Performance review August 2014 – Comment “Patient enough ?”

Performance August:

In August, the Benchmark (Eurostoxx50 (Perf.Ind) (25%), Eurostoxx small 200 (25), DAX (30%), MDAX (20%)) recovered from last month’s loss to a certain extent and gained +1,1%. The portfolio could not keep up with that and was almost unchanged. YTD, the score is +7,6% for the portfolio against +0,3% for the BM.

Winners were Installux (+6,9%), Van Lanschot (+5,9%) and Cranswick (+5,1%). Losers were Admiral (-8,4%), Sistema (-8,3%) and Kas Bank (-3,2%).

Current Portfolio & transactions:

In August, I added Bouvet ASA as a new position to the portfolio and increased Gronlandsbanken to a half (2,5%) position. This reduced the outright cash level to 9,0%. Together with 3 special situations (Depfa LT2, MAN AG, Sky Deutschland) which I consider “close to cash”, the portfolio is still very conservatively positioned.

The detailed portfolio can be seen as always under the portfolio page.

Comment: “Patient enough ?”

In my blog, I have often written about the virtues of patience for an investor, for example in my January 2013 comment. This is what I wrote some 19 months ago:

However another potentially big mistake should also not be underestimated: Taking profits too early. Most investors (including myself) get nervous if their stocks climb quickly 20-30%. What you then often hear is something like “It never hurts taking a profit” or “No one ever got bankrupt by taking a profit” or something similar.

The truth is: In order to generate above average returns, taking profits too early hurts badly. Statistically, the vast majority of investment ideas will be rather average, some will be bad, but some of them and usually only a small amount will be really really succesful.

So if I look at the January 2013 portfolio, I can already identify a couple of positions which I have sold far too early, among them Total Produce, WMF, Dart Group, Bouygues which I sold far too early despite my smart talks in the comment. So obviously, I am still not patient enough, especially with my winning shares. So how can I trick myself into more patience ?

In my current portfolio overview I added a column called “Holding period”. This is simply the calculated time since I bought the first part of the position. Interestingly, both for the “core value” part as well as for the special situations, the average holding period is around 1,5-1,6 years.

Name Weight Perf. Incl. Div Holding period
CORE VALUE      
Hornbach Baumarkt 4,3% 35,7% 3,7
Miko 3,9% 10,7% 1,0
Tonnellerie Frere Paris 5,7% 117,3% 3,7
Installux 3,5% 82,1% 2,3
Poujoulat 0,8% 26,5% 2,3
Cranswick 5,8% 72,4% 2,2
Gronlandsbanken 2,5% 25,7% 1,8
G. Perrier 4,5% 102,5% 1,5
IGE & XAO 2,2% 57,3% 1,3
Thermador 3,0% 41,3% 1,2
Trilogiq 1,7% -14,5% 0,9
Van Lanschot 2,6% 9,7% 0,8
TGS Nopec 4,9% 12,3% 0,8
Koc Holding 3,6% 46,3% 0,5
Ashmore 2,9% 17,8% 0,5
Sistema 1,1% 4,4% 0,5
Sberbank 1,1% 6,7% 0,3
Admiral 2,7% 3,3% 0,2
Bouvet 2,7% -0,3% 0,0
       
OPPORTUNITY      
KAS Bank NV 4,3% 49,8% 3,7
Drägerwerk Genüsse D 4,8% 143,5% 2,9
DEPFA LT2 2015 5,0% 30,3% 3,7
HT1 Funding 4,3% 86,5% 0,8
MAN AG 2,3% 4,8% 0,5
Energiedienst 2,6% 10,6% 0,3
Depfa 0% 2022 TRY 3,0% 16,5% 0,2
NN Group 2,6% 2,5% 0,1
Sky Deutschland 2,5% -0,8% 0,0
       
Cash 9,0%    
       
Core Value 59,5%   1,6
Opportunity 31,5%   1,5
Short+ Hedges 0,0%    
Cash 9,0%    
  100,0%   100,0%

Most of my “core value” investments are usually meant to take 3-5 years in order to work out as planned. Of course, sometimes events out of my control impact the holding period such as buy- outs (EGIS, AIRE KGAA) or maturities in the case of bonds. But especially for the “core value”, the current 1,6 year holding period looks short on average. Clearly, there is some effect due to the fact that I started the blog 3,7 years ago and in my private portfolio some of the initial positions are there for a much longer time. Nevertheless, in the future I will focus more on the average holding period.

