Praktiker Bond (ISIN DE000A1H3JZ8) – Scenario analysis & crazy hedging idea

I already wrote a lot of posts about Praktiker in the past.

My previous summary was something like this : I don’t understand the motivation behind the recent events especially asking senior bond holders for a cut first before shareholders contribute , why they didn’t do any capital increase when the stock price was higher etc. etc.

After thinking about this the most likely possibility in my opinion is the following thesis:

Current Management doesn’t work in the interest of the current shareholders and bondholders but in the interest of potential future investors.

The result of this is relatively clear: It would be suicide to invest into the shares, as you can take a massive dilution at some point in time for granted. However, a new investor might prefer a “non-bancrupt” company, so for the bond things might look better from a risk/return perspective.

With this in mind, I think one can now try to analyse the different possible scenarios for bondholders, which in my opinion are

1) No bankruptcy – (unrealistic) best case: Take over within 1-2 year and early full pay out of bond
2) No bankruptcy – normal case: Bond pays out as scheduled
3) No bankruptcy – bad case: coupon gets reduced in second round of bondholders vote
4) bancruptcy – normal case: bond gets “fair” share of liquidation value 40% in 2016
5) bancruptcy – bad case: “DIP” financing reduces liquidation value significantly , value 10% in 201

Then we have to do 4 more steps:

First, assign probabilities to each scenario and the second, “model” cashflows.In a third steps we then can calculate “weighted” total cashflow and then calculate an internal rate of return based on current market prices.

In the following table, I have made a first try:

Bankrupt Prob. in % 2013 2014 2015 2016
Best Case No 5.00% 5.88 105.88 0.00 0.00
Normal Case No 60.00% 5.88 5.88 5.88 105.88
bad case No 10.00% 1.00 1.00 1.00 101.00
Normal Case Yes 12.50% 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.00
bad case Yes 12.50% 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00
             
Weighted CF   100% 3.91875 8.91875 3.625 79.875

This scenario would give the bond at the current price of 40% an implicit IRR of 28%, which would be attractive. If we would change for instance the “normal non bancruptcy” probability to 35% and increase the two bancrupty scenarios to 25% each, we would end upwith a 17.6% IRR.

Bankrupt Prob. in % 2013 2014 2015 2016
Best Case No 5.00% 5.88 105.88 0.00 0.00
Normal Case No 35.00% 5.88 5.88 5.88 105.88
bad case No 10.00% 1.00 1.00 1.00 101.00
Normal Case Yes 25.00% 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.00
bad case Yes 25.00% 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00
             
Weighted CF   100% 2.45 7.45 2.16 59.66

An analysis like this can help to understand better the sensitivities of such a rather complicated special situation investment.

Of coure, the probability of bankruptcy is the single most important driver, so let’s discuss this shortly:

On the positive side we have the fact that Praktiker survived the year end and the restocking of inventory for the spring 2012 season. Further, I think at the moment no one has a real advantage if Praktiker goes bankrupt. The biggest problem, the leases for the real estate, could be better reduced if Praktiker would be bancrupt but on the other hand they might have much more problems getting merchandise delivered even if bankruptcy would only be short term.

Additionally, I think the “year end accounting blood bath” makes more sense on a going concern basis than if one would prepare a “prepackaged” bancruptcy.

Potential Catalyst:

In my opinion, something with regard to financing has to happen this year. So there might be a good chance that the bond reacts positively within a limited time frame if the refinancing package is hopefully finalized.

Stand alone risk / return and portfolio view

If I compare Praktiker with the sucessful WestLB Genußschein investment, the Praktiker bond looks more risky, both from the potential downside and time horizon. However, also the potential upside is a lot higher at current levels.

However, on a portfolio level, things look differently. With special situations, I try to make “bets” as long as they are company specific and not directly correlate with each other or “normal” portfolio companies.

With Praktiker, we have the interesting situation that the bond ecoonomically is even negatively correlated with one of my core holdings, Hornbach.

This is something we can clearly see in current company news. In 2011, the German DIY segment showed around 3% growth, Praktiker lost almost 10% in slaes whereas Hornbach and OBI gained significantly above the market growth with 5-6% growth each.

If Praktiker really goes bancrupt, Hornbach among other will profit even more, either through taking over some of the better locations or just gaining more customers. On the other hand, if Praktiker manages the turn around or even gets a startegic shareholder, they might win back a lot of customers from the competition and hurt them significantly.

So one could argue (and I know this sounds a little crazy) that the Praktiker bond combined with the Hornbach shares creates a kind of “hedged” position.

Just for fun I loked at correlations between the Praktiker share, the Praktiker bond and the Hornbach Baumarkt Aktie. And, surprisingly we see the following based on 12 months and daily observations:

Over the last 12 months, the Praktiker share was slightly positively correlated with the Hornbach share (+0.03) whereas the bond was slightly negatively correlated with -.002. Not much but. nevertheless interesting. Again, for instance the last 4 months shows a small positive correlation between the shares (0.05) and a slightly negative correlation (-0.02) between Bond and Hornbach. So maybe not that crazy after all….

Summary:

On a stand alone basis, at current level, the Praktiker Bond is no “sure thing”, but a relatively risky speculation however with a relatively attractive risk/return ratio. In combination with the Hornbach share in my opinion, the combined position has a very intersting risk/return relationship which can greatly increase the expected return of the portfolio by actually reducing risk on an overall level.

