Monthly Archives: May 2012

Update DJE Real Estate, SEB and CS Euroreal

DJE Real Estate

Thanks to a friend a received the link to the recording including the slides.

Most important points:

– cash payment of ~17-20% of NAV in Juli (1.30-1.50 EUR)
– however overall cash flow to fund holders much slower than initially thought

In the original post I wrote the following

A) around 2/3 of the fund’s investments (based on NAV) are relatively liquid. It should be no big problem for DJE to return 5 EUR or more within the next 12 months or so. This would mean that at current prices, the investment itself should flow back pretty soon and the discount to intrinsic value could decrease equally soon

This seems to be have been overly optimistic. As far as I understood, a couple of funds have extension options from the side of the fund and some of the still open funds need at least 12 months notice to get the money.

According to management, the secondary market for those funds seem to be very illiquid with large discounts.

So for the portfolio, I will start selling the fund from today on, as my investment case which implied signifcant cash flows in the next 12 months does not really hold.

SEB & CS Euroreal

As now already widely known, the SEB has closed for good beginning of last week.

The CS Eurreal is trying its luck now with Monday, May 21st as the last day where investors can ask for redemptions.

Current price action and price to NAV for the CS indicates a very low propability of reopening:

So potential real estate buyers will see a large pipeline of real estate offers from all those funds with sometimes quite similar objects.

One thing which is interesting is that as far as I know, the funds do not really have to sell all obejcts within the communicated timeframe (i.e. SEB 5 years, AXA 3 years). If they don’t manage to sell, the deposit bank has to take over.

As the deposit banks most likely will not want to be involved in those cases (there will be a wall of law suits along the way) they most likely will directly auction off the properties.

So the end could be quite ugly in the worst case. On the other hand, if prices fall further, the run off funds could become interesting again.

SIAS SpA – Deutsche Bank “buy” recommendation and risk free rates

Normally I tend to ignore any sell side ratings for the stocks I am interested in.

However, this time with the Deutsche Bank “buy recommendation” for portfolio Stock SIAS (target 7,70 EUR) I find it interesting how they justify their valuation in the summary:

Our target price of E7.7 is based on an SoTP, which values each concession with an individual DCF based on an 8.5% WACC (5.5% risk-free, 5.0% risk premium and beta of 1.3x). We subtract net debt and provision and we then apply a 20% discount to reflect lower liquidity than peers and risk of value destructive M&A. Sias trades at a 30% discount to the European peers: 2012E EV/EBITDA is 4.5 (vs. 7x for the sector) and 2012E PE is 7.4x (10x). Downside risks are regulatory changes, more negative traffic performances, capex delays and value-destructive M&A (see page 32).

This is highly interesting. As I have written in an earlier post about risk free rates, the CAPM requires to use the default free risk free rate in the currency of the issuer.

It is difficult to determine an “undisturbed” risk free rate in the EURO anyway and maybe the 10 Year rate for Bunds at 1,46% is too low, but using 5.5% as a EUR risk free rate is defintiely wrong. Even more as the Bonds outstanding from SIAS yield 4.9 and 5.4%, which is below the assumed risk free rate.

In my opinion, the Deutsche Bank assumptions double counts the Italian risk because they use a high Beta and a “risky” rate to discount rate. Just as another interesting point: SIAS beta relative to the Italian FTSE MIB is only 0.8.

Nevertheless it is interesting, that even with double counting Italian risk they still end up with a price target of 7,70 EUR which would imply a 65% upside from the current 4.70 EUR.

This shows how undervalued some of the PIIGS shares are at the moment.

Magic Sixes – “new entries” quick check (BAM, ENEL, Mr. Bricolage, Europac)

After the recent stock market declines I had a look into the “Magic Sixes” screen (P/E < 6, P/B 6%), if some interesting companies show up as potential candidates for “contrarian” Plays.