If i would invest consequently along my stated goals I would expect an average holding period of at least 2-3 years for my “core value” part. The “special situation” part is naturally a little bit shorter.

Now the good news: I don’t have to do anything to increase the holding period. I just have to sit around, wait and do nothing and the holding period will increase each day…..

I don’t want to give myself any “hard restrictions” on the average holding period as I strongly believe that most external restrictions on investment portfolios are negative for performance in the long run. One of the biggest advantages of any private investor is that he/she doesn’t need to have any restrictions. If you look at any institutional portfolio, it is crazy how many regulatory and other restrictions exist. Many portfolio managers spend most of their time steering through those restrictions instead of looking for good investments.

For that reason I will not create any artificial minimum but rather look at this as a continuous process and as a “qualitative factor”. In practice for instance I will check any new idea against the alternative to increase an existing position and report the holding period in my monthly updates. Of course this does not prevent too early selling, but I think it helps to implement more patience into my portfolio management process.

AGEAS (ISIN BE0974264930) – Potential litigation play ?

The company:

Ageas is a Belgium based insurance company and formerly known as “Fortis”, one of the biggest Eurpoean casualties of the financial crisis. Fortis, together with RBS and Santander tried to take over ABN Amro but especially Fortis then failed spectacularily and was saved by the Belgian Government and finally sliced and diced into Insurance and Banking, of which the banking part was sold to BNP Paribas.

Ageas itself is an interesting case, similar to NN Group, it is a strange collection of Belgium, UK, and Asian insurance companies plus some weird stuff at corporate level, resulting from the quite ugly split of a combined group into two separate businesses. However, a lot of the ugly stuff has already been cleared over the last few years and Ageas was looking like an almost “Normal” insurance company

The litigation

A few weeks ago, a Dutch court decided that Ageas is liable for misinforming Fortis shareholders in 2008:

The Amsterdam Appeals Court ruled that Fortis is liable for misleading investors by saying the firm was “financially stronger than ever” after a government bailout on Sept. 28, 2008, only to be replaced by a break-up plan five days later.

and further down:

Ageas should be able to meet a worst-case liability of 2.5 billion euros before taxes possibly stemming from the ruling, Matthias De Wit, a Brussels-based analyst at KBC, said in a note today. Still, potential indirect effects shouldn’t be ignored, he said.

Looking at the stockprice, we can estimate that the stock lost ~ 5 EUR per share:

With about 230 mn shares outstanding, the market seems to have implied ~ 1,1 bn EUR loss after tax. Ageas itself has provisioned around 130 mn EUR against this case.

Is this interesting ?

At the moment, it is hard to say. Ageas trades at ~0,62 times book value, which is relatively cheap. They are very active in repurchasing shares (sharecount decreased by -115 since 2011). I do like the insurance sector at the moment because its cheap and the problems (low interest rates etc.) are well known.

Insurance companies do have traditionally very good lawyers on their payroll and litigation is part of their business, so one can assume that they handle this very professionally. On the other hand, other than the CIR Spa case, there is no direct catalyst as the law suit can linger on quite some time.

Valuation wise, Ageas look similar to NN Group, actually, I could easily see those two Groups merging at some point in the future. My guess is that someone is maybe already working on the idea to form a strong Benelux players out of the available mid size companies (Delta lloyd, NN Group, Ageas, SNS).

Nevertheless, I do not think that AGEAS is a “Litigation play” at the moment, as I don’t have a good idea on the time line of the law suit. However it it looks like a pretty cheap insruance company with some upside potential, so I will keep it on my watchlist.

MIFA Bond (ISIN DE000A1X25B5) – Distressed debt & Restructuring “German Style”

I had covered the case of MIFA several times in the last few months (part 1, part 2, update, update 2).

Over the week-end, finally some news emerged with details about the restructuring.