I will therefore add a half position (2.5%) of Praktiker 2016 bonds to the portfolio at current prices (limit 41% of nominal value).

Book review: Dark Genius of Wallstreet

Easter time is a good time for a “historical” book review:

The book is about the life of Jay Gould, one of the most notorious “Robber barrons” in the 19th Century in the US.

The so called “robber barons” were a group of several “arch capitalists” who made their money in the 19th century through means which nowerdays would be punished with prison.

However in those days, there was no such things as “insider training”, people were even considered stupid if they traded stocks without insider information.

The first part of the book covers Jay Gould’s childhood which I found personally a little bit boring. It gets more interesting around page 50 or so when Jay Gould’s first real business venture, leather manufacturing is described where he starts as a junior partner.

It is fascinating to see how quickly he realizes that the production part of the value chain is the most capital consuming and risky part wheras the traders need a lot less capital and make more or less the same amount of profit. Naturally he started to speculate early in leather futures.

The “spirit” of those times is already clearly shown in the fight over a leather production site with the heirs of his former partners. “Unfriendly takeovers” in those times were a lot more unfriendly than today, not only involving lawyers but also armed men and gun fights.

Some how naturally he finds his way to Wall Street, where he starts as a so called “curb trader”, traders who literally stood outside the stock exchange and making bets because they had no license to trade directly.

After trading a lot, Gould started pretty early to actually taking over a small railroad company a and operate it on a day today basis. To day one would call this a public-to-private equit deal. This lead directly to the famous battle for Erie Railroad between Gould, Vanderbild, Drew and Fisk one of the most intensively fought battles in corporate history. Anfd fighting again in those times meant armed men etc etc

More or less in parallel, Jay Gould tried with James Fisk tried to corner the Gold market, resulting in the “Black friday” of 1869.

At the peak of his career, he even managed to control Western Union additionally to a combination of several important railroad lines.

Summary:

I think it is a great read for everyone interested in the history of capital markets. The book also shows that nothing is really new in capital markets, neither market volatility nor crashes etc. It is also interesting to gain some insight into those “dark ages” of insider based capital markets, maybe a good training if someone wants to invest in China or India…..

Weekly links – Easter edition

Must read: Graham and Doddsville Winter 2012

Two great posts from Damodaran: First why he sold Apple after owning it since 1997. And second about the importance of the type of shareholders for a company.

Funny April 1st letter to the board of Berkshire Hathaway

Must read: The Grumpy Old Accountants on Groupon: part 1 and part 2. Forensic accounting at its best !!!

Another lesson about Chinese Corporate Governance

Keynes, a superstar stock investor ?

EDIT: Really good new German/English Blog rueckzugsgut Keep it up mate !!

Kurzanalyse Prokon Genußrechte

ACHTUNG: DER FOLGENDE BEITRAG IST DIE PERSÖNLICHE MEINUNG DES AUTORS UND KEINE ANLAGEEMPFEHLUNG ODER ÄHNLICHES. DIE MEINUNGSBILDUNG ERFOLGTE AUF BASIS ÖFFENTLICH VERFÜGBARER INFORMATIONEN. DER AUTOR HAT KEINERLEI WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN ODER FINANZIELLEN INTERESSEN IN ZUSAMMENHANG MIT DEM BESPROCHENEN WERTPAPIER.

Nachdem mir unaufgefordert ein Flyer für Prokon Genußrechte in die Post geflattert ist und ständig nervende pop ups von Prokon auftauchen, habe ich mir rein interessehalber mal die verfügbaren Informationen “zu Gemüte” geführt.

Kritische Pressestimmen gibt es genug, z.b. im Handelsblatt, Stiftung Warentest und beim Privatanleger.

Als fundamental orientierter Investor sollte man sich generell zwei Fragen stellen:

1) Was für ein Instrument wird da angeboten ?
2) in Anhängigkeit von 1), was steckt fundamental dahinter

Zu 1): Das angebotene Instrument ist ein Genußrecht und die haben im Prinzip folgende “Features”:

a) Die Zahlung der Verzinsung ist in der Regel vom Gewinn abhängig, im Gegensatz zu einer Anleihe oder Bankeinlage wo die Verzinsung Gewinnunabhängig ist

Bei Prokon findet man das im Hauptprospekt immerhin schon auf Seit 4 wie folgt:

Verzinsung
GRUNDVERZINSUNG: 6,00 % pro Jahr ab dem Tag, der auf die Wertstellung der jeweiligen Einzahlung auf dem Konto der Emittentin folgt. Die Auszahlung bzw. automatische Gutschrift (Thesaurierung) der Zinsen erfolgt nur, wenn dadurch bei der Emittentin kein Bilanzverlust entsteht. Nicht ausgezahlte bzw.
gutgeschriebene Grundverzinsung in eventuellen Verlustjahren wird in späteren Gewinnjahren nachgezahlt bzw. gutgeschrieben.

b) oft haben Genußrechte eine direkte Verlustbeteiligung, d.h. bei einem verlust reduziert sich automatisch der Rückzahlungsanspruch

Da muss man schon ein bischen länger suchen, aber auf Seite 47 des Prospektes findet man den entsprechenden Passus:

5. Weist die PROKON Regenerative Energien GmbH & Co. KG in ihrem Jahresabschluss einen Jahresfehlbetrag aus, wird dieser nach vollständiger
Aufzehrung der gesetzlichen und eventuellen gesellschaftsvertraglichen Rücklagen zunächst bis zur Höhe des vorhandenen Kommanditkapitals dem Kommanditisten zugewiesen. Sollte die Emittentin darüber hinausgehende Verluste ausweisen, nimmt das Genussrechtskapital daran bis zur vollen Höhe durch entsprechende Verminderung des Genussrechtskapitals teil. Die Rückzahlungsansprüche der Genussrechtsinhaber vermindern sich entsprechend.