Currently, using Bloomberg, the following “new” companies seem to be interesting:

BAM Groep

P/E 5.9, P/B 0.49, Div. Yield 6,42%

Dutch constrcution group. However highly leveraged, lots of goodwill and negative free cash flow, chart looks like a falling knife on the way to zero —> NOPE

ENEL SpA

P/E 5.4, P/P 0.57, Div. Yield 10.7 %

Large Italian utility.. Political risk, high debt load and negative tangible book. Howver significant free cash flow genration –> WATCHLIST

Mr. Bricolage

P/E 5,3, P/B 0.4, Div. Yield 6.34%

French DIY chain. Relatively low tangible book, relatively high debt but improving. Stable results over past year —> WATCHLIST

Europac

P/E 4.6, P/B 0.6, Div. Yield 7.7%

Spanish paper and cardboard producer. Good tangible book, however relatively high debt load. Volatile Free Cashflow generation, although very profitable in 2011 —> WATCHLIST

Summary: It is interesting to see that some “normal” companies enter into the “Magic Sixes territory”. So the choice for contrarian invetsments is getting better.

French stocks (3): Poujoulat (ISIN FR0000066441) – boring building materials or renewable energy growth machine ?

After my first French stock analysis Installux, let’s have a look at another of my favourite French small caps, Poujoulat SA

As this is a pretty long post, I will introduce a kind of “management summary” in the beginning:

SUMMARY:

– Poujoulat is a small family owned chimney producer in France

– company is not an asset play (P/E ~ 8, P/B 0.9) but a cheap stock which showed consistent profit growth of 15% CAGR since 1999 with little impact from business cycles

– Poujoulat has profited and profits from the secular trend to energy-efficient heating and is investing into renewable energy (wood pellets)

– if the new “renewable energy” segment really takes of, the company could be worth multiples of the current stock price, if not, the downside is relatively limited as the stock is cheap without any growth

Introduction

Bloomberg describes the company as follows:

Poujoulat is involved in the building supply and heating industries, and specializes in manufacturing chimneys. The Company, through its subsidiaries, supplies construction companies and individuals in France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Belgium.

If we look at “traditional value metrics, the stock is cheap but not spectacularly so (all information from the 2011 annual report)

MArket Cap: 62 mn EUR
P/E 2011 8,0
P/B 2011 ~0.95
P/S 0.4
EV/EBITDA ~5
Div. Yield 2.7%

So nothing special which would show up on one of the various screeners. So what’s interesting about this company ? That becomes clear if we look at the recent history since 1999:

TRAIL_12M_EPS NI Margin ROE ROIC
1999 2.61 2.9% 8.3% 5.6%
2000 3.39 3.4% 10.0% 6.1%
2001 5.85 4.9% 15.8% 8.6%
2002 3.81 2.9% 9.3% 5.3%
2003 5.41 3.9% 12.2% 6.7%
2004 5.10 3.4% 10.5% 6.3%
2005 7.56 4.3% 13.6% 9.9%
2006 9.76 4.7% 15.2% 15.7%
2007 11.62 4.8% 15.8% 10.6%
2008 14.19 5.0% 16.8% 10.3%
2009 16.73 5.9% 17.0% 9.9%
2010 18.15 5.8% 15.8% 9.8%
2011 16.62 4.6% na na

Poujoulat managed to grow its earnings relatively steady by 15% CAGR from 1999 to 2011.

NI margin have almost doubled, however with a small set back in 2011. ROE has increased to a nice 15-17%, ROIC is slightly lower because Poujoulat has some debt on its balance sheet.

So this stock looks like some nice “Growth at reasonable price” stock or GARP. GARP investing was the “Mantra” of Peter Lynch, the legendary Fidelity Portfolio manager.

The most important ratio for “GARP ers” is the PEG (or Price Earnings Growth ratio). The PEG ratio is calculated relatively easy by P/E divided through the growth rate in absolute terms.

For Poujoulat this would be

P/E = 8 , Growth 15%, PEG = 8/15 = 0.53. Everything under 1 is normally considered good, a value like here at 0.53 is even considered very good.

I have no statistical evidence if GARP really works, but all things equal, I always prefer a cheap growing stock to a super cheap no growth stock.