If I understood the filing correctly, the following will happen:

1. Existing shareholders will be diluted 1:100
2. Bondholders will accept a “haircut” of 60% plus the coupon will be reduced to 1% (from 7,5%) and the maturity will be extended to 2021 (from 2018)
3. Hero cycles will inject (up to) 15mn EUR via a capital increase
4. Bondholders will get 10% of the new company for the 15 mn haircut and a subscription right for additional shares

Interestingly, the advisor nominated by the bondholders also made a press release. Some additional info from this release:

- the advisor estimated a recovery rate of only 15% for bondholders in the case of bankruptcy
– technically, bondholders will own 91% of MIFA equity before Hero cycle invests
– bondholders get subscriptions right and could, if they want to invest new money, own up to 30% of MIFA including those shares they get via the debt equity swap

As some details are still missing (price of new shares) etc., it is hard to correctly say how much the bonds are worth and if bondholders were treated fairly compared to Hero. However current prices at ~38% seem to imply most of the upside.

My 5 cents on this

For me, the following aspects of this whole episode are interesting:

- How can be the recovery rate of bond issued twelve months ago only be 15% ? Where did the 21,5 mn EUR disappear ? In my opinion, MIFA was a fraudulent company for quite some time and was already insolvent when they issued the bonds.

- Will there be any law suits by bondholders ? Why did Hero take the risk and didn’t wait for insolvency ? Are there any special provisions for Hero to back out if law suits come up ?

- “Senior bonds” under German law should not be treated and priced as senior bonds. As this example shows, one can “haircut” bond holders under German law (“Schuldverschreibungsgesetz”) without even going into bankruptcy procedures. German Bonds are much more similar to potentially perpetual, deeply subordinated bonds or “Genußschein” than a senior bond under international law. Any covenants written into the prospectus are worth nothing as it is so simple to just restructure the bonds.

- such a restructuring can be decided with only a small percentage of the bondholders. Only 28% of the MIFA bondholders were present when the advisor, who can commit to binding changes, was elected. So in theory, 14% of the bondholders can decide what happens to the remaining 86% of the bondholders with very little chance for any “hold outs”. Maybe Greece and Argentina should issue their future bonds simply under German law. Tha would make life much easier for them.

. why does the MIFA share (1% of the future company) trade at 80 cents or 6 mn EUR market cap ? Do shareholders think that the company is worth 600 mn EUR ? This is a clear “short zo zero” situation if one could actually borrow the shares

- one could argue that the restructuring makes sense because MIFA will be able to continue to operate and now jobs are lost. However I think it would be naive to believe that Hero will operate MIFA they way they worked before. Hero wants the brands and the distribution, not the production. I am pretty sure that they will not guarantee a lot of jobs.

- but at least, the order that existing equity gets wiped out before the senior bonds still holds, even under German law. I had some serious doubts about this.

The most important lesson: As I have written before, new corporate bonds under German law should be avoided at all cost. Especially the “Mittelstandsanleihen” are in principal similar 20 EUR bills issued at 100 EUR with a tiny little option to receive 100 EUR. The “lipstick on this pig” is the high coupon. But German investors seem to buy anything with a high coupon these days anyway. No surprise maybe if you have to pay for holding 2 year treasuries at the time of writing.

Short cuts: Installux, Gronlandsbanken, Admiral

Installux

Compared to Poujoulat and other French company, Installux released almost sensationally good 6M results. Sales went up +3% which is quite impressive for a domestic, France focused company and net result went up almost +14%.

According to the half year report, cash is now around ~86 EUR per share. Only with the 15,80 EUR 6M Earnings per share, Installux would trade at a single digit p/E ex cash even if they make no profit at all in the second 6 months. With a realistic 25-30 EUR per share for the whole year, we are at an cash adjusted P/E of somewhere between 5-6. In my opinion, despite the illiquidity, Installux still offers a great return/risk profile.

Gronlandsbanken

Grondlandsbanken delivered very strong 6 month numbers. 6 month profits of 30 DKK per share were almost 20% higher than in 2013, althhough there were significant positive one time effects included (valuation and disposal gains). Nevertheless, operating results also increased yoy despite overall still muted economic activity. What I found most interesting in the report was this statement from the outlook:

After a weak socio-economic growth and negative GDP in 2012 and 2013, no or a weak growth in the Greenland economy is expected in 2014, however, still with much uncertainty. In the expectation that the prices and
quantities of fish hold steady, that no raw material projects are initiated, but that large construction activities will start in the second half of 2014, the bank expects an increase in activity in 2014. It is, however, si gnificant that the activity in Nuuk remains low, while there is in creased activity in a number of coastal towns. A noticeable activity increase is thus essentially not expected until 2015.

