Tag Archives: Warren Buffett

Notes & impressions from Omaha 2026

This year, after a 7 year break, I once again went to the US to attend the Berkshire AGM. Just for clarification: I don’t own Berkshire shares and unfortunately never did because I always thought that they were too expensive.

Attendance:
As mentioned elsewhere, attendance was clearly lower than in the past. The arena was only half full, the overflow rooms almost empty. On the positive side, with less people it was much more relaxed. On the negative side, prices in Omaha during the weekend are still sky high. Hotel rooms have been very expensive and Steaks in the city steakhouses cost around 60-70 USD (plus sides, taxes and obligatory tip). Most restaurants were only half full. It also seems that hotel prices for the weekend were much lower just before the weekend.

Paying 21 USD for a pretty miserable “Lunch box” during the AGM was not big fun either.

I wonder if Omaha hotels and restaurants will still be able to charge those sky high prices next year.

AGM Content:

Greg Abel is clearly not Warren Buffett. He is much more a “normal”, more operative CEO than Buffett. He also  gave more air time to the other Berkshire business CEOs.

What I liked is that they clearly said that BNSF and Geico still have a lot of work to do, in order to become as good as their competitors. Another plus was that the Q&A session was not too long.

On the other side, Greg Abel clearly did not offer any philosophical insights on capital markets. This was different when Warren and Charlie were running the show and attracted the masses.  And I think it is a good thing that he didn’t even try to do it.

Buffett himself appeared twice, once in a video and then in a half time break interview with Betty Quick. This interview was actually a little bit “cringe” especially when he mentioned that Greg Abel, a Canadian would become American soon and how special an American Passport is. As a Canadian Berkshire investor, I would be pretty pissed off by those comments as it kind of implies that being a Canadian is not good enough to run Berkshire. In any case, I found it super hard to actually understand what Buffett was saying during the interview. 

From an “actionable idea” point of view, the only inspiration I took away from the AGM is the  Tokio Marine Insurance investment. This was clearly Ajit’s idea and despite showing his age, this guy knows what he is doing in insurance. It was also interesting that this was mentioned very prominently despite being a rather small position for Berkshire.

Overall it will be interesting to see how this will develop over the next few years. Will Omoha still remain a meeting point for investors from around the world or will there be another kind of Omaha elsewhere ? We’ll find out eventually.

Berkshire Stock

For Berkshire, I do think the biggest risk is that the company will be seen as a “normal” HoldCo or a normal Insurance company. Normal Holdco’s often trade at steep discounts to their “sum-of-the-part” value. Berkshire so far could always count on the “Buffett factor”, but it will be interesting if and for how long this lasts, especially as it is not easy to really understand who owns what (Insurance, Non-insurance) at Berkshire.

Another aspect is that Berkshire in the past was also seen as a good proxy for the overall US economy due to its significant diversification. These days, this is no longer the case as the portfolio lacks exposure mainly to Big Tech/Cloud/KI and Defense which have been the strongest performers over the previous years.

Maybe that will be an advantage going forward but Berkshire is clearly not a good proxy for the overall US economy anymore.

As I mentioned, I was never a shareholder, but at the moment I would be really cautious with the stock. The market seems to think in similar ways:

The most interesting question is clearly, what Greg Abel will do with the cash pile at Berkshire. The AGM provided very little insight into this unfortunately. 

General observations:

As in the past, for me the reason to go there is mostly the network of investors and the pre-AGM events. I was again able to attend a two day meeting of German Speaking investors in Omaha and before that did some company visits in Dallas with a group of German “investor friends”. As in the past, the actual Berkshire AGM was always only the cherry on the top.

I actually contemplated for some time if I should go to the US at all because of all the political noise and scary stories about the immigration. However, in my case, immigration was super easy and even kind of friendly (Dallas airport).

As in the past, in all private encounters, Americans are always super friendly. We were often asked by random people in the Supermarket or elsewhere where we come from and when we said “Germany” everyone was super friendly and mentioned relatives or previous visits. So on a personal level, at least the Americans that I met, were as friendly as they always were.

However, in most business settings it was clear that Americans are obviously avoiding to say anything negative about the current US Administration. We never pressed the topic but it is really interesting that no one seems to be willing to say anything critical at all.