Business model / reason for past growth

Before we go into the valuation exercise, let’s have a look at the business itself. Chimney manufacturing is a highly localised and fragmented industry. Poujoulat calls itself “market leader in Europe” however 85-90% of their business is located in France.

As chimneys are an important part in Fire prevention, chimneys have to be certified by the respective authorities in most countries. So we have certain local barriers of entry because you cannot just import stuff from China and sell it, but I wouldn’t consider this as a really high moat.

Most chimneys are sold through the respective construction companies, so the sales organisation is more business to business than business to consumers. So we should not expect too many branding effects etc. However I could imagine that a good established b2b sales force (plus service and infrastructure) might be a competitive advantage.

Chimneys themselves are not only simple tubes to lead exhausts outside the house, but there seems to be a fair amount of technical knowledge involved.

In summary I would assume that there is no real moat in this business but maybe some regional competitive advantages like sales force etc.. So where did the strong growth in the last 10-12 years come from ?

The answer is relatively easy: usually you need a new chimney if you build a new house or if you change the heating system. As everyone knows, building activity itself is somehow subdued, but due to high oil prices and government incentives, heating systems are being exchanged in an ever-increasing pace.

What seems to be especially interesting is the fact that you seem to get nice tax credits in France especially for wood pellet stoves. According to this article, tax credits have evolved as follows:

In France, 30 – 40% of the population in most areas uses wood as a primary or secondary heat source. However, there was not the explosion of low efficiency polluting devices that occurred in the US in the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, the average French person does not regard wood heating as a pollution problem as many Americans are likely to.

France has had tax credits for stoves at 15% starting since at least 2001. In 2005, they rose to 40% and were as much as 50% in 2008 and 2009. In 2010 they went down to 40%, and in 2011 they were further reduced to 36%. Due to budget cuts, tax credits are likely to be reduced again in 2012 or end altogether.

Also many of the other energy-saving heating systems usually require new chimneys as exhaust fumes are colder and more humid.

So one could compare this a little bit with the German company STo AG, which produces insulation material and profited as well from the energy-saving boom.

If we compare the charts, we can see that at least to a certain extent the stocks performed similar to each other:

So to summarize the business case: We do not have a moat company but a company which has profited and might profit from a secular trend, in this case energy-saving.

Valuation

Even if we don’t account for growth, the company seems to be really cheap. We can buy a company below book value with an ROE of 15%. Even if we assume no growth and 10% CoC, Poujoulat should still be worth something like 160-170 EUR.

If we assume only half of the growth from the past (~7%) then the stock would could be worth 300-400 EUR.

So from a valuation point of view, I think one gets a free option on the further growth of energy-saving solutions which is not a bad deal.

Management / Shareholders / etc.

The company is led by Frederic Coirier, the son of Yves Coirier who bought the majority of the company in 1975 and is still President of the supervisory board.

Son:

Father:

The family holds around 73% of the shares, another 11% are held by three French funds according to Bloomberg. In the annual report they mention a forth fund (“Ocean”). So free float is really small, below 10 mn EUR.

Balance Sheet quality seems to be relatively good. Only small amounts of goodwill, no big acquisitions in the past. The company uses debt. Debt to capital ratios improved until 2010, but debt increased due to relatively large investments in 2011. I did not find anything with regard to hidden assets.

Unlike Installux, there is a link to the annual report on the homepage, even English annual reports are available, unfortunately only until 2009. On a quarterly basis, the company only issues sales updates.

Issues / Problems

For a “perfect” stock, Poujoulat does not generate enough free cashflow. Total Free Cashflow since 1999 is negative. This means that they actually had to invest to grow. Which is normal for a company but some investors do not seem to like companies who invest in fixed assets.

Especially in 2011, Poujoulat invested 25 mn EUR or almost a third of the market cap into fixed assets. On the other hand, if a company manages to earn 10% on invested capital and 15% ROE relatively stable across business cycles one could argue that this is actually a good sign if a company has such reinvestment opportunities.

Another issue to be aware of is of course the impact of tax credits and regulations. This is an issue all the renewable energy stocks share, the impact of the Government is huge and regulations could change quickly.

