Category Archives: Short

Why is Michael Kors (KORS) so succesful ?

In this post I identified Michael Kors as a “Tier 2” luxury stock with a really high valuation which might be an interesting stock to short based on my underlying thesis.

So justa few days later, Michael Kors reported a blow out performance, among oters:

Sales including licensing revenue rose 71 percent to $414.9 million in the first quarter ended June 30, driven by comparable-store sales and shops within department stores, the company said.

Retail net sales rose 76 percent to $215 million in the quarter, driven by a 37 percent increase in sales at stores open for at least a year, or comparable-store sales. The company opened 76 stores from the same period last year and operated 253 retail stores as of June 30.
First-quarter net income more than doubled to $68.6 million, or 34 cents a share, from $24.1 million, or 13 cents a year earlier.

First-quarter net income more than doubled to $68.6 million, or 34 cents a share, from $24.1 million, or 13 cents a year earlier.

So a doubling net income, 76% sales growth and a 37% yoy same store sales growth is really amazing if we look at how other upscale retailers do.

Interestingly enough, Michael Kors is not yet present in Asia, despite having the shares listed in Hongkong.

So the question is clear: Why is Michael Kors so successful (at the moment) ?

I guess one of the reasons is hs involvement in the US “Project Runway” designer casting show as a judge. However, the 10th series seems not to be too successful right now with viewers down 25%.

Kors’ Fashion is often described as the “Jet Set style”, whatever that means. His bio is not without bumps, for instance he went bankrupt in 1993 according to this article.

Michael Kor watches and jewelry are actually made by Fossil, which seems to have its own problems.

But still, why are they so successful ? I browsed around a little bit and among others I found statements

here:

What is the deal with the Michael Kors watch phenomenon? Everywhere I look there’s another small wrist encircled by an oversized gold Kors disc. Beauty PRs and fashion assistants absolutely love them, as do twenty-something city girls. “Girls that work in the city who want a Rolex. They might not know who Michael Kors is but they know they like shiny things,” tweeted @WhistlesPR in reply to my ‘who’s buying all the Kors watches’ tweet. “It’s chunky and looks expensive but it’s waaay cheaper than my dream Rolex! It has that magpie effect on everyone who clocks it,” confirmed @saraheangus.

With prices for Kors watches hovering around the £250 mark, they’re an easy entry-level accessory to buy into if you’re not in a position to spend £600+ on the bag or shoes. Clearly, plenty of people aren’t; according to the New York Times, sales of Kors watches went up 142% in the first quarter of this year. And good news for Mr Kors, his customers don’t just settle for one.

If one googles around, it seem to be really the relatively cheap watches which are extremely popular at the moment.

Balance sheet

Looking in the 2011/2012 annual report one can see that comparable sales growth per store have been 39% last year and even 48% the year before.

A quick check of the annual report showed nothing unusual in the accounts. Free cashflow generated is positive but relatively low due to large investments and the high growth rate. That’s normal. Also, goodwill is low and almost no financial debt.

Operating lease liabilities are around~ 560 mn and increasing due to the new stores.

Summary:

I am not sure why Michael Kors is so successful at the moment. This might be just a consumer fad which according to Jim Chanos might be a good short opportunity. On the other hand, the accounts look OK and currently in a “new normal” world, people pay up for growth.

So for the time being I will sit on the sideline and watch.

Manchester United IPO (MANU) – Prime short target ?

After unseccusfully trying Hongkong and Singapore, ManU Ipoed today on the US stock exchange. The IPO price was significantly below the initial range:

The IPO priced at $14, below the $16-20 range the club’s bankers had been seeking. It valued the 19-times English champions at only $2.3 billion and shaved as much as $100 million off the proceeds expected for the team and its owners.

Of course, the public shares have almost no voring rights and dividends should not be expected.

For anyone interested in stocks and football, the F-1 listing prospectus is really fun reading and should not be missed.

Valuation is relatively difficult to determine, but somewhere in the 20-25 EV/EBITDA range based on 2011 figures. Naturally, Manu has been pumped full with high yielding debt from its P/E owners and has additional “goodies” such as 140 mn USD “purchase obligations” etc.

Interestingly they file under the “Emerging Growth” company rule, which allows corporate governance similar to my beloved Italian highway operators….