So it seems to be that finally the big projects will be realized with a delay. As Gronlandsbanken has shown that they can increase earnings even without economic growth, I think the stock is “worth” to be upgraded to a “half position”. I will therefore increase the position from 1,9% to around 2,5% at current prices.

Admiral

Already a few days ago, Admiral released H1 2014 numbers. Looking at the stock price, many investors seem to have been dissapointed:

Analysts have mostly lowered their ratings and/or price targets:

Firm Analyst Recommendation Tgt Px Date↑ 1 Yr Rtn BARR Rank
Credit Suisse Chris Esson neutral 1350 08/18/14
Canaccord Genuity Corp Ben Cohen sell 1220 08/15/14 4th
Berenberg Sami Taipalus sell 1168 08/14/14
Nomura Fahad Changazi buy 1493 08/14/14 10.64% 4th 5th
Exane BNP Paribas Andy Hughes underperform 1070 08/14/14
Deutsche Bank Oliver Steel hold 1260 08/13/14 2nd
Keefe, Bruyette & Woods Greig N Paterson market perform 1227 08/13/14
Oriel Securities Ltd Marcus Barnard sell 900 08/13/14 6th
Numis Securities Ltd Nicholas Johnson add 1720 08/12/14 10.97% 3rd
Barclays Andrew Broadfield equalweight 1428 08/12/14 3rd

Tha analyst “consensus” rating in Blommberg is 2,57 which is pretty bad and one of the worst for all European insurers.

Actually, Admiral posted higher profits than the comparable 6 months in 2013, however the released above average reserves. On the other hand, they still invest a lot, especially in US price comparison and the international business. For me, the results were pretty inline with what management has been saying all along. UK car insurance is in a tough spot and will remain so for some time. Interestingly, the all important “auxiliary” income remained constant despite lower premiums which in my opinion is a very good sign.

International premium has increased by 10%, however the loss has increased as well. Allthough I usually don’t like investor presentations that much, but the Admiral presentation is extremely good. There is also a lot to learn about insurance in general, such as the claim inflation example on page 20 or the detailed reinsurance terms on page 48. Also their view on the US market is quite interesting, especially slide 35 with the acquisition cost per insurance contract. For me, this is showing that the Admiral guys know what they are doing which is unfortunately not the general rule in insurance.

The only disappointing part in my opinion is the Italian subsidiary. Admiral says that they didn’t undwrite more as prices were un attractive. Other than that the international business seems to expand nicely.

Reader Musti forwarded me a link why Morgan Stanley sold out Admiral in one of their funds.

The team became more wary of Admiral (LSE:ADM) after the 2011 turbulence in the stock price, after a scare about the potential for large personal injury claims. While the 2011 claims ratio eventually turned out to be fine, it caused a revision in our view of the quality of the name. The combination of the stock’s recovery, and long-term concerns about the effect of autonomous driving on the motor insurance industry, caused us to reduce and then exit the position.

I think this is quite interesting and revealing. They became nervous because the stock price was volatile and that caused a revision of the “qualitiy of the name”. Self driving cars is definitely something to look at but I think no one can say now how quickly this will come and what impact this will have. A self driving car will still need insurance, so much should be clear.

Overall, for me nothing has changed with regard to Admiral. If you want to see smoothly increasing earnings then you have to go somewhere else. If you want a truly great business at a fair price then you should hold or buy more which I might do if the price falls further. I plan to make this a “full” position until the end of the year.

Bouvet ASA (NO0010360266) – 40%+ ROE micro cap from Norway

DISCLAIMER: The stock which is discussed in this post is an illiquid micro cap stock. The author will most certainly have bought it before writing the post and will not necessarily tell you when he sells. This is not an investment advice. Please do your own research and never rely on stock tips without carefully scrutinizing th motivation and assumptions behind them.

The company

Bouvet ASA is a small Norwegian IT consulting company operating almost exclusively in Norway.

The company is the result of a merger of several smaller Norwegian IT consulting companies and, after a management buyout went public in 2007 on the Oslo stock exchange. Current market cap is around 850 mn NOKs or ~ 100 mn EUR, so it is really small.

Valuation wise, the traditional metrics are OK but not spectacular (at 83 NOks):

P/E: 11,8
P/B: 4,8
P/S: 0,7
Dividend yield 7,2%
EV/EBIT: 8,1
EV/EBITDA: 7,3

No debt, the company has net cash of ~15 NOK per share.

