18 observations from Berkshire’s 2014 annual report
Just an upfront note: I have written down those items while reading the 2014 annual report for the first time. Usually I read them at least twice. This year’s report contains a 4 page letter from Charlie Munger (page 39), nicely summarizing the “Berkshire system”. Overall, Buffett and Munger seem to emphasize in this year’s report that they see a great future ahead for Berkshire, even without them on board.
I would recommend anyone to read the annual report first before reading any comments from secondary sources. It is a lot to read but it is definitely worth your time.
My personal take is that it will be extremely hard for any succesor to fit into Buffett’s (and Munger’s) shoes. This company was built by and around two geniuses. Yes, the “Berkshire system” does have some enduring qualities but combined with the size of the company, it will be extremely hard to deliver outstanding performance ging forward.
Call for comments: Comments from my readers about what items you did find especially noteworthy would be highly appreciated !!!!
1. 50 year history
They have changed the layout of the 50 year table (included Berkie’s stock performance, especially they dropped the difference between book value increase and S&P 500. Buffett has mentioned several times that he doesn’t see increase in book value as the main yardstick anymore. However I am surprised that now he changes the layout.
I guess there is some vanity on his side included. The old layout would have shown that he has now underperformed the 3rd year in a row based on his old benchmark. Multiple expansion did help Berkie’s share price a lot over the last few years. As mentioned above, the company now is so big that it seems to be already too difficult to perform well under the old standard,
2. Problems at Burlington
Burlington was his biggest acquisition and 2014 seems to have been a bad year. I wonder how 2015 will look like if oil production (and transport) will go down at some point in time. It looks like that they had under invested in their infrastructure and do now have to put a lot of money back into the business.
The story at BNSF, however – as I noted earlier – was not good in 2014, a year in which the railroad disappointed many of its customers. This problem occurred despite the record capital expenditures that BNSF has made in recent years, with those having far exceeded the outlays made by Union Pacific, our principal competitor.
The two railroads are of roughly equal size measured by revenues, though we carry considerably more freight (measured either by carloads or ton-miles). But our service problems exceeded Union Pacific’s last year, and we lost market share as a result. Moreover, U.P.’s earnings beat ours by a record amount. Clearly, we have a lot of work to do.
3. Car dealership acquisition
In October, we contracted to buy Van Tuyl Automotive, a group of 78 automobile dealerships that is exceptionally well-run. Larry Van Tuyl, the company’s owner, and I met some years ago. He then decided that if he were ever to sell his company, its home should be Berkshire. Our purchase was recently completed, and we are now “car guys.”
Larry and his dad, Cecil, spent 62 years building the group, following a strategy that made owner-partners of all local managers. Creating this mutuality of interests proved over and over to be a winner. Van Tuyl is now the fifth-largest automotive group in the country, with per-dealership sales figures that are outstanding.
Another acquisition based on personal contact and a lot of patience from Buffett’s side. Owner-partnership at local level seems to be a good formula for such businesses (see Les Schwab).
4. He mentioned the classic book “Where Are the Customers’ Yachts?”
Was alway on my list but I didn’t manage to read it yet.
5. Some “gems” on the insurance industry:
Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low-interest rates our country is now dealing with causes earnings on float to decrease, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of the industry.
Berkshire’s underwriting insurance profit is down, only a small profit increase at GEICO. He is suffering too, but the companies still produce positive technical results. Howevr there was no NatCat in 2014, so expect losses if there are large Natcats again. Even Buffett cannot fully escape the pricing pressure in insurance.
6. How to measure interest coverage
(Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
I had written about the stupidity of EBITDA, especially for capital-intensive businesses already a few times. Good to hear the “master” on this.
7. Clayton: Bought for 1,7 bn in 2003, Earnings 2014 558 mn USD
Clayton homes seems to have been another, underappreciated home run for buffet. At 15 times P/E a 500% return in 11 years, not bad.
2013, I soured somewhat on the company’s then-management and sold 114 million shares, realizing a profit of $43 million. My leisurely pace in making sales would prove expensive. Charlie calls this sort of behavior “thumb-sucking.” (Considering what my delay cost us, he is being kind.)