A quick look at other listed Football clubs:

By the way, Porto could be bought for only 5 mn EUR…..

Yes, ManU is a great Football club, but they cannot and will not defy gravity. So prime short candidate if borrowing is available. It is not yet oin the Interactive Broker US short list, but as soon as it is there, I wil establish a position.

Shorting Luxury stocks – Follow up

So shorting luxury stocks is not easy. I mentioned Bronte’s Richemont short in the previous post. Howver, Richemont issued very strong numbers with no slow down detectable. The same seems to be true for Prada:

Italian fashion house Prada SpA (1913.HK), which competes with Louis Vuitton (LVMH.PA) and PPR’s (PRTP.PA) Gucci, posted a 36.5 percent jump in first-half revenue, buoyed by strong growth in Asia, with sales driven mainly by its Prada and Miu Miu brands.

Revenue for the six months ended in July rose to 1.55 billion euros ($1.9 billion), the Milan-based maker of luxury bags and clothing said on Monday.

John Hempton reacted pretty quickly but seems to be confused.

One alternative explanation of Richemonts numbers comes from the WSJ:

“China’s outbound tourism industry has boomed in recent years, helped in part by the allure of luxury goods overseas.”

So with a relatively cheap Euro, Chines Mainlanders might not fly to Hongkong but straight to Europe to shop for their Richemont Watches and Hermes bags. Just on the week end I was astonished by the long queue of Asians on the Munich Airport waiting for their sales tax refund.

My current thesis for shorting luxury stocks is the following:

– the ultimate top level luxury brands like Hermes etc. will suffer less from a slow down as the very rich will keep on spending, no matter what
– tier 2 brands, those who get bought by the upper middle class will suffer more as those guys will have to cut back quicker and harder in a crisis
– companies who expanded their own sales network rapidly in the last few a lot will get hit harder than companies which don’t run own outlets.

So the focus should be on “tier 2” luxury brands with a lot of retail exposure (operating leases) and weak balance sheets. Preferrably, store growth should have slowed done already, or maby some store closings should have already happened.

So lets look at a list of luxury/high end retailers. For fun I included Nike, Adidas and Piquadro as well to look how they compare:

Name
Tier 1
PRADA S.P.A.
CHRISTIAN DIOR
HERMES INTERNATIONAL
LVMH MOET HENNESSY LOUIS VUI
PPR
BURBERRY GROUP PLC
TIFFANY & CO
SALVATORE FERRAGAMO SPA
CIE FINANCIERE RICHEMON-BR A
Tier 2
PIQUADRO SPA
BRUNELLO CUCINELLI SPA
ADIDAS AG
NIKE INC -CL B
SAMSONITE INTERNATIONAL SA
TUMI HOLDINGS INC
TOD’S SPA
RALPH LAUREN CORP
COACH INC
MICHAEL KORS HOLDINGS LTD
HUGO BOSS AG -ORD

The Tier 1 /Tier 2 classification is a totally subjective classification from my side.

So to add some “meat” to this, lets look at some “raw” valuation metrics:

Name EV/EBITDA 2012 P/E P/B P/FCF
Tier 1        
PRADA S.P.A. 15.5 34.7 8.3 65.9
CHRISTIAN DIOR 6.1 15.1 2.2 9.8
HERMES INTERNATIONAL 19.7 39.0 10.0 40.5
LVMH MOET HENNESSY LOUIS VUI 10.5 19.0 2.8 30.7
PPR 9.8 15.2 1.4 24.8
BURBERRY GROUP PLC 10.4 21.9 6.7  
TIFFANY & CO 8.4 15.7 3.0  
SALVATORE FERRAGAMO SPA 12.8 34.3 13.2 34.7
CIE FINANCIERE RICHEMON-BR A 9.6 17.4 3.0 26.4
Tier 2        
PIQUADRO SPA 5.5 9.0 2.7 10.9
BRUNELLO CUCINELLI SPA 17.3 34.3 19.1 67.4
ADIDAS AG 8.9 16.6 2.3 17.3
NIKE INC -CL B 11.3 20.0 4.2 33.6
SAMSONITE INTERNATIONAL SA 8.1 26.3 2.6 85.3
TUMI HOLDINGS INC 21.2 42.7 43.9  
TOD’S SPA 9.1 17.4 3.4 26.4
RALPH LAUREN CORP 9.9 20.8 3.8 22.7
COACH INC 8.4 15.5 7.9 16.0
MICHAEL KORS HOLDINGS LTD 19.9 38.0 18.1  
HUGO BOSS AG -ORD 10.9 17.4 11.9 29.8

One can see clearly that in the “Tier 1” category, Prada and Hermes stand out in terms of valuation, but also they are outstanding premium brands.