Finally trading for the stock is really illiquid and prices jump around like crazy. It is nor unlikely that from session to session, prices move by 10% without any news up or down.

New business segment

One interesting aspect is that they are actually diversifying away from producing chimneys. Starting only in 2011 they show now a separate segment “Bois energy” which I would translate as “wood based energy”. Almost 50% of new investments in 2011 went into this area, however with a negative result of -600 K EUR in 2011.

If I understood this article correctly (and Google translated well), they are actually moving into manufacturing wood pellets and logs to be used in wood heating. The new production site also seems to include a biomass electricity generation.

Normally I would see this kind of activity as “diworsification” but with Poujoulat this might be a little bit different. Due to their know how with wood heating and chimneys, they might have a relatively good inside view into this market.

So this could even be the start of a new fast growing segment for the company. As far as I know, the wood pellet market is currently quickly growing and to my knowledge, Poujoulat is the only listed company with exposure to this segment of renewable energy. I have some friends who work in Private Equity who consider this area as quite interesting.

The business segment showed a loss in 2011 although this seems to be normal if you start something like this from scratch. In another article, they say that the new processing plant went live only in Novmeber 2011. Here is a picture:

Accoring to the articel, the dried wood logs and pellets are sold through 1.400 point of sales. So this is something to watch closely, although due to the reporting of Poujoulat we will see the next results only in next year’s annual report.

If we assume a 15% growth rate for this business and a 10% ROA based on the current 25 mn EUR investment, this segment alone could be worth an additional 50-100 EUR per Poujoulat share.

Current quarter

In the first quarter 2012. as usual they only report sales divided into France and “export”. On a group level, they increased sales by a whopping 14.5%, with France actually growing 17%.I assume that this includes the wood energy segment has contributed significantly to this growth.

If the Wood energy business returns the same ROA as the other businesses, we should see some extra 3-4 EUR earnings per share pretty soon.

Summary:

As a pure building material stock, Poujoulat would not be interesting. However due to the fact that they profit over proportionally from the secular trend to energy-saving, the stock becomes more interesting. The final argument for me was the “free option” included for the new segment “wood energy” which looks promising and is not priced in my opinion.

So for the portfolio I will start accumulating Poujoulat from today with a limit of EUR 140, although due to the low trading volume it might take a while before a reach even 1% of the portfolio.

Praktiker Bond – catalyst event (sort of…)

Interesting developement for my “special situation” investment, the 2016 Praktiker senior bond. In my analysis I had written the following:

Potential Catalyst:

In my opinion, something with regard to financing has to happen this year. So there might be a good chance that the bond reacts positively within a limited time frame if the refinancing package is hopefully finalized.

So fast forward to this weekend: The CEO and another board member have been fired and one oof the supervisory board members stepped in.

According to this Handelsblatt article, a new restructuring concept was presented by the largest shareholder which requires a lot less capital (120 mn EUR compared to 300 mn EUR) than initially announced.

There seems to be a new loan of 85 mn EUR and a capital increase in the pipeline, however no further details are available.

If one looks at the chart of the bond one can see that this was clearly positive news for the bond:

So where do we stand with regard to the initial scenario analysis ?

With this in mind, I think one can now try to analyse the different possible scenarios for bondholders, which in my opinion are

1) No bankruptcy – (unrealistic) best case: Take over within 1-2 year and early full pay out of bond
2) No bankruptcy – normal case: Bond pays out as scheduled
3) No bankruptcy – bad case: coupon gets reduced in second round of bondholders vote
4) bancruptcy – normal case: bond gets “fair” share of liquidation value 40% in 2016
5) bancruptcy – bad case: “DIP” financing reduces liquidation value significantly , value 10% in 201

I think at the moment, it is too early to fully assess the situation as the details of the financing are not available yet. Due to the bond covenants I asume the loan financing might be tricky.

So for the time being, I will hold the bond despite the quick 30%+ gain in only a few weeks. However if the bond goes above 60% without further news I will most likely sell as the intrinsic value of the negative (and cautious) scenario would have been fully realized.

Edit: On Praktiker’s homepage they issued a press release about this.