In Dallas, one could see quite a lot of Waymos driving around plus some of the autonomous Ubers.

Price levels in general are clearly higher than in Europe. Restaurants, apart from basic Fast food places, are at least 50% more expensive than even in my very expensive hometown Munich, especially if you include taxes and the more or less obligatory 20% tip. It is also interesting how aggressively tipping is demanded even for basic non-service offerings like in airports or coffee shops. Unfortunately this is now much more common in Germany, too.

Another cost factor is that there is very little in the form of public transportation. You either need a rental car or pay for an Uber. Over can be sometimes quite expensive. In Denver, where I had a forced overnight stop-over, I paid almost 60 USD for a 15 minute ride, with Uber charging almost 50% of the total fee at 11 pm.

A final observation is that flying domestically in the US is also a pretty miserable experience. If you don’t pay extra, you will need to wait longer at Security and will board last. Boarding is always a “high stress” event as many Americans travel with the maximum allowed onboard luggage, so compartments fill up very quickly.

My personal highlight was the visit to a real Rodeo outside of Omaha. I have never been to such an event but it was great fun and even good “value for money”.

Will I go there again ?

Currently I am not sure. Overall, it is quite an expensive trip and the main attraction is to meet people that in theory, I could meet much easier in Europe than in far away Omaha. In addition, I had a pretty exhausting trip back.

From a pure financial perspective, going to Omaha is clearly not “great value”. However, on a personal level it was clearly a net positive. experience.

Home Capital Group (HCG) – Contrarian Opportunity in Canada after being rescued by Buffett ?

hcg-logo-200x72

Background:

Home Capital Group is a Canadian bank/mortgage lending company founded in 1986 and run by the same CEO for 30 years, which came into the spotlight over the past few months. It ran into trouble, almost imploded and then got saved by no one other than Warren Buffett (and Ted Weschler).

There is good coverage following this link. The story in short:

Home Capital wanted to aggressively expand into insured mortgages. However at least one underwriter collaborated with mortgage brokers to get mortgages approved without proper documentation. At some point regulators reigned in but management did not tell shareholders about it. Then the regulator got tough and management had to go. In the meantime, short-term financing was pulled and the company got into real liquidity troubles.

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Capital Allocation & Capital Management – What is good and what is bad

Everyone who has read Thorndikes book “The Outsiders” clearly knows that capital allocation& capital management is one of the most important factors in creating long term shareholder value. After I watched Thorndike give a briliant talk at Google on this topic, I decided to write down my own thoughts on the topic.

What is CAPITAL ALLOCATION & CAPITAL MANAGEMENT anyway ?

CAPITAL ALLOCATION is simply what you do with your profits/cash inflows once they are in your account. You can do a lot of things with it. Thorndike in the talk above uses 5 uses, I would add another 2 (in bold)

1. Reinvest: Maintain your existing assets/infrastructure/operations
2. Grow organically: Expand your business by buying more machines/outlets/opening stores etc.
3. Expand your business by M&A
4. Pay back liabilities (debt, payables, pension liabilities etc.)
5. pay dividends
6. buy back shares
7. just leave the cash on your account and wait for better opportunities

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My 6 observations on Berkshire’s 2015 annual report

One general remark upfront: The 2015 annual report wasn’t that exciting in my opinion. Actually, I didn’t plan to write a post on it. However, after reading a couple of posts on the topic, I though maybe some readers are interested because I haven’t seen those points mentioned very often elsewhere.

  1. Bad year for GEICO

GEICO had a pretty bad year in 2015. The loss ratio (in percent of premium) increased to 82,1% (from 77,7%), the Combined ratio increased to 98% and the underwriting profit fell by -60%. Buffett talks about the cost advantage a lot in the letter, but the only explanation forthe increase in loss ratios are found in the actual report:

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Buffett & Munger on Cost of Capital: Don’t listen to what they say but look at what they do

After bashing David Einhorn for his Consol Energy WACC assumption last week, by chance I read at the very good 25iq blog an article on how Buffett and Munger publicly speak about those things.