Die Einlage des Kommanditisten wird an anderer Stelle mit 400 Tsd. EUR genannt, bei einem ausstehenden Betrag von über 800 Mio Genußrechten also unerheblich.

c) Im Falle einer Insolvenz und/oder Liquidation sind Genußrechte nachrangig, salopp gesagt bekommt man dann das was noch übrig ist, was in der Realität in solchen Fällen meistens einer “0” entspricht.

Auf Seite 49 findet man den entsprechenden Passus:

§ 11
Auflösung der Emittentin 1. Im Falle der Auflösung der Emittentin haben die Genussrechtsinhaber Anspruch auf Rückzahlung des Genussrechtskapitals zum Buchwert, sofern die Emittentin über ausreichende Liquidität verfügt. Der Buchwert wird ermittelt aus dem Nennwert des eingezahlten Genussrechtskapitals abzüglich noch nicht wieder aufgefüllter Verlustanteile zuzüglich noch nicht ausgezahlter Gewinnanteile.
2. Der Rückzahlungsanspruch besteht vorrangig vor der Rückzahlung des Kommanditkapitals, ansonsten nachrangig nach allen anderen nicht nachrangigen Ansprüchen von Gläubigern der Emittentin.

Zwischenfazit: Das Instrument ist also nach allen “Regeln der Kunst” als sehr nachrangiges Kapital anzusetzen, dass ein direktes Verlustrisiko trägt. Ein Vergleich der Anlage sollte deshalb nie anhand von Bank oder Anleihezinsen erfolgen sondern nur im Vergleich zu anderen Eigenkapitalbeteiligungen.

Kommen wir nun zu Punkt 2), der Fundamentalanalyse.

Dazu empfiehlt sich als erster immer den Blick in den Geschäftsbericht.

Was hier auffällt ist Folgendes:

– als “echten” Abschluss gibt es (ähnlich wie bei WGF) nur einen HGB Einzelabschluss, es fehlt der testierte und wirtschaftlich relevantere Konzernabschluss

–> an dieser Stelle kann man eigentlich als fundamental orientierter Anleger gleich wieder aufhören. Nur ein vollkonsolidierter Abschluss kann als Basis für eine Analyse dienen.

Ab Seite 34 des Geschäftsberichts findet man wörtlich “Summierte betriebswirtschaftliche Erträge und Aufwendungen der PROKON Unternehmensgruppe im
Geschäftsjahr 2010 (Die aufgeführten Zahlen entstammen im Wesentlichen aus nicht von einem Wirtschaftsprüfer bzw. einer Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft
geprüften Jahresabschlüssen.)”

Summiert heisst hier einfach zusammengezählt und vermutlich nicht konsolidiert.

Interessant an der Aufstellung ist die Tatsache, dass eigentlich fast der ganze 2010er Gewinn “ausserordentliches Ergebnis” ist. Dieses “ausserordentliche Ergebnis” ist in der Fussnote wie folgt beschrieben:

Entstanden durch Aufdeckung stiller Reserven im Rahmen von Verkäufen von Beteiligungen, Forderungsverzichte von Banken, Leasingunternehmen sowie innerhalb der PROKON Unternehmensgruppe.

Das ist ein klares Zeichen, das man hier durch internes Hin- und her schieben Gewinne generiert, was diese “summarische” Aufstellung aus fundamentalen Gesichtspunkten völlig bedeutungslos macht.

Ein weiteres Detail aus dem Geschäftsbericht:

– die Genußscheine werden lt. Seite 14 nur von einer “Schwestergesellschaft” der operativen Gesellschaften ausgegeben, nicht von der Mutter. Somit sieht man z.B. nicht, welche Zahlungen an die tatsächlichen Eigentümern zufliessen. Das zumindest war bei WGF immerhin noch etwas transparenter.

– die “Emissionsgesellschaft” selber generiert signifikante Kosten. 2010 waren das 17 Mio von 48 Mio Gesamtertarg, also deutlich über ein Drittel. Bei durchschnittlich (291+477)/2 = 384 Mio ausstehendem Genußrechtskapital, sind das 4.4% “laufende” Einwerbungskosten etc. p.a.

– zusätzlich fällt im WP Bericht zum Einzelabschluss noch auf, dass ca. 43 Mio oder 10% der Mittel nicht in Projekte sondern an “Gesellschafter” gegangen ist.