They talk of ” Vorrangiges Darlehen” which equals a senior secured loan. It will be interesting to see how they reralize this. As I have mentioned before, the bond contains a “negative pledge” covenant which should prevent any pledging of relevant assets. So this will be really interesting….

Weekly links

If you only want to read one thing today, I would highly recommend the Jim Chanos Interview in the spring issue of the Graham & Doddsville newsletter.

Great post at Greenbacked about the Magic Formula

Interesting post about fallen Angel UK retailer Supergroup from ExpectingValue

Excellent write up on Avon by Wexboy.

Nate from Oddball about managing risk an and learning from mistakes. Odd how similar his portfolio management rules are to my rules.

Stefan at SimpleValue analyses AutoHellas, a Greek company which is on my watchlist but I never really had time to write about. Recommended !!!

SIAS SpA – Mixed Q1 report & special dividend

It was an interesiting week for SIAS SpA shareholders already. Today, SIAS published Q1 numbers.

Traffic decreased significantly, but was compensated more or less through tariff hikes.

The most interesting part of the press releae was however this one:

As already highlighted in Management Discussion & Analysis of the Financial Statements as of 31 December 2011, SIAS S.p.A. has signed an agreement on 24 February 2012 with Autostrade per l’Italia S.p.A. concerning the disposal of the entire stake held in Autostrade Sud America S.r.l. (representative of 45,765% of share capital) for an overall amount of EUR 565.2 million; on 8 March 2012 the first installment – equal to EUR 100 million – of the consideration has been collected. The predictable completion of the transaction in the above mentioned terms (expected by 30 June 2012) could result in the distribution of an extraordinary dividend, in one or more tranches, associated to the capital gain produced by the same disposal.

As I have written earlier, the capital gain has been around 380 mn EUR.

So this could mean a special dividend of up to EUR 1,50 per share. I consider this announcement as extremely positive, as the fear of Gavio using SIAS for further Impregilo purchases should be no longer valid.

Maybe this explains the crazy reversal int he stock price from yesterday’s lows:

Together with the normal dividend, at the current price of 4,80 EUR one gets back more than 40% of the shareprice in the next 12 months. That should be quite some support for the share price.

On this basis I will accumulate up to a full position beginning next week.

By the way, yesterday’s 1% purchase was executed at the VWAP of 4,39 EUR per share.

SIAS SpA stock tanking – what to do ?

At the moment, my portfolio position SIAS is tanking like crazy. Interstingly much more than Autostrada:

The reason seems to be quite obvious: People are worried that Gavio will use SIAS to fund further Impregilo Purchases.

Interestingly, there seems to be now an activist Investor on board who has voiced this concern publicly, Italian version here.

He is basically demanding that Gavio publicly announces not to use SIAS (and the cash proceeds from the South America sale) to fund further Impregilo purchases.

The current share price however speaks a different language. So what to do now ? In the case of Autostrada, it had paid to sell first and ask questions later.

In this case howver, I am currently inclined to wait as nothing has happened yet. The publicity of the activist investor will make it more difficult for Gavio to use the funds in a bad way for minority shareholders.

Lutetia Capital itself seems to be a contrarian event driven fundSuch an announcement of course would be highly beneficial for the stock. The boss of Lutetia is a Lazard veteran which is intersting as Lazard is a 5% shareholder of SIAS.

So at the moment I will watch and do nothing, howver I am tempted to “ride the coat tail” of the activist investor at some point in time and increase the exposure if they seem to be succesfull.

Edit: As AS said in the comments, price targets were adjusted downwards, but I usually try to ignore those “trend following” activities.

Edit: I jsut saw that already 3.8 mn stocks were traded whcih is 10 times the normal volume. Maybe this is some kind of sell out. So I will add 1% Portfolio Weight as of today to the SIAS position.

Digging deeper: Short interest and stock performance

In my last post about potential short candidates, I said:

Personally, I would hesitate to short anything above a 15%-20% percentage of SI/Free float although I have no “hard knowledge” to support this.

In the comments, Winter correctly pointed out that one could also argue the other way around, the higher the short interest, the higher the possibility that the stock will drop.