In “Tier 2”, especially the new IPOs, TUMI, Michael Kors and Brunello look expensive, especially I highly doubt that those brands are even close to the long term value of a Hermes or Prada brand.

Some additional infos in the next table:

table.tableizer-table {border: 1px solid #CCC; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12px;} .tableizer-table td {padding: 4px; margin: 3px; border: 1px solid #ccc;}
.tableizer-table th {background-color: #104E8B; color: #FFF; font-weight: bold;}

Name Future Minimum Operating Lease Obligations LF Revenue T12M Lease/revenue Debt/EBITDA LF
Tier 1        
PRADA S.P.A. 1,318,771,727.17 2,212,724,598.94 59.6% 0.5
CHRISTIAN DIOR 4,499,997,166.86 23,185,601,928.23 19.4% 1.4
HERMES INTERNATIONAL   2,465,950,626.43   0.0
LVMH MOET HENNESSY LOUIS VUI   22,261,439,383.88   1.3
PPR   9,599,553,313.27   2.8
BURBERRY GROUP PLC 640,300,032.00 1,857,200,000.00 34.5%  
TIFFANY & CO   2,327,788,295.92   1.0
SALVATORE FERRAGAMO SPA   856,156,635.81   0.6
CIE FINANCIERE RICHEMON-BR A 1,194,736,463.41 7,644,616,343.90 15.6% 0.4
Tier 2        
PIQUADRO SPA   55,621,116.76   0.9
BRUNELLO CUCINELLI SPA   210,603,043.70   1.4
ADIDAS AG   12,125,170,682.01   1.2
NIKE INC -CL B 1,386,834,706.54 15,181,364,342.46 9.1% 0.1
SAMSONITE INTERNATIONAL SA 129,442,413.07 976,677,821.80 13.3% 0.0
TUMI HOLDINGS INC 0.00 228,242,106.47   4.5
TOD’S SPA 250,946,920.20 775,643,994.46 32.4% 0.3
RALPH LAUREN CORP 1,227,233,677.46 4,301,242,776.32 28.5% 0.2
COACH INC   3,010,310,037.06   0.0
MICHAEL KORS HOLDINGS LTD 335,036,357.76 770,199,265.10 43.5% 0.0
HUGO BOSS AG -ORD   1,867,480,409.77   0.8

I tried to gather some data regarding debt and leases. Although I have not filled all the blanks, it looks like TUMI has quite a lot of debt, whereas Michael Kors has some serious lease obligations.

So those two might be interesting short candidates. Although for Tumi, Short interest is already ~37% of float…

To be continued….

Idea generation: Shorting Luxury stocks

This is an idea which I am contemplating for some time.

Coneventional stock market wisdom says: Chinese / Asians love luxury goods, therefore this is the safest bet to buy Luxury stocks who sell to the Chinese consumer.

As a result, many luxury companies had great runs intheir stock price, for instance:

LVMH

Boss

or Ralph Lauren

However up until now, I did not really no where a “catalyst” would come from. So switch to the brilliant John Hampton at Bronte who really nails it down with Richemont, the Swiss luxury group:

Swiss Watch exports have been increasing, as the Chinese really dig expensive watches:

It is the Rococo stuff that is winning. The Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry publish export data from Switzerland (not sales to end consumers). June data shows a 4.1 percent reduction in volume, a 21.7 increase in value. The average price of a watch is going up sharply. This has been the case for years. The Federation published this graph which shows that (relatively accurate) electronic watches have been flat in value for years – but that mechanical movements (inaccurate but reassuringly expensive) have gone skyward:

Although exports to Hong kong are still increasing strongly, sales seem to have stalled:

There are several data sources I watch to keep tabs on spending by Chinese elite. The Swiss Watch data is obvious.

Exports to Hong Kong in June were up 21.2 percent. It was about the same in May (but the monthly data has disappeared from the web). It was about the same every other month this year. They keep upping the exports to Hong Kong.