Was one of the biggest loosers of all time, acted to slowly. Would be interesting to know what exactly irritated him. Interestingly, the decision didn’t include thoughts on competition form Aldi, Lidl etc. but only Tesco management.
9. Market timing / borrowed money
Investors, of course, can, by their own behavior, make stock ownership highly risky. And many do. Active trading, attempts to “time” market movements, inadequate diversification, the payment of high and unnecessary fees to managers and advisors, and the use of borrowed money can destroy the decent returns that a life-long owner of equities would otherwise enjoy. Indeed, borrowed money has no place in the investor’s tool kit: Anything can happen anytime in markets. And no advisor, economist, or TV commentator – and definitely not Charlie nor I – can tell you when chaos will occur. Market forecasters will fill your ear but will never fill your wallet
Very good advice. Borrowing is only good if your name is Buffett and you call it “float” or “Non-recourse”…..
10. On Cigar butt investing
Those were the days. For small investors, Cigar butt investing might still work….
My cigar-butt strategy worked very well while I was managing small sums. Indeed, the many dozens of free puffs I obtained in the 1950s made that decade by far the best of my life for both relative and absolute investment performance.
11. On 60s Conglomerates:
Since the per-share earnings gains of an expanding conglomerate came from exploiting p/e differences, its CEO had to search for businesses selling at low multiples of earnings. These, of course, were characteristically mediocre businesses with poor long-term prospects. This incentive to bottom-fish usually led to a conglomerate’s collection of underlying businesses becoming more and more junky. That mattered little to investors: It was deal velocity and pooling accounting they looked to for increased earnings.
That basically is valid for all “roll up” situations. Targets with lower P/Es will get scarcer and have less quality over time.
12. On private equity
In truth, “equity” is a dirty word for many private-equity buyers; what they love is debt. And, because debt is currently so inexpensive, these buyers can frequently pay top dollar. Later, the business will be resold, often to another leveraged buyer. In effect, the business becomes a piece of merchandise.
Great sentence, however would sound more honest if he hadn’t teamed up for mega-leveraged buyout Heinz with 3G.
13. Instant classic
But Charlie told me long ago to never underestimate the man who overestimates himself.
This is very helpful advise in many situations, especially if you want to short a company…..
New collateral requirements mean no more “float” in writing options:
Some years ago, we became a party to certain derivative contracts that we believed were significantly mispriced and that had only minor collateral requirements. These have proved to be quite profitable. Recently, however, newly-written derivative contracts have required full collateralization. And that ended our interest in derivatives, regardless of what profit potential they might offer. We have not, for some years, written these contracts, except for a few needed for operational purposes at our utility businesses.
15. Insurance, float & liquidity
Moreover, we will not write insurance contracts that give policyholders the right to cash out at their option. Many life insurance products contain redemption features that make them susceptible to a “run” in times of extreme panic. Contracts of that sort, however, do not exist in the property-casualty world that we inhabit. If our premium volume should shrink, our float would decline – but only at a very slow pace.
A hidden hint in my opinion that you don’t want to own life insurance companies…..
16. From Munger letter, biggest mistakes
What were the big mistakes made by Berkshire under Buffett? Well, while mistakes of commission were common, almost all huge errors were in not making a purchase, including not purchasing Walmart stock when that was sure to work out enormously well. The errors of omission were of much importance. Berkshire’s net worth would now be at least $50 billion higher if it had seized several opportunities it was not quite smart enough to recognize as virtually sure things.
That would be agood question to both on the AGM: Why was it sure that WalMart would work out “enormously well” and why didn’t they buy a boatload ?
17. Munger on the Age of incoming CEOs
Compare this to a typical big-corporation system with much bureaucracy at headquarters and a long succession of CEOs who come in at about age 59, pause little thereafter for quiet thought, and are soon forced out by a fixed retirement age.
A very good observation and something to keep in mind when looking at companies. In a situation like that you rarely see long-term strategies implemented.
18. Munger on recreating Berkshire
Berkshire’s marvelous outcome in insurance was not a natural result. Ordinarily, a casualty insurance business is a producer of mediocre results, even when very well-managed. And such results are of little use. Berkshire’s better outcome was so astoundingly large that I believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and regaining his youth.
Good advice for all “would be Buffets”: Forget it. Berkshire was a “one off”.