Interestingly, for many trades, stocks with high short interests seem to be attractive long opportunities as pages like this show.

To quote them:

Stocks with high short interest are often very volatile and are well known for making explosive upside moves (known as a short squeeze). Stock traders will often flock to such stocks for no reason other than the fact that they have a high short interest and the price can potentially move up very quickly as traders with open short positions move to cover.

Googling around a littel bit I found the following interesting paper called Short Interest and Stock Returns

The introduction starts of supporting Winter comment:

It is now widely accepted that stocks with high short interest ratios underperform the market. This is a very recent bit of conventional wisdom, based largely on the evidence in Asquith and Meulbroek’s (1995) unpublished working paper for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (Amex) stocks, and Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran’s (2002) article for Nasdaq stocks. Both Asquith and Meulbroek and Desai et al report negative and significant abnormal returns for firms with short interest ratios of 2.5% or more, where the short interest ratio is defined as the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding. Both papers also report large secular increases in short interest ratios, and skewed cross-sectional distributions, with most stocks having short interest ratios of less than 0.5%, and very few firms having a ratio exceeding 10%. Prior to these papers, the conventional wisdom was that large short positions presaged positive future returns, caused by the flow demand from short sellers covering their positions

The paper is worth a read. In general, the authors confirm that stocks with high short ratios seem to underperform:

Consistent with other studies, we find that the higher the short interest ratio, the lower is the subsequent performance. That is, firms with short interest ratios of 10% or more underperform those of 5% or 2.5%.

Their research shows that the effect is not so significant as previously thought and that it only works for equal weighted portfolios, not for market cap weighted portfolios.

They paper also gives a good overview of ohter papers on this topic, it seems to be that this area is not as well researched as others.

Their results can be summarized with this quote:

We find that the underperformance of high short interest firms is fairly brief, and only rapid portfolio turnover allows us to realize this underperformance. We also examine whether high short interest is based only on valuation concerns and find that convertible bond arbitrage is a major reason for high short interest as well. Finally, we show that the performance of high short interest NYSE-Amex stocks is more severe and consistent than for their Nasdaq 24 counterparts over the period July 1988-2002, and that small cap firms make up a large portion of the firms that are highly shorted.

Howver they question if a such a strategy can be effectively implemented especially as the overall universe of high short interest stocks is relatively small.

One aspect is missing in the paper in my opnbion : As far as I could see they did not explicitly incorporate volatility of returns. So the outperformance could be just the effect of a much higher volatility of those shares.

However as a first summary, I will have to rethink my gut feeling to stay away from stocks with high short interest.

It might make also sense for short idea generation to use those short interest tables, especially AMEX/ NYSE stocks.

Currently the NYSE page from the link mentioned above shows the following top 20 NYSE stocks with high short interest:

TEA Teavana Holdings, Inc. NYSE 60.04% 8.81M 38.31M Retail (Grocery)
HGG hhgregg, Inc. NYSE 54.35% 17.26M 37.24M Retail (Technology)
BPI Bridgepoint Education Inc NYSE 53.93% 17.23M 52.21M Schools
BKS Barnes & Noble Inc NYSE 49.68% 38.38M 60.20M Retail (Specialty Non-Apparel)
GME GameStop Corp. NYSE 49.46% 131.18M 133.98M Retail (Technology)
KBH KB Home NYSE 47.06% 65.44M 77.10M Construction Services
SVU SUPERVALU INC. NYSE 41.95% 210.68M 212.26M Retail (Grocery)
ESI ITT Educational Services, Inc. NYSE 39.67% 24.44M 24.75M Schools
OSG Overseas Shipholding Group Inc NYSE 38.20% 23.27M 30.45M Water Transportation
MCP Molycorp, Inc. NYSE 37.87% 56.05M 96.40M Metal Mining
RSH RadioShack Corporation NYSE 36.41% 98.46M 99.43M Retail (Technology)
CRR CARBO Ceramics Inc. NYSE 35.98% 19.73M 23.09M Oil Well Services & Equipment
USNA USANA Health Sciences, Inc. NYSE 35.81% 6.17M 14.99M Personal & Household Products
ONE Higher One Holdings, Inc NYSE 34.55% 32.64M 56.81M Schools
SAM Boston Beer Company, Inc., The NYSE 34.14% 8.40M 8.79M Beverages (Alcoholic)
AM American Greetings Corporation NYSE 33.79% 34.51M 35.54M Printing & Publishing
GDP Goodrich Petroleum Corp NYSE 33.26% 26.03M 36.37M Oil & Gas Operations
URI United Rentals, Inc. NYSE 31.78% 63.05M 63.77M Rental & Leasing
CJES C&J Energy Services Inc NYSE 31.63% 39.07M 51.89M Oil Well Services & Equipment
FIO Fusion-IO, Inc. NYSE 31.15% 49.59M 90.12M Computer Hardware