Ein Wort noch zur sogenannten Rücknahmegarantie:

Folgender Passus steht im Genußscheinprospekt:

Die von den Garantiegebern erklärte Rückkaufgarantie steht unter der Bedingung, dass sie nur dann von den Genussrechtsinhabern in Anspruch
genommen werden kann, wenn durch die Inanspruchnahme bei den Garantiegebern keine Zahlungsunfähigkeit oder Überschuldung im Sinne der Insolvenzordnung eintritt. Bei drohender Zahlungsunfähigkeit oder Überschuldung durch die Inanspruchnahme aus der Garantie verpflichten sich die Garantiegeber, die Genussrechtsinhaber umgehend davon schriftlich in Kenntnis zu setzen und ihnen mitzuteilen, dass die Garantie ausgesetzt wird. Sobald sichergestellt ist, dass durch eine Inanspruchnahme aus der Garantie bei den Garantiegebern Zahlungsunfähigkeit oder Überschuldung im Sinne der Insolvenzordnung nicht mehr droht, lebt die Garantie in ihrer ursprünglichen Form wieder auf. Die Garantiegeber verpflichten sich, die Genussrechtsinhaber umgehend über diesen Umstand schriftlich in Kenntnis zu setzen.

D.h.in dem Fall wo man die Garantie eigentlich brauchen könnte, zieht sie nicht. Mangels konsolidierten Abschluss kann man auch die “Qualität” der Garantiegeber nicht beurteilen.

Zudem sollte man nicht vergessen, dass die Garantie immer nur auf den jeweils gültigen Nennbetrag läuft. Theoretisch kann also die Genußscheinemittentin einfach einen riesen Verlust ausweisen mit einer entsprechenen Abschreibung auf den Nennwert bevor die Garantie theoretisch ziehen würde.

Damit kann man hier schon ein Fazit ziehen:

– Der Genußschein selbst ist ein hochriskantes Eigenkapitalinstrument
– Die Qualität und Profitabilität des zu Grunde liegenden Geschäfts kann mangels konsolidierten Konzernabschlusses nicht nachvollzogen werden
– der ständige Vergleich mit Bankeinlagen und die sogenannte “Rücknahmegarantie” sind nicht substantiell und stehen in keiner Relation
– wer eine sichere Geldanlage will, sollt die Finger von so einem Genußschein lasen, für spekulative Naturen gibt es sicher transparentere Vehikel

Mir selber ist es nach wie vor ein Rätsel, warum es in Deutschland überhaupt erlaubt ist, ein solches Produkt ohne konsolierten Abchluss in so einer Größenordnung zu vertreiben. Anscheinend sind ja schon über 800 Mio EUR investiert worden, das entspricht eigentlich schon SDAX oder MDAX Niveau.

Aus persönlicher Erfahrung würde es mich auch stark wundern, wenn die Windparks wirklich 8% nach Steuern und den erheblichen Vertriebskosten abwerfen würden. Die Projekte die ich gesehen habe sind (ungehebelt) eher bei 5-7% p.a. gelegen-

UND NOCHMAL DER HINWEIS: ICH HABE KEINE FINANZIELLEN INTERESSEN AN DEM PRODUKT. MIR WURDEN DIE ANGEBOTE UNAUFGEFORDERT ZUGESCHICKT BZW: IN DEN BROWSER “GEPOPPT”.

Gruppo Sol SPA part 2 – balance sheet, qualitative aspects and weaknesses

After the initial post about Gruppo Sol SpA, let’s look at some other standard issues which are important for a “value investment”:

1. Balance Sheet quality

Gruppo Sol is definitely not an asset play, as the main value lies in at least some local competitive advantages, mostly in it’s homecare business. However it makes nevertheless sense to check the quality of the balance sheet, as a solid balance sheet significantly decreases the downside in those cases where the investment thesis doesn’t play out.

a) Goodwill

Good news here: Gruppo Sol has only a very small amount of goodwill (22mn EUR out of 375 mn EUR equity). In comparison to AIr Liquide or Linde, this looks quite good. Air Liquide has only half of its book value in tangible assets, whereas Linde has negative tangible book value due to its past acquisition. Tangible book value in itself is definitely not a guarantee for success, but it limits the downside to a certain extent.

b) Debt

Debt is unfortunately not insiginifcant. With around 170 mn net debt as of 31.12.2011, debt to equity is around 50%. Although this is exactly the same ratio as Linde and slightly better than Air Liquide, for an Italian based company with most likely Italian bank as creditors, this is something to monitor closely.

Interestingly, they provide a very detailed overview of financial liabilites in the 2010 report on page 54. The good news is that very few loans contain covenants and there are no critical maturities, the “roll down” seems to be very conservatively structured, the bad news is that some of the loans are quite expensive. In total I would judge this as a rather well managed conservative financing structure.

c) Extra assets, Pensions, operating leases, depreciation etc.

There are basically no other assets on the balance sheet than those required for running the business, so no big minority stakes etc. On the one hand, this doesn’t leave any potential for “extra” assets like Autostarada, howver on the other side its a good sign as the comnpany seems to be focused on its core business and not trying to play the typical Italian pyramide structure games.

The company doesn’t seem to have off-balance sheet operational leases. A smaller amount of the assets are financed through financial leases which are included in the nebt debt

They don’t really show pension liabilites which is due to the fact that defined benefit plans are unusual in Italy anyway. However the show a 10 mn EUR reserve for “employee severance and other benefits”. Interestingly they seem to discount this with 1.30% p.a. which is a very very conservative assumption.

