Some links

Must read: Howard Marks on skill, luck and inefficient markets

Deep value investing: Buying a house in Detrait for 500 USD

Great interview on Japanese economic myths

Technical but interesting story, how a 95% market share software program (Quark XPress) was killed by the competing product.

Interestingly, packaging seems to be as important as branding. Another argument that Brand does not equal Moat.

Finally a new and promising value investment blog: Odd lot Investing. Great post about compound and decay rates for instance.

Celesio – why merger arbitrage is hard business

Let’s start with a few quotes from yesterday’s post:

a) It is almost 100% assured that the bid goes through, there is now a “floor” under the stock price at 23,50 EUR

and

I have written above that this was a “Low risk” bet. In reality, I do not know if it was high risk and I was very very lucky or if it was indeed low risk. In statistics, one would call this a “beta error”, assuming that one was right but in reality the probabilities were very different. For me the best way to handle this is to do only small “bets”, keep track of assumptions and outcomes. Systematic “beta errors” in investing in my opinion are very dangerous as this will inevitable lead to some disastrous outcomes in the long run (Bill Miller).

Very rarely, one gets such a direct feedback from the market. McKesson said yesterday around 7 pm that they did not reach the 75% threshold and dropped the bid.

So this was clearly no a low risk M&A arbitrage situation but a high risk one and I was very very lucky to exit just in time.

McKesson themselves seems to be surprised as well:

“This is fresh news to us. We obviously had the support of the management team, we had the support of the family, which obviously was a significant holder, we had the support of Elliott, which was one of the vocal players in this process,” he said. “The best I can speculate is that people either forgot the tender date or they somehow believed that there is more on the other side of this.”

Let’s quickly check the facts:

In their 9th notification, dated January 9th, 2 pm, McKesson reported the following:

As of the Notification Reference Date, based on the regular conversion price, the aggregate number of Celesio-Shares held by the Bidder and/or persons acting jointly with it plus the number of Celesio-Shares for which the Takeover Offer has been accepted plus the number of voting Celesio-Shares which can be acquired through instruments pursuant to section 25a WpHG amounts to 106,213,544 Celesio-Shares; this corresponds to approximately 62.44% of the currently issued share capital and the currently existing voting rights in Celesio. In relation to the acceptance threshold in section 13.1 of the offer document the aggregate number amounts to 107,617,021 Celesio-Shares, which corresponds to approximately 52.94% of the share capital and the voting rights in Celesio on a fully diluted basis.

This was a significant increase against the 44,88% (fully diluted) a day before.

How much did Elliott own ?

This is from their official “recection” notice as of December 23rd:

Elliott Associates, L.P. and Elliott International, L.P. together with affiliated entities (“Elliott”), which own or have an interest economically equivalent to over 25% of Celesio AG (1)
(1) Calculated in accordance with Section 25a of the German Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz/WpHG), in connection with Sections 21, 22 and 25 WpHG

Elliott did report surpassing the 25% threshold in late November 2013.

If I read this correctly, they owned 25.1% on a non-diluted basis.

So let’s do quickly the math with what we have available:

  Undiluted Diluted
McK 107,617,021 62.44% 52.94%
Elliott 42,803,603 25.16% 21.06%
Total   87.60% 74.00%
       
Celesio      
Shares undiluted 170,100,000    
Shares diluted 203,281,113  

So this is interesting: Even with Elliott tendering its full stake, McK was still short 1% to their threshold on a diluted basis.

Could it be that this whole thing was just an accident ? No super-clever play by Elliott but rather a stuoid one ? Were other people assuming like myself that the offer period would be extended ? I don’t know, but I think it would have been better if MCK had said something about the offer period.

Looking back at the Rhoen chart after the first bid failed, one can expect the stock price to be very very volatile:

Anyway, I will watch this from the side line and will be extra carefull with the next M&A arbitrage situation….

Celesio Merger Arbitrage – follow up (and exit)

On Thursday, acquirer McKesson and Elliott agreed on a slightly increased offer 23.50 EUR (vs. 23 EUR) per share which Elliottt promptly accepted.