Indirectly, this is clearly a slap in my face because even the headline already says it all:

 

Why and how do Munger and Buffett “discount the future cash flows” at the 30-year U.S. Treasury Rate?

The post summarizes what Charlie and Warren have said over the years with regard to cost of capital and discounting. I try to summarize it as follows:

  • They seem to use the same discount rate for every investment, the 30 year Treasury rate
  • in a second step they then require a “margin of safety” against the price at offer
  • they estimate cash flows conservatively
  • Somehow Buffet seems to have a 10% hurdle nevertheless
  • Buffett compares potential new investment for instance with adding more to Wells Fargo

So if Buffett doesn’t use more elaborated methods why should any one else ? Was I wrong to beat up David Einhorn because he used a pretty low rate for Consol Energy ? Add to this Mungers famous quote “I’ve never heard an intelligent cost of capital discussion” and we seem to waste a lot of time here, right ?

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Book review: “Damn Right: Behind the Scenes with Berkshire Hathaway Billionaire Charlie Munger” – Janet Lowe

The success story of Berkshire for a long time has focused only on Warren Buffett, the front man with the knack of explaining even the most complicated issues in a funny and folksy manner. Charlie Munger was for a long time only considered to be the “funny side-kick” who seems to be asleep most of the time during Berkshire’s annual share holder meeting.

This changed somehow in the last few years, among them the excellent “Poor Charlie’s Almanack” from Peter Kaufmann and there seem to be a couple of Charlie Munger books already released or in the pipeline.

So I was pretty surprised that there is a much older book about Charlie than the others. “Damn Right” was written and released in 2000 and is based on many interviews, some with Charlie Munger directly but also with his family and former colleagues and friends. 2000 was a year where many people thought that Berkshire had lost it, maybe one reason why the book didn’t become more well-known.

The book starts slowly with some stories on his parents and grand parents but gets more interesting pretty quickly. Munger started early on as a lawyer but discovered that he can make more money by being a real estate developer and started buying plots, building and selling apartments and houses. He then started to buy parts of or whole small companies. For a very long time he did so as a pure “Graham investor”, picking up bargains or even net nets.

Munger then started Munger Wheeler in the 60ies but was already discussing investment ideas with Buffett over the phone. He also invested together with Buffett and another Californian investor and friend Rick Guierin (One of Buffett’s “Superinvestors”) into the same companies sometimes even closely held ones. The most famous common acquisition of this time was the Blue Stamp company.

Wheeler & Munger performed greatly from 1962 to 1969 but did badly the next few years when Warren Buffett hat already closed his partnership. Munger dissolved the partnership in 1976 but still had a track record of making ~24% p.a.against 6% p.a. fr the Dow Jones.

The changing point in his history is clearly the purchase of See’s where they paid, for the first time in their history, above book value for a company. Munger is quoted that they would not have bought Coke if they hadn’t started with See’s.

After that the book covers some of the major Berkshire stories but with an interesting perspective. For me the most surprising facts from the book were:

– Munger and Buffett were fined by the SEC in 1974 (WESCO)
– Munger’s Partner had the original See’s Candy idea
– Munger was a “Graham style investor” for a very long time
– there were really big draw downs in the Munger partnership

Interestingly enough, the book says that already in the late 90ies, Munger wasn’t involved that actively in Berkshire anymore. For me the question always remains: Would Buffett had been as succesful without meeting Munger or would he would have become “just another succesful” investor ? Who knows.

Overall the book is definitely a good read for any value investor and tells most of the Berkshire story from a slightly different perspective. HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.

Quick check: John Deere (DE) – Great “cannibal” or cyclical trap ?

Looking at Berkshire’s portfolio is clealry a “must” for any value investor. Whenever they disclose a new stake it makes clearly a lot of sense to look at least briefly at what they are buying. Berkshire disclosed the John Deere position in late February this year. I assume this is a “Ted & Todd” stock. Looking at the track record of Berkshire’s public holdings, this is actually a good sign as Ted&Todd have beaten the “master” now several years in a row.