A quick view into fixed assets shows that plant and machinery of Sol SpA show a cummulated depreciation of ~2/3 of historical values. Land and building values are only a small amount of fixed assets, so I would not expect any “hidden reserves” there.

So overall, I would consider the balance sheet of Sol SpA as conservative but without significant hidden value.

2. Shareholders & Management

Large shareholders are:

59.98% are held by a Dutch entity called “Gas and Technolgies world” whcih is the vehicel of the founding Fumagali family. The CEO of SoL SpA, Aldo Fumagalli Romario is currently CEO of Sol SpA, so SOl is both, family owned and also actively managed by a family member.

7.35% are held by Tweedy Browne
5.05% are held by Bestinver
4.50% by Stefano Bruscagli, a board member of Sol SpA
3.00% are held by Alberto Tronconi, a former Sol SpA director.
1.13% owned by Leonardo Alberti, a current director of Sol Spa

So in total, 60% are held by the family and further 8.6% by active board members which in my opnion is a good sign.

Board compensation

For some reason I didn’t find director’s comp in the report, so I rely on the FT information. However 500 k compensation for the top officers seem to be OK.

Corporate Governance

The only thing I can say about this is that I am not aware of anything yet. So no dealings between main shareholder and company or directors and company whcih is very good for an Italian company.

Weaknesses and known problems

At some point in time one should also consider the main weaknesses as you rarely find the “perfect” company at hte perfect price.

Capital intensity

As mentioned in the first post, especially the industrial gas business is very capital intensive. So no nice free cashflow franchise busienss but “real investment” business. If Sol was an Anglo Saxon company, they would have spun off Vivisol a long time ago and milking the cash from the gas business without reinvesting.

I am not sure if Vivisol relies to a certain extent on facilities from the industrial gas segment, this is something to explore further. Also, in the Vivisol segement, receivables started to grow. At some point, manngement mentioned that public health insurers, which usually pay for the home care services are paying slower espacially in Italy.

Italian exposure

This brings us to the next obvious point: Especially the industriel gas division is naturally exposed to Italy and a possible further detoriation of economical activity. As of 2010, Sol made 60% of sales within Italy and 40% outside, with outside sales growing by double digits. Although the business should be more stable than other businesses, this risk is definitely there.

2011 preliminary results and intra year reporting

During the year, Sol is only reporting EBIT. For Q3 for example, Sol reported 13.3% increase in YOY EBIT increase, a really strong double digit growth number.

So it came as a surprise that in the preliminary 2011 full year numbers, 12 M EBIT suddenly wnt flat agains the year before and EPS actuall decreased slightly.

As there is no segemnt reporting in the preliminary release, we cannot see if this is an issue for both segments. My assumption is thta the bad Q4 comes from the Italian industrial gas side but it is not really explained and one has to wait for the full annual report.

Investor relation / reporting

This brings us directly to another weak point. Quarterly reports do not include EPS and explanations are short. The last inevstor presentation is from 2003, so they seem to save a lot of money on investor relations if we look at the bright side. Tehy don’t even show up at the “Star” conferences.

Research Coverage & Index

For Sol SpA, analyst coverage is very low. Only one small shop covers them (“EVA dimensions”, whoever that is) with an overweight rating but noprice target. They are also not included in any index, and trading volume with around 200 k paer day is too low for many funds.

For larger institutionals with shorter time horizon, the stock is most likely not interesting.

So lets stop here and summarize part 2:

+ on the plus side, Sol seems to have a relatively conservative balance sheet
+ company is family owned and family run
+ management compensation is OK, managers have relevant stakes in the company
+/- corporate governance is good for Italian standards, however neutral for objective standards
– business is capital intensive
– significant exposure to Italy
– reporting during the year only on EBIT basis, very limited information

So far no “deal breakers” but also some significant general issues. I will have a final post up if to invest and at what price.

Magic Sixes: Follow up Iren SpA

In November, I had a quick look at Iren SpA, an Italian company which would have qualified as a “Magic Sixes” company.

My summary was the following:

For me, the combination of a large debt pile, negative free cashflows and a significant portion of non-tangible book value makes Iren SpA more or less uninvestible. Based on the pure financials without any further analysis there doens’t seem to exist any Margin of Safety despite qualifying as “Magic Sixes” stock. For the time being, Iren will not be analyzed further as there seem to be more attractive “targets”.

Yesterday, Iren SpA announced that due to “one off effects”, they will actually show a loss for 2011 and the dividend is cut down to 1 cent per share.

The stock now is down almost 50% from when I wrote the post:

Interestingly, by just looking at “momentum” one would have come to the same conclusion. Both in absolute terms and relative terms, the stock started underperforming from October.

Or maybe “momentum” for low P/B Stocks (and magic sixes) maybe is a shortcut to detect weak balance sheets ? I don’t know but something to keep in mind.

Nevertheless, I will keep Iren SpA on my radar screen in order to learn more about the Italian market. In theory Iren would be a prime take over target.

Gruppo Sol SpA (ISIN IT0001206769) – only hot air or hidden moat company (part 1) ?