Interestingly,the stock trades now higher than the offer:

Apparently, during Wednesday some people already anticipated the increased offer. Technically, the acceptance period has not been extended and closed on Friday, January 9th according to the official statement. Honestly, I do not understand this. If I read §21 of the German take over law correctly, any late change in the offer automatically extends the offer period by 2 more weeks. I will need to double-check this.

The offer for the 2018 bond was also increased to 123.4 according to the amended bond offering document.

So what to do now with the price of he shares trading above the 23,50 EUR offer ?

Going back to the initial post, that’s how I valued the shares back then:

Now if we want to speculate on a top up, we have to make two assumptions: How likely is a top up and how large will it be ? In order to keep it simple, I would assume a 50/50 chance for a top up and as I like “round” numbers, I assume 5 EUR per share or a final offer at 28.

This leads us to the following expected value under those assumptions:

Exp. value Celesio share = (3.4% x 17) + (48.3% *23) + (48.3%*28)= 24.25 EUR or around 10.6% higher than the current share price.

So if we leave aside the rather bad mistake in calculating the upside potential, the price is now where I saw the “fair value” before, although I was totally wrong about the size of the “top up”. The reason that I still can make some money was that I bought below the initial bid price and the stock price did overshoot the offer.

Now we do have a very different situation compared to some weeks ago:

a) It is almost 100% assured that the bid goes through, there is now a “floor” under the stock price at 23,50 EUR
b) on the other hand it is a lot less likely that the bid will be further increased.

I can think of two reasons why the stock is currently trading above 23,50 EUR:

1) People are hoping that Elliott might have one last trick up in its sleeve to increase the offer within a relatively short time
2) Speculation that McK wants to quickly achieve a squeeze out and will buy more shares and/or have to pay some compensation for implementing the profit and loss transfer agreement (similar to MAN).

Overall, the “new” situation for me is harder to grasp and the time frame is more difficult to estimate. One should also expect, that Celesio will show most likely a lot of extra charges etc. in the next few quarters in order to both, build some buffer for Mckesson in the future and to discourage shareholders bidding up the remaining shares.

So for the portfolio, I will exit the position at current prices with a modest gain of around 6.5% for the shares and a little less for the bonds. Not spectacular but also not bad for a 4 week and relatively low risk investment.

One final remark on such M&A Arbitrage situations:

I have written above that this was a “Low risk” bet. In reality, I do not know if it was high risk and I was very very lucky or if it was indeed low risk. In statistics, one would call this a “beta error”, assuming that one was right but in reality the probabilities were very different. For me the best way to handle this is to do only small “bets”, keep track of assumptions and outcomes. Systematic “beta errors” in investing in my opinion are very dangerous as this will inevitable lead to some disastrous outcomes in the long run (Bill Miller).

Ackermans & Van Haaren – Mini Berkshire from Belgium ?

Ackerman’s and Van Haaren is a diversified Belgian company which was on my research pile for quite some time. Bloomberg describes the company as follows:

Ackermans & van Haaren NV is an industrial holding company. The Company’s holdings are in the contracting-dredging environmental services, financial services, staffing services, and private equity investing.

Looking onto their participations overview on the (very informative) homepage, one can easily see that this is a quite diversified company. From oil palms in Asia (SIPEF) to old age homes, port service companies, real estate investments and an Indian cement company are among the 30 or more participations.

The largest investments are however a 78.75% Stakes in Delen Investments and Private Bank J. van Breda and a 50% stake in DEME, a marine engineering Group.

The DEME stake itself shows that Ackermans is rather an active holding company. This year they surprised everyone by striking a deal with Vinci and traded their 50% stake in DEME (valued at 550 mn EUR) with a 60% stake in CFE, the listed Belgian company which owns the other 50% of DEME.

The stock itself is not really cheap:

P/B ~ 1.3
P/E 2013 ~15
Market cap: 2.8 bn

The stock gained nicely in 2013 and is trading at an ATH:

Why did I call them a potential “Mini Berkshire” in the beginning ? Well, that’s what they are showing in their latest Q3 presentation:

avh cagr

14.4% CAGR of book value is not bad over the last 10 years. Just for fun, I calculated Berkshires 10 Year CAGR from 2003-2012 based on the disclosure in the latest letter to shareholders:

Berkshire  
   
2003 21%
2004 10.5%
2005 6.4%
2006 18.4%
2007 11%
2008 -9.6%
2009 19.8%
2010 13%
2011 4.6%
2012 14.4%
   
10 year CAGR 10.60%

So at least for the last 10 years, AvH has clearly outperformed Buffet by almost 4% p.a. which is really a lot.