But Hong Kong also has sales tax data which comes from the sales tax receipts. There is in the data a series for “Jewellery, watches, clocks and valuable gifts” by both value and volume. The value series – relatively flattering, has monthly sales (versus previous corresponding period) for the last six months as:

+18.3%
+14.1%
+18.4%
+15.1%
+2.9%
+3.1%
Sales growth stopped. However exports to Hong Kong kept up (note that 21.2 percent figure above).

John Hempton is not a guy who would short such a share because of date, he needs a real reason and this is the following:

have a theory given to me by a China watcher. The theory – it turned bad sharply with the ouster of Bo Xilai and now the murder charge on his wife Gu Kailai. Gu Kailai is going to have a hard time avoiding a mobile execution unit. This changes the stakes and it is structural. A half million dollar watch no longer says “look at me”. It says “look at me, I am a kleptocrat”. Thoughts of that beautiful Van Cleef and Arpels hair clip become the last thing that runs through your brain before the bullet.

And he can prove his theory with the example Brazil in the 80ties and 90ties:

We know what a completely collapsed luxury good market looks like. Brazilians like a bit of bling. But in the late 1980s and into the 1990s the kidnapping rate in Brazil went skyward. (There is an horrific documentary about that called Manda Bala which translates “send a bullet”.) After kidnapping became a major industry (particularly in São Paulo) carrying a $3000 handbag no longer said “look at me”, it said “kidnap me”.

Two other data points in the recent weeks show that maybe the Chinese consumer might be (for any reason) a little biut more cautious:

– Sales at Sand’s Chinese casinos disappointed strongly

– and even McDonalds announced that same store sales in China fell

For me, such company news are much more reliable than any Chinese Government statistics.

Let’s quickly look at Richemont:

The stock price ist still below its 2008 highs:

The stock doesn’t look so expensive either:

Trailing P/E 16,6
P/B 2.8
P/S 2.9
EV/EBITDA 9

is not that expensive for a stock with a 17% profit margin and 20% ROIC, a very conservative balance sheet with no goodwill and net cash. Even mean reversion would support current levels. 10 year average net margin is 20%, only 10 year average ROIC is “only” around 10%.

A much more interesting short candidate might be Boss.

Boss is more expensive

Trailing P/E 17.3
P/B 11.9
P/S 2.4
EV/EBITDA 11.5

and 10 year avg. profit margin is 8.6% against current 13%.

Still, I would prefer to short luxury shares with aggressive accounting, but I have to dig a little bit deeper for this.

And do not forget: Luxury sales in Europe are bad anyway and as Coach shows, even the US is not “an island” with regard to luxury sales.

Summary:

I guess shorting Luxury stocks might be an interesting idea at some point in time. I wouldn’t short Richemont, as this is really one of the rock solid companies, but other candidates might be more interesting. Preferably with aggressive accounting and US / Europe exposure.

Digging deeper: Short interest and stock performance

In my last post about potential short candidates, I said:

Personally, I would hesitate to short anything above a 15%-20% percentage of SI/Free float although I have no “hard knowledge” to support this.

In the comments, Winter correctly pointed out that one could also argue the other way around, the higher the short interest, the higher the possibility that the stock will drop.

Interestingly, for many trades, stocks with high short interests seem to be attractive long opportunities as pages like this show.

To quote them:

Stocks with high short interest are often very volatile and are well known for making explosive upside moves (known as a short squeeze). Stock traders will often flock to such stocks for no reason other than the fact that they have a high short interest and the price can potentially move up very quickly as traders with open short positions move to cover.

Googling around a littel bit I found the following interesting paper called Short Interest and Stock Returns

The introduction starts of supporting Winter comment:

It is now widely accepted that stocks with high short interest ratios underperform the market. This is a very recent bit of conventional wisdom, based largely on the evidence in Asquith and Meulbroek’s (1995) unpublished working paper for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (Amex) stocks, and Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran’s (2002) article for Nasdaq stocks. Both Asquith and Meulbroek and Desai et al report negative and significant abnormal returns for firms with short interest ratios of 2.5% or more, where the short interest ratio is defined as the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding. Both papers also report large secular increases in short interest ratios, and skewed cross-sectional distributions, with most stocks having short interest ratios of less than 0.5%, and very few firms having a ratio exceeding 10%. Prior to these papers, the conventional wisdom was that large short positions presaged positive future returns, caused by the flow demand from short sellers covering their positions

The paper is worth a read. In general, the authors confirm that stocks with high short ratios seem to underperform:

Consistent with other studies, we find that the higher the short interest ratio, the lower is the subsequent performance. That is, firms with short interest ratios of 10% or more underperform those of 5% or 2.5%.