Grupo Sol SpA is an Italian company, which accoding to its homepage is active in

the production, applied research and marketing of industrial, pure and medicinal gases as well as being involved in the home care and in the welding markets. Today, SOL is an Italian based multinational company present in 20 European countries and in India and it has over 2,100 people employed. The annual revenue is 518 million Euro (2010 consolidated figures).

At a first view,the company doesn’t look that exciting and will most likely not show up on any screener with multiples like this:

Market Cap ~380 mn EUR
P/E 12.0
P/B 1.1
P/S 0.7
Div. Yield 2.4%
EV/EBITDA 5.7
P/E (10) 12.5

So neither expensive nor cheap and why bother ?

A quick view to the stock chart doesn’t look that convincing either:

After almost regaining the ATH in 2011, the stock dropped significantly and only regained a little since then.

The reason I got interested was the fact, that Sol SPA is one of the biggest Italian positions of Tweedy Browne’s international value fund. They hold around 7.4% of all shares. Additionally Bestinver, a Spanish value shop which portfolio I track is also invested with a 5% position.

Tweedy normally prefers companies which have almost no debt and relatively large free cashflows. However if we look at historical numbers, both, Sol’s debt position which is constantly increasing and its patchy free cash flow generation are not overly convincing.

debt/assets fcf per share
31.12.1999 17.4012 -0.05
12/29/00 18.5842 0.08
12/31/01 18.5484 -0.06
12/31/02 24.0896 -0.22
12/31/03 22.0988 0.12
12/31/04 22.8246 -0.05
12/30/05 23.4384 -0.08
12/29/06 24.0223 -0.15
12/31/07 25.8941 0.03
12/31/08 28.702 -0.09
12/31/09 29.0258 0.19
12/31/10 29.5759 0.0041

However some other historical stats are more interesting:

GJ EPS Net Margin Op Margin ROE
1999 0.12 5.6% 11.6% 6.6%
2000 0.14 6.1% 10.9% 7.4%
2001 0.15 5.5% 9.6% 7.2%
2002 0.17 5.8% 10.6% 8.1%
2003 0.17 5.1% 11.1% 7.4%
2004 0.20 5.5% 11.4% 8.1%
2005 0.19 5.0% 10.5% 7.4%
2006 0.19 4.2% 10.7% 6.7%
2007 0.30 6.3% 10.8% 10.1%
2008 0.38 7.6% 9.7% 12.0%
2009 0.28 5.4% 10.8% 8.1%
2010 0.35 6.1% 11.5% 9.6%

Although the business seems not not to be extremely profitable, Net Income margins and returns are very stable and EPS grows along increasing sales nicely over the 12 years from 1999-2010. Interesting so far, but what else ?

If one looks in to the (english) annual report 2010, the really interesting stuff is hidden in the notes on page 58 which shows the break down of the 2 main segments, industrial gases and “home care”.

It’s relatively easy to see that home care shows ~50% higher margins than industrial gases.

The differences between the two segments become even clearer if on looks at the history of the two segements. I have compiled some ratios for both segments from past annual reports:

2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Homecare            
Sales 222 191.2 167.1 150.1 121.9 106.5
Operating profit 31 27.7 24.8 22.8 21.5 14.6
in % 14.0% 14.5% 14.8% 15.2% 17.6% 13.7%
Net assets 157 145 134 118 84 53
Net income 18.3 17.4 17.1 14.4 12.9 6.6
NI margin 8.2% 9.1% 10.2% 9.6% 10.6% 6.2%
ROA 11.7% 12.0% 12.8% 12.2% 15.4% 12.5%
             
Gas            
Sales 331 304 319.5 304 286.7 257.2
operating profit 28.6 22.1 26.7 23.1 13.7 21.5
in % 8.6% 7.3% 8.4% 7.6% 4.8% 8.4%
Net assets 301 289 276 256 269 225
Net Income 20.3 13.8 21.7 12.4 3.6 10.6
NI margin 6.1% 4.5% 6.8% 4.1% 1.3% 4.1%
ROA 6.7% 4.8% 7.9% 4.8% 1.3% 4.7%

Business model:

Industrial gases is a relatively simply business model. One can think of it as a kind of unregulated local utility business model. Technical gases are usually difficult and expensice to transport over longer distances, so competitive advantages exist to a certain extent at a local level. If one operates a industrial gas plant in an indusstrial zone, barriers to entry are one one hand relatively high, as competition has to built a gas plant first. Transport over a longer distance from a gas plant in another country are very difficult to achieve.

On the other hand, pricing power is not unlimited, because if prices get too high in a region, competitors might just built a new gas plant if the margins are high enough. Technologically this is not so difficult, o its mostly a matter of capital and return on capital

Sol SPA seems to have a nice market share (~15%) in the Italian technical gas market. Sol’s profitablity ratios compares pretty well for instance with European market leader Lide AG, which also shows NI margins of between 5-8% and ROCE or ROA of around 6-8%. So a smaller regional player seems to be able to earn similar returns in this business like the undisputed market leader, which is a sign for at least some local competitive advantages in this field.

The much more profitable Home Care business is very interesting in itself. Sol SpA is running this through its subsidiary called “Vivisol“.

They offer different services for home care patients, however the “core service” seems to be the delivery of liquified oxygen to patients who are at home and need respiratory assistance. So this is basically a nice “repeat” business as the liquid oxygen has to be replaced on a weekly or daily basis.