Step 1: “Quick and Dirty” sum of parts

When I look at a company like AvH, i generally try to do a quick and dirty “sum of part” analysis first. AvH makes it quite simple by providing a net cash figure at holding level which is required as the consolidated accounts include non-recourse debt as well.

The only thing I was not sure was the fact that the holding segment borrowed money from the private equity part in an amount of 120 mn EUR. I decided to play it save and deduct it from the private equity NAV.

So this is the “quick and dirty” result:

Value Method
DEME 550 Implicit valuation takeover
Van Laere 26 0.75 book
rent-a-port 5 at book
Maatschappi 20 At book
Sipef 130 market cap 482
Delen 522 1.5 book
van Breda 336 1.2 book
Extensa 80 0.8 book
Leaseinvest 108 Traded
Financiere duval 40 at book
AnimaCare 40 2x book
MAx Green 70 10x Earnings
Telemanod 30 10x Earnings
Sofinim 255 75% of NAV minus cash to holding
     
Net cash holding 148 Q3
     
     
Total 2,361

The result of this exercise is higher than stated book equity of around 2.05 bn EUR, but on the other hand, significantly lower than the 2.8 bn market value.

If I haven’t made a big mistake, then even if some of the holdings like Delen are worth more than I assumed, AvH looks as it is trading at a premium. Although I think the company is a good one and can create value, I would not want to pay a premium, so one can stop at this point and move on.

Summar:

Ackermans & Van Haaren seems to be an interesting company with diverse holdings and a good culture and some very good and interesting businesses. The track record over the last 10 Years looks impressive and is better than Berkshire. Nevertheless, the stock looks overvalued from a sum of parts point of view, offering no margin of safety.

Valmet Spin off – No action

Yesterday, Valmet was spun off from Metso and trading for the first day.

The price action on the first day was quite interesting. The first trade was around 7,20 EUR, far above my threshold of 5 EUR, then the price went down to ~6,30 before rocketing up to 8 EUR. ending up at around 6,65 EUR. Today, the stock is trading at 6.80 EUR.

For me, this is too expensive, but it is still interesting, how volatile such a first day of a spin off really is. Intraday fluctuations of ~30% clealry show that this can’t be fully efficient and price discovery is not that easy. Trading Volume on the first day was around 45 mn EUR, or less than 5% of market cap.

It is interesting to see that at the first day for the Osram spin off, volatility was lower and the stock price ended higher than in the beginning:

Trading for Osram on the first day was around 25% of market cap. I guess, that Siemens had much more index investors than Metso. In this case it would have been better to buy Metso pre spin off

Annual Performance Review 2013

Performance:

Performance for the month December was +1.2% vs. +1.3% for the benchmark, an underperfomrance of -0.1%. For the year, this resulted in +32.8% vs. +29.0% for the Benchmark (50% Eurstoxx 50, 30% Dax, 20% MDAX), an outperfomance of +3.8%.

Since inception (1.1.2011), the score is now +75.0% for the portfolio (20.5% p.a.) vs. 40.7% (10.4% p.a.) for the Benchmark.
Read more

Value and Opportunity “Design poll”

Dear readers,

a few weeks ago, I changed the design of the blog. I got mixed feedback since the change. Some did welcome it, some complained about the colors, some have problems reading it on mobile devices.

Personally, I like the colors of the new layout but I think the posts get too big on my screen. The old design was much more compact.

So it would be great if you could take a few seconds to answer the following 5 questions. Many thanks in advance !!!

Some links

10 interesting stocks for 2014 from moatology (I don’t know a single one of them….)

Frenzel & Herzing with the second part of their STo AG valuation

A nice “best book” list for 2013 from Farnam Street

Very interesting story about th movie “A wonderful life” and the guy behind the Bankers anonymous blog

Value Investing France with a (too) short summary of 2013

Jim Chanos, last bear standing, thinks it is a good time to raise fresh money for his short fund.

Finally, the free Winter issue of Grant’s interest rate observer (via Canadian Value)

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