Their research shows that the effect is not so significant as previously thought and that it only works for equal weighted portfolios, not for market cap weighted portfolios.

They paper also gives a good overview of ohter papers on this topic, it seems to be that this area is not as well researched as others.

Their results can be summarized with this quote:

We find that the underperformance of high short interest firms is fairly brief, and only rapid portfolio turnover allows us to realize this underperformance. We also examine whether high short interest is based only on valuation concerns and find that convertible bond arbitrage is a major reason for high short interest as well. Finally, we show that the performance of high short interest NYSE-Amex stocks is more severe and consistent than for their Nasdaq 24 counterparts over the period July 1988-2002, and that small cap firms make up a large portion of the firms that are highly shorted.

Howver they question if a such a strategy can be effectively implemented especially as the overall universe of high short interest stocks is relatively small.

One aspect is missing in the paper in my opnbion : As far as I could see they did not explicitly incorporate volatility of returns. So the outperformance could be just the effect of a much higher volatility of those shares.

However as a first summary, I will have to rethink my gut feeling to stay away from stocks with high short interest.

It might make also sense for short idea generation to use those short interest tables, especially AMEX/ NYSE stocks.

Currently the NYSE page from the link mentioned above shows the following top 20 NYSE stocks with high short interest:

TEA Teavana Holdings, Inc. NYSE 60.04% 8.81M 38.31M Retail (Grocery)
HGG hhgregg, Inc. NYSE 54.35% 17.26M 37.24M Retail (Technology)
BPI Bridgepoint Education Inc NYSE 53.93% 17.23M 52.21M Schools
BKS Barnes & Noble Inc NYSE 49.68% 38.38M 60.20M Retail (Specialty Non-Apparel)
GME GameStop Corp. NYSE 49.46% 131.18M 133.98M Retail (Technology)
KBH KB Home NYSE 47.06% 65.44M 77.10M Construction Services
SVU SUPERVALU INC. NYSE 41.95% 210.68M 212.26M Retail (Grocery)
ESI ITT Educational Services, Inc. NYSE 39.67% 24.44M 24.75M Schools
OSG Overseas Shipholding Group Inc NYSE 38.20% 23.27M 30.45M Water Transportation
MCP Molycorp, Inc. NYSE 37.87% 56.05M 96.40M Metal Mining
RSH RadioShack Corporation NYSE 36.41% 98.46M 99.43M Retail (Technology)
CRR CARBO Ceramics Inc. NYSE 35.98% 19.73M 23.09M Oil Well Services & Equipment
USNA USANA Health Sciences, Inc. NYSE 35.81% 6.17M 14.99M Personal & Household Products
ONE Higher One Holdings, Inc NYSE 34.55% 32.64M 56.81M Schools
SAM Boston Beer Company, Inc., The NYSE 34.14% 8.40M 8.79M Beverages (Alcoholic)
AM American Greetings Corporation NYSE 33.79% 34.51M 35.54M Printing & Publishing
GDP Goodrich Petroleum Corp NYSE 33.26% 26.03M 36.37M Oil & Gas Operations
URI United Rentals, Inc. NYSE 31.78% 63.05M 63.77M Rental & Leasing
CJES C&J Energy Services Inc NYSE 31.63% 39.07M 51.89M Oil Well Services & Equipment
FIO Fusion-IO, Inc. NYSE 31.15% 49.59M 90.12M Computer Hardware

Some of those stocks even show up regulary on value blogs. So another application of such lists could be to even more scrutinize “value stocks” with high short interest as they might be potential value traps.

A final word on European stocks: Unfortunately, the disclosure of short interest in Europe is close to non-existent. Also, as the Volkswagen example showed, “cornering” is still an issue with European stocks. So in any case one should be extra carefull with single stock shorts.

Idea generation – potential short candidates (Zagg, Rite Aid, Zynga, Groupon, Herbalife, Overstock.com, SodaStream)

After closing the Green Mountain Short yesterday (final gain ~55%), I have only Kabel Deutschland left.