In general, patients with a oxygen deficency need additional oxygen for the rest of their life. For stationary patients, a kind of “oxygen compressor” can be used, however for “mobile” patients, liquid oxygen is the only practicable way of carrying enough oxygen around.

As one can imagine, it is not really an option to order liquid oxygen online at Amazon or Ebay, as on the one hand, certain medical standards have to be fullfilled (inc. licences) and on the other hand liquid oxygen has to be kept at temperatures of -190 degrees celsius. So “disintermediation” through the internet seems to be not a danger.

Vivisol seems to have expanded above the pure liquid oxygen delivery into similar areas like sleep therapy, wound care etc.

As with technical gases, competitive advantages seem to exist on local levels. As it doesn’t make sense to ship around liquid oxygen thousands of kilometers, on a daily or weekly basis to hospitals or home care patients, once a local production capacity and a local distribution system is intstalled, it will be quite difficult for any competitor to enter into this local market.

One could also argue that in contrast to technical gases this creates a sort of network effect if further patients are added within a distribution area.

Competition

Major competitors in both areas are mostly the large Industrial gas players, especially Linde, Air Liquide and Air Products. Howver as discussed before, a dominant position in one market does not automatically generate a big competitive advantage in another area, as the business seems to be highly localized.

I didn’t really find market share data for home care. However in the wake of the recent acquisition of the Air Porducts homecare business by Linde, the following was stated:
e

An industry observer who declined to be named said the acquisition — one of Linde’s biggest since it bought UK-based BOC for 12 billion euros ($15.3 billion) five years ago — would make Linde a strong No. 2 in the homecare business after French group Air Liquide SA (AIRP.PA).

In this German article they say that Linde had 280 mn EUR in home care sales in 2010.

So we don’t know how mach sales Air Liquide has in home care, but I assume that SOL SpA will be either number 3 or 4 on Europe with its ~240 mn EUR home care sales in 2011. So in this niche market they seem to have a quite nice market share which they have built more or less organically.

We have therefore a limited amount of competitors, however the more important point seems to be that it is not so easy to simply enter the market from scratch.

Valuation: Sum of parts

Normally, I could start now with a bottom up DCF analysis. Howver in this case we have a very nice public transaction and we can do a quick (and dirty) sum of parts valuation.

As quoted before, the Air Products business had almost identical size than the Vivisol business (210 mn Sales against 240 mn) and was valued at 590 mn EUR, a whopping 2.8 multiple on sales. Although I have no further info on profitability, this multiple would represent a 2.8*2.40 mn = 672 mn EUR valuation for Vivisol alone. If we deduct a 20% control premium from the purchase, this would give us a non-control value of around 540 mn EUR for Vivisol assuming profitability is close to the Air Products division.

For technical gases, competitors Linde, Air Liquide and Air Products trade at ~9 x EV/EBITDA, so if we apply a 20% discount, a multiple of 7 seems to be reasonable. Based on available 2010 EBITDA for the industrial gases of 70 mn EUR, we would get a EV of 490 mn EUR for the technical gases.

Added together, we would get a theoretical EV of (540+490) = 1.030 mn EV for Sol, compared to actual EV of around 550 mn EUR as of today, which would leave a lot of upside for the company at current valuation levels.

So lets summarize at this point:

+ the business model of Sol SpA looks interesting. Local competitive advantages seem to exist and one part of the busienss seems to be very profitable and growing nicely based on a “repeat business model” including some networ effectss

+ a quick and dirty “sum of part” valuation based on a recent competitor deal shows a significant potential upside

Enough to look further into the company in a follow up post including a more detailed DCF computation and a review of qualitative factors.

Portfolio Performance March 2012 & comments

In March 2012, again the portfolio slightly outperformed with +1.2% against +0.4% for the Benchmark (50% Eurostoxx 50, 30% Dax, 20% MDAX). The outperformance for March was basically created on the last day of March, when there were significant jumps both in Hornbach and Draeger Genußscheine. This might be also the result of some quarter end “window dressing” for Hornbach, Draegerwerke continue to perform well.

YTD, the portfolio is now up +11.7% against +14.9% for the benchmark, since inception (01.01.2011), the protfolio is up +7.2% against -1.0%.

Bench Portfolio Perf BM Perf. Portf. Portf-BM
2010 6394 100      
2011 5509.87 95.95 -13.8% -4.1% 9.8%
           
Jan 12 5972.48 99.27 8.4% 3.5% -4.9%
Feb 12 6275.00 105.90 5.1% 6.7% 1.6%
Mrz 12 6329.66 107.22 0.9% 1.2% 0.4%
 
YTD 12 6329.66 107.22 14.9% 11.7% -3.1%
 
Since inception 6329.66 107.22 -1.0% 7.2% 8.2%

Portfolio activity:

Portfolio activity was relatively limited in March. As posted, Autostarda was sold completely which turned out to be a good decision as the shares dropped a further -20% after I sold them. Tonnelerie was increased to a full position.