Looking quickly at Deere, it is not difficult to see some of the attractions:

+ relatively cheap (trailing P/E of 12,6, Stated EV/EBITDA of 5,5, EV EBIT 7)
+ organic growth, low Goodwill, good profitability in the past
+ good strategy /incentives in place
+ solid business model, significance of dealer network (quick repairs during harvest season…)
+ “Cannibal”, is massively buying back stocks

Especially the massive share buy backs are clearly a common theme for “Ted&Todd stocks”. Starting in 2014, Deer has reduced the sharecount constantly from around 495 mn shares to now ~344 mn shares.

However we can also see quickly a few “not so nice” things at Deere:

– pension /health liabilities (health – how to value ? 6bn uncovered. Very critical, healthcare sunk GM, not pension (EV multiples need to be adjusted for this)
– they do not cancel shares, held as “treasury”, why ?
– Financing business –> receivables & ROA most likely not “true”..
– lower sales but higher financing receivables ? Channel stuffing ?
– comprehensive income to net income volatility
– cyclical business. current profit margins still above historical average

Financing business

One of the most interesting aspects of John Deere is clearly the financing business. As other companies they offer financing, here mostly to dealers and not to the ultimate clients. A financing business is nothing else than an “in-house bank”, sharing much more characteristics with a financial than a corporate business, for instance requirement of continuous capital market access, default risk etc.

What I found especially interesting is the following: looking at Bloomberg, they already strip out automatically all the debt from the financing business when they show EV multiples. This could be OK if the debt is fully non-recourse however I am not so sure with Deere. Although they not explicitly guarantee the debt, there seems to be some “net worth maintenance” agreement in place which acts as a defacto guarantee for the debt.

An additional important point is the following: Deere shows very good profitability on capital in its “core” business. However, this is partly due to the fact that they show almost no receivables in the core segment. the receivables are indirectly shown in the financing business. To have the “true” ROIC or ROCE, one would need to add back several months of receivables to the core segment in my opinion.

Cyclical aspect: Corn prices

This is a 35 year chart of annual corn prices:

corn annual

We can clearly see that corn prices went up dramatically in around 2006 but are dropping since 2013 back to their historical levels. Demand for farm equipment is pretty easy to explain: If you make a lot of money on your harvest, you have money to spent for a new tractor (with a small time lag).

This is the 17 year history of Deere’s net margins:

Net margin
31.12.1998 7,52%
31.12.1999 2,08%
29.12.2000 3,76%
31.12.2001 -0,49%
31.12.2002 2,32%
31.12.2003 4,17%
31.12.2004 7,04%
30.12.2005 6,89%
29.12.2006 7,82%
31.12.2007 7,68%
31.12.2008 7,32%
31.12.2009 3,78%
31.12.2010 7,17%
30.12.2011 8,75%
31.12.2012 8,48%
31.12.2013 9,36%
31.12.2014 8,77%
Avg total 6,02%
Avg 2006-2014 7,68%
Avg. 1998-2005 4,16%

So it is quite interesting to see, that in the 7 years before the “price explosion” of corn, margins were quite volatile and around 4,2% on average. In the last 9 years however, the average jumped to 7,7% with 2014 being still above that “high price period” average.

Clearly, Deere doesn’t only sell to corn farmers, but many other agricultural prices have faced similar declines.

To be honest: I do not know enough if Deer can maybe keep the high margins they are enjoying currently, but to me at least the risk of margin mean reversion is pretty high for such a cyclical business.
Even if we assume mean reversion only to the overall average of ~6%, this would mean around 6 USD profit per share which seems to be currently also the analyst consensus.

Summary:

For me, despite a lot of positive aspects, John Deere is not an attractive investment at the moment. Despite being well run, the business is cyclical and has profited from high crop prices in the past. The balance sheet is not as clean as I like it and the valuation is not that cheap if we factor in pensions and the financing arm. Clearly the stock looks relatively cheap to other US stocks but the risks are significant. Maybe there is more if one diggs deeper (network moats via dealers etc.) but for the time being I will look at other stuff. At an estimated 2015 P/E of 16-17, there are many opportunities which look relatively speaking more attractive and where I can maybe gain a better “informational advantage” than for such a widely researched stock.

Edit: By the way, if someone has a view on the moat / brand value of John Deere I would be highly interested……

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