Clearly the dividend yield looks attractive but P/B for instance looks quite expensive, so it’s definitely not a Graham cigar butt.


The business

Consulting business itself is a relatively straight forward business. You hire bright young motivated people and “sell them” on a daily basis to companies at a higher price. In between you have to train and motivate them. This business requires very little capital, mostly it is the receivables from clients and some office supply in a small company office. You don’t need big offices anyway as the consultants are usually at the client’s site.

In my opinion, barriers to entry and therefore competitive advantages in consulting can be achieved via:

1) “Brand name”

The brand name is important for two purposes:

a) For clients: Hiring a “famous” consultant is more expensive but also lowers the “reputational risk” for a project sponsor. If “xyz consulting” is screwing up a project, then the project sponsor has a problem because he hired and unknown consultant. If McKinsey screws up, than it’s not his fault. Achieving a brand is not that easy, so entering the market on the “High end” is not that easy either. It needs time to build up the reputation, although in IT consulting the brand name is a little less relevant than in typical management consulting.

b) For employees: In order to get the best employees, you must have a good reputation with Students, MBAs etc. Without good people you cannot charge high prices, so this is a self-reinforcing cycle once you are on the list of the “High potentials”. High potentials these days have many options, consulting companies, start-ups, investment banks, Google, brand companies etc.

2) Existing client list

It is always easier to pitch “from the inside” than from the outside. Once you are inside a company as consultant, you have access to decision makers which is essential to sell new projects. If you do a good job, many managers will think twice to go through an official bidding process and give the follow-up work to the consultant who is already there. Even for projects with a competitive bidding, it is always better to have some “Inside” knowledge, especially about the client company culture etc. The bigger the client company, the better the chances to get additional projects. Large companies have a surprisingly large “thirst” for consultants.

3) Network effect of “old” consultants with important function

Consulting is not a job to get old. Most young employees will switch to a “normal” job at some point in time. If you treat your employees well, they will be proud of having worked there. Often consultants switch to relatively senior jobs or get hired straight way by clients. If they then search for consultants, they will often give the first shot to their former colleagues (and friends…). This is even more important in management consulting but also important for IT consultants. Good consulting companies “groom” their network of ex colleagues via regular “off site” meetings in nice location.

So how does Bouvet score on these 3 categories ? From my armchair perspective, it is clearly difficult to judge. With regard to attractiveness to employees; Bouvet seems to do some things right, as they are regularily among the “top places to work” both in Norway and Europe. Employee reviews are generally good, although I found one comment that the atmosphere might be a little bit “too relaxed”.

I cannot judge how good their network is, but at least the “Brand” seems to be good in Norway. The client list seems to be as good as it gets in Norway, with Statoil being a big client as well as the Norwegian Government.

Additionally to their consulting (or as a result of it), they also seem to develop some specializes software, for instance this one which measures electricity consumption of trains.

Financial track record

The easiest way to look how Bouvet is doing is of course to look at their financials

EPS ROE NI margin Div Payout ratio
2006 3,04 53,6% 7,7%    
2007 3,96 39,3% 8,3% 3,70 121,8%
2008 5,51 42,3% 9,8% 4,00 100,9%
2009 4,21 34,3% 7,2% 3,75 68,0%
2010 4,78 40,1% 6,8% 4,10 97,3%
2011 6,13 50,0% 7,0% 5,00 104,6%
2012 5,41 40,2% 5,4% 5,00 81,6%
2013 6,75 46,2% 6,2% 5,00 92,4%
2014       6,00 88,9%
           
CAGR/avg 10,5% 43,2% 7,3%   99,4%

Them most remarkable part is clearly that they managed to grow EPS by 10,5% p.a. and distribute 100% of their profit as dividend. This shows that consulting can be really good business if done right and Bouvet at least in the past seems to have done a lot of things right.