Some of those stocks even show up regulary on value blogs. So another application of such lists could be to even more scrutinize “value stocks” with high short interest as they might be potential value traps.

A final word on European stocks: Unfortunately, the disclosure of short interest in Europe is close to non-existent. Also, as the Volkswagen example showed, “cornering” is still an issue with European stocks. So in any case one should be extra carefull with single stock shorts.

Idea generation – potential short candidates (Zagg, Rite Aid, Zynga, Groupon, Herbalife, Overstock.com, SodaStream)

After closing the Green Mountain Short yesterday (final gain ~55%), I have only Kabel Deutschland left.

So of course I am looking for new short opportunities. As mentioned in an earlier post, the ideal short candidate should have most of the following “features”:

+ shady accounting
+ massive insider sales
+ negative free cashflows
+ pumped up growth through expensive acquisitions
+ expiring patents
+ hyped or “fad” based business model
+ very expensive valuation
+ high debt load and/or pension liabilities, operating leases etc.

Some of great sources for “shady accounting” or “accounting shenanigans” are specialised accounting blogs.

One of my favourite blogs is the fanatastic “Grumpy old Accountants” Blog. The writers, professors and assistent professors from US universities really produce superior forensic accounting analysis of US companies.

It is both, a great place to learn as well as to get some interesting short ideas.

Their latest analysis, which are all worth a read are about the following companies:

Zagg, which among other things inflates cashflow by accounting receivables as cash.

Rite Aid , the US drug store chain. I especially like the old post called “Rite Aid: Is management selling drugs or using them ?”

Groupon

Zynga

Personally, I think Zynga might be an interesting candidate if the Facebook IPO hype lifts their shareprice in the coming week.

Another interesting candidate they mention is Overstock.com, which is also a favourite of the initial Green Mountain critic Sam Antar at White Collar Fraud and J2 Global, a “cloud computing” company.

Another source for short ideas are of course famous hedge fund managers, most notable Jim Chanos and David Einhorn
For instance Herbalife. If David Einhorn himself is asking questions , you don’t want to bet against him.

Another “classic” is SodaStream, the company once called “the next Green Mountain”, when times were great then.

WARNING:

Many of those companies have already large short positions outstanding. Sodastream for instance has a Short interest to Free Float ratio of 58%, meaning that 58% of all freely available shares are sold short.

Another factor to watch closely is the relationship between outstanding short positions and trading volume. This measure is called “days to cover”. For an illiquid stock, even relatively low short interest percentages can lead to a long period of “days to cover” and therefore increase the risk of painful short squeezes

Let’s have a quick look at the stocks mentioned (sorted by SI / free float):

SI/Free float Days to cover
Herbalife 5.14% 4.9
Rite Aid 5.70% 3.5
Zynga 14.80% 3.5
Groupon 15.25% 4.8
Overstock.com 18.61% 26.2
J2 Global 24.43% 19.2
Zagg 44.66% 10.8
Sodastream 58.42% 10.8

Personally, I would hesitate to short anything above a 15%-20% percentage of SI/Free float although I have no “hard knowledge” to support this.

Summary: I do not have obvious short candidates yet, but I will try to enhance the watch list in order to act quickly if the opportunity comes up.

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