term leases.
Portfolio Risk Management aspects:
Together with Buzzi, EMAK and Autostrada, I have already ~15% exposure to Italian small caps. Adding Piquadro as a full portion would overweight this specific risk too much for my risk appetite. Especially f I want to add further GIPSI stocks in the future.
If we look at the last 6 months, one can see that Piquadro has underperformed the FTSE MIB significantly and the correlation was relatively limited:
As I want to hedge the cummulative Italian risk of the portfolio, I wouldpreferably use the FTSE MIB as hedging intrument.
I will add Piquadro as full position to the portfolio in the coming days as I believe that the “fair value” should be somewhere between 2-2,50 EUR based on market growth and conservative assumptions, giving the stock an upside of at least 50%. In order to manage the Italy risk and to fund the position, I will fund this through an equivalent short position on the FTSE MIB which will be built up according to the Piquadro purchases.
[i]“P/B for Coach is extremely high, this reflects most likely the „aggressive“ US approach to capital management.”
“+ As a result, Piquadro’s competitors and similar (but larger) companies enjoy rich valuations which imply either relatively low cost of capital or high implied growth rates or both”
“+ the reason for the current low valuation seems to be easy to identify: the market considers Piquadro’s exposure to the Italian consumer as very risky
+ from a „soft factor“ point of view, Piquadro looks good: conservative balance sheet, fair dividend distributions, coherent management, CEO and founder’s interst is aligned with minority shareholders”[/i]
Neben dem Kapitalumschlag beachtenswert sind in diesem Kontext die Bruttomargen des jeweils letzten Geschäftsjahres:
Piquadro 85,2%, Coach 72,7%, Fossil (die ich hier mal mit reinnehme) 56,9%, Samsonite 56,7%, Tod’s 41,1%.
Unterschiede könnten hier allerdings durch die Art des Vertriebs begründet sein. Je umfangreicher das eigene Vertriebsnetz, desto höher i. d. R. die Bruttomargen.
Der ROA ist bei Coach deutlich höher als bei Piquadro und Fossil, von Tod’s ganz zu schweigen, und Samsonites Zahlen müssten um “Reversal of impairment of intangibleassets and fixed assets” (380 Mio. $) bereinigt werden, wonach deren Renditen äußerst spärlich wären.
Auch beim “P/B-Indikator” ROE gibt es erhebliche Unterschiede.
Zu den wesentlichen Gründen für Piquadros relativ niedrige Bewertung (verglichen mit jenen Peers) gehört deren vergleichweise hohe Verschuldung und die daraus resultierende geringere EK-Quote.
EK-Quoten: Tod’s 64,1%, Fossil 68,7%, Coach 60,3%, Samsonite 55,8%, Piquadro 35,7%.
[i]”+ the market itself has no „hard“ barriers of entry. However, Piquadro and its competitors seem to achieve quite high returns on capital and margins. This is most likely the effect of established brands and „aspirational branding“,it is therefore not unreasonable to expect above average rates of return in the future.” [/i]
Eine gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit spricht spricht sicherlich dafür, wenngleich auch hier nichts für die Ewigkeit ist. Siehe Goldpfeil.
It is a frosty morning, so I prefer this strange language.
Hi, I would not invest here. Had a conversation with the CFO today which brought some interesting facts to light:
1.) The decline in DOS-margins in H1 is mainly attributable to the opening of new stores (I guess in China) – however I doubt that this is the whole story, because…
2.) … the sharp decline in the Spanish market is due to the recession in Spain. Which in turn means that Piquadros brand might not be that resilent after all.
The crucial question is now whether or not Italy will weather the storm – at least related to Piquadro, I would doubt that. Also the China expansion might not pay off within the next two years, since Piquadro has no world-wide brand like LVMH or alike. Usually, clothing retailers turn their stores profitable after 24 to 36 months.
Those two facts – declines in margins and recession vulnerability – might be alarming, but what really concerns me is that group sales in Q3 turned negative by approx. 7%. This sharp decline can only be attributed to problems in Italy which might have been even worse in Q4 (which is still ongoing).
All in all, I used a two-staged DCF (to consider the near term problems) with cost of equity of 14% (Italy risk-free rate is 6%) and ended up in the region of 0,8€ to 1€ per share. The problem with a one-staged DCF is that a long-term growth rate of 4% is quiet unlikely in my opinion, therefore a two-staged with 1 to 2% long-term growth rate might be better.
However, assuming that the near-term trouble can be prevented, the stock might really carry some considerable upside. It`s just that I would not bet on that; too much Italy in this one here.
Against this background your hedge against the MIB is a good idea, but the trouble in Spain (-25% in H1!) actually scared me off. Also, the women handbag segment declined in H1 and we all know what happens to an economy once “mulier” stops buying 😉
Just my two or three cents!
thanks for the comment. I will shoot a more comprehensive post later