So the current portfolio as of MArch 30th looks like the following:

Name Weight
Hornbach Baumarkt 5.3%
Fortum OYJ 5.0%
AS Creation Tapeten 3.7%
BUZZI UNICEM SPA-RSP 5.8%
EVN 2.9%
Walmart 4.0%
WMF VZ 3.8%
Tonnellerie Frere Paris 4.8%
Vetropack 4.8%
Total Produce 5.0%
OMV AG 2.4%
Nestle 2.2%
Piquadro 1.1%
   
Drägerwerk Genüsse D 9.3%
IVG Wandler 2.3%
WESTLB 6.9% 5.6%
DEPFA LT2 2015 3.3%
AIRE 5.5%
HT1 Funding 4.9%
EMAK SPA 5.4%
DJE Real Estate 4.4%
   
   
Short: Kabel Deutschland -2.1%
Short: Green Mountain -1.5%
Short Ishares FTSE MIB -1.0%
Terminverkauf CHF EUR 0.2%
   
Tagesgeldkonto 2% 12.9%
   
Summe 100.0%
   
Value 50.8%
Opportunity 40.7%
Short -4.4%
Cash 12.9%

Further comments & outlook

My biggest position, Draegerwerke Genußschein now approaches the 10% portfolio weight which is usually a threshold where I will take a explicit decision either to hold or to cut down. At the moment I am inclined to hold, as the “catalyst” has brought even more attention to this interesting situation.

The portfolio itself in the moment is very stable, as a lot of the investments are hardly moving at all. Economically, especially WestLB is basically a cash position now. So the “economic” cash portion is now already 18.5% which is a little too high.

In general, it is relatively hard to find “value” in German stocks these days, but in my opinion there are lots of interesting companies in France and the PIIGS, also the UK seems to be becoming more interesting. Of course some of those companies are a lot more risky than “normal” shares so I still think of adding a “basket” of some 1% PIIGS recovery opportunites as well as a “French” basket with some relatively illiquid samll caps.

So as Peter Cundill would say “there is always somthing to do”…..

Weekly links

Great book review of “Investing in Japan” from Nate at Oddball

Interesting paper why a “long low beta, short high beta” portfolio outperforms

Interesting Q&A session with David Einhorn

Groupon: Less than 6 months after the IPO, Groupon has to restate earnings and the auditor has identified “material weaknesses”. Short candidate.

Sino forrest is finally bankrupt but sues Muddy Waters for 4 bn USD….

Edit: Although it is not a listed stock, this article about Goretex contains a lot about how to create and defend “moats”…

Track record (attention: shameless self advertisement)

When I looked through Tim du Toit’s Eurosharelab, I saw that Tim actually also shows his non-public track record since 2004.

For myself, I keep score of my track record since 2001 but I hesitate to publish this as it is not really possible to verify.

Then however I realised that I took part in the “Aktienbord Musterdepot” since 2007 with a kind of “best ideas” portfolio. In parallel, I discussed my strategy at my “home Board” Antizyklisch Investieren (only in German and you have to register).

Although the “Aktienboard” platform is not perfect (for example Dividends are not included), the performance relatively closely tracked my “real” performance. It is also an interesting way to look at how my old portfolios looked like and in what kind of stocks i was invested at that time.

2007

2007 Performance was 34.4% plus 2,94% in Dividends.

That compares pretty well against 22.9% for the Dax 22.3 for the MDAX and +6.9% for the DJ Stoxx.

If I look at the 2007 ending portfolio, the only stock I still hold is WMF Vz. At that point in time, I held mostly German special situation stocks as I was not able to find cheap stocks anymore.

2008

2008 Aktienboard performance ended with a loss -13.54 % before dividends of 2.70%, again quite good against -40.4 DAX, -46% MDAX and -45% DJ stoxx.

This was mostly due to avoiding any financial exposure and concentrating on low beta special situations like Biotest and other small caps which is basically still my main strategy.

2009

“>2009 Aktienboard performance was +45.86% plus an additional 3.56% in Dividends and the absolut best year “on the record”. Again quite good compared to Dax (23.9%), MDAX (26.7) and DJ Stoxx (21%).

On the one hand, I rode the recovery story in cheap large caps, but additionally I kind of “discovered” distressed and subordinated debt which offered amazing risk/return opportunities. Subordinated bonds were also the way to inevst in financials without getting diluted through all the capital increases.

2010

In the last “pre blog” year, the Aktienboard portfolio performed with 33.5% + 3.47% dividends (remark: I think the overview number is better than the detail page performance).

This was the only year where the “best ideas” performed better than my real portfolio by a margin of about 10%.

Benchmarks in 2010 were DAX 16.1%, MDAX 34.9% and DDow Jones Stoxx -5.35%. The 2010 portfolio contains already a significant part of the current portfolio, with AIRE, Buzzi, Hornbach, AS Craetion and EVN, 5 stocks are still relatively heavily weighted today.

Before getting to enthusiastic about this track record, one has to say that this investment style would not fully scale into a 10 mn portfolio I am trying to run virtually at the moment. Some trades, like in illiquid Depfa subordinates etc. were only possibel with double digit k EUR amounts or sometimes less.

In the last 5-6 years, I was also able to profit from the “secular” German recovery story which turbo charged German small caps plus the “once in a lifetime” opportunites in the subordinated bond area.

Going forward, it will be very difficult in my opinion to find such secular stories again. My biggest hope is that an eventual PIIGS revovery and maybe some French small caps offer comparable risk/return opportunities.

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