Let’s look at a quick peer group comparison:

EPS Growth NI margin ROE Payout ratio EV/EBIT
Accenture 14,3% 7,5% 64,4% 146,0% 12,0
Cap Gemini 3,0% 3,9% 8,8% 103,0% 8,8
Atos 5,6% 1,7% 5,7% 109,0% 9,3
Bechtle 10,2% 2,8% 13,6% 100,0% 12,1
Reply 16,2% 5,4% 16,4% 100,0% 8,8
Tieto -3,6% 3,90% 12,3% 89,0% 17,0
           
Bouvet 10,5% 7,3% 43,2% 99,3% 8,1

Interestingly, payout ratios are in all cases around 100%. However margins and especially return on equity are very different. Clearly US behemoth Accenture shows outstanding ratios in any category, but the stock is also priced a lot higher than the competitors. The comparison in my opinion shows that Bouvet is cheap compared to how good the business look. Bouvet has at least double the profit margins and multiple time ROE compared to those peers and still trades as the cheapest stock in this group.

Other considerations

Management / compensation

This is CEO Sverre Hurum, who owns 4,9% of the Bouvet SA:

He earned around 330k EUR total comp in 2013. This is actually slightly less than what he earned as dividend on his ~5% stake. So at first sight, comp seems to be reasonable and aligned with shareholders. One has to mention that he seems to have sold 1,4% some years ago, he used to own 6,3%.

Other than for instance the Akka CEO, he is not into motor racing but seems to enjoy cross-country skiing. The CFO Erik Stuboe owns another 2,35% in the company.

Analyst coverage /shareholders

Only 2 analysts are covering the stock according to Bloomberg and only one analysis is actually from 2014 (ABG, price target 110 NOK).

Other shareholders:

No dominating shareholders, mostly Nordic pension funds and asset managers. The biggest shareholder is Varner Kapital, the investment arm of a rich Norwegian textile family, followed by Stenshagen, another Norwegian investor with 8%, Interestingly, none of the big international investment companies is invested, this seems to be a “Local” stock.

Stock price & performance

Shareholders who bought Bouvet at the IPO and held the stock, will be very happy. They made 21,9% p.a. or 320% in total compared to only 3,9% p.a. for the Norwegian Stock index.

Despite the stock price increase, the valuation of Bouvet stayed mostly in the 11-13 P/E range as profits rose proportionally to the stock price. The stock has a very low beta to the stock market (0,38). That is not terribly important but good for my nerves especially in volatile markets….

“Flying under the radar” or why is the stock cheap ?

Bouvet is a micro cap stock. Most of the stock is held by pension funds etc, so although free float is theoretically there, trading volume is very low, around 60k EUR per day. So for many small cap funds, this is not interesting as they want to be able to move in and out of a stock relatively quickly. On the other side, this is also a potential “double upside” for investors who are able to invest “under the radar screen”. If the company continues to grow, at some point in time the market cap, free float and trading volume get so big that smaller funds become interested. In such a case, multiple expansion is often very likely. So as an investor, investing in a small, unknown grwoth stock the upside is much better than compared to an “established” stock with a relatively big free float


Negatives:

- expansion outside Norway difficult. Norway is a high cost country, exporting Norwegian consultants to other countries will most likely not work that well
– CEO is 57, how long will he continue ?
– cost structure most likely not as flexible as in an US style company
– consulting is to a certain extent personalized business. If employees are unhappy they can leave the firm but keep the client

Valuation / return expectation

Instead of coming up with a valuation, this time I make an even simpler case. I want to earn 15% on this investment p.a. With the 7,2% dividend yield, I am almost half way there. In order to earn another 8% p.a. over 3-5 years I need either:

- a multiple expansion. Based on the current cash adjusted multiple of ~10xP/E, it is not unreasonable to expect a 12-13 multiple at some point in the future
– or, based on the same multiple ~7% p.a. which is slightly below the CAGR since IPO (around 8% pa.a.)

I am willing to “bet” that it ois likely that one of those 2 scenarios will happen. If both happen, then my upside would be much higher.

Summary:

Bouvet in my opinion is the perfect “boring” small cap company I am looking for. Although it is neither terribly cheap nor having a big moat, it is a very good business at a reasonable price. It is pretty much neglected from analysts and the shareholders seem to be “strong hands”. The company is very shareholder friendly and has good growth potential in a normal environment. There is no “catalyst” event around the corner, but I still think that it is a very good complimentary position to my current portfolio, adding some Norwegian exposure along my mostly continental Europe /UK stocks.

I will therefore establish a “half position” (2,5%) at current prices of ~85 NOK per share. My target would be a 50-75% gain within 3-5 years including dividends.

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