So of course I am looking for new short opportunities. As mentioned in an earlier post, the ideal short candidate should have most of the following “features”:

+ shady accounting
+ massive insider sales
+ negative free cashflows
+ pumped up growth through expensive acquisitions
+ expiring patents
+ hyped or “fad” based business model
+ very expensive valuation
+ high debt load and/or pension liabilities, operating leases etc.

Some of great sources for “shady accounting” or “accounting shenanigans” are specialised accounting blogs.

One of my favourite blogs is the fanatastic “Grumpy old Accountants” Blog. The writers, professors and assistent professors from US universities really produce superior forensic accounting analysis of US companies.

It is both, a great place to learn as well as to get some interesting short ideas.

Their latest analysis, which are all worth a read are about the following companies:

Zagg, which among other things inflates cashflow by accounting receivables as cash.

Rite Aid , the US drug store chain. I especially like the old post called “Rite Aid: Is management selling drugs or using them ?”

Groupon

Zynga

Personally, I think Zynga might be an interesting candidate if the Facebook IPO hype lifts their shareprice in the coming week.

Another interesting candidate they mention is Overstock.com, which is also a favourite of the initial Green Mountain critic Sam Antar at White Collar Fraud and J2 Global, a “cloud computing” company.

Another source for short ideas are of course famous hedge fund managers, most notable Jim Chanos and David Einhorn
For instance Herbalife. If David Einhorn himself is asking questions , you don’t want to bet against him.

Another “classic” is SodaStream, the company once called “the next Green Mountain”, when times were great then.

WARNING:

Many of those companies have already large short positions outstanding. Sodastream for instance has a Short interest to Free Float ratio of 58%, meaning that 58% of all freely available shares are sold short.

Another factor to watch closely is the relationship between outstanding short positions and trading volume. This measure is called “days to cover”. For an illiquid stock, even relatively low short interest percentages can lead to a long period of “days to cover” and therefore increase the risk of painful short squeezes

Let’s have a quick look at the stocks mentioned (sorted by SI / free float):

SI/Free float Days to cover
Herbalife 5.14% 4.9
Rite Aid 5.70% 3.5
Zynga 14.80% 3.5
Groupon 15.25% 4.8
Overstock.com 18.61% 26.2
J2 Global 24.43% 19.2
Zagg 44.66% 10.8
Sodastream 58.42% 10.8

Personally, I would hesitate to short anything above a 15%-20% percentage of SI/Free float although I have no “hard knowledge” to support this.

Summary: I do not have obvious short candidates yet, but I will try to enhance the watch list in order to act quickly if the opportunity comes up.

Good old friend: Asian Bamboo reports 2011 earnings

One of our “good old friends”, the former short position Asian Bamboo announced preliminary results.

I find the report especially intersting, not because of “I told you so and I am so clever” but because of this:

As domestic and international markets were weak, revenue per hectare fell, while plantation costs, such as cultivation costs and amortisation, increased due to a larger plantation size.

Asian Bamboo is basically producing sprouts which is sold as food and bamboo trees which are mostly used for construction. The food part in theory should be stable, so there must have been significant negative developements in the construction sector.

Maybe it is just a lame excuse but it could also be that China domestic market is not so resilient as everybody wants to believe.

Back to Asian Bamboo: 2011 earnings are ~1.20 EUR per share. So the “ridiculous” PE has now normalized to something like 12-13.

As one could expect, return on assets for a plantation are rather low and without significant investments, the returns are stable at best. Even for a plantation with fast growing bamboo trees.

Inefficient Markets – Solon SE edition: Shorting to Zero

One of the “ineffecient” corners of the stock markets are definitely penny stocks, in particular stocks of bankrupt companies.

A very good example is currently Solon SE, the once highflying German solar panel manufacturer.

Solon became bankrupt in mid December 2011. The stock dropped already a lot before:

However, after the news that an Indian company might be interested in some of the assets, the share price went up from around 0,23 EUR to 0,30 EUR, giving the shares a market cap of around 5 mn EUR.

Before going into the liquidation value anaylsis, we should look at the debt structure. Solon has created a lot of debt in the last years, in total around 400 mn in loans and bonds. Solon has one listed bond outstanding, a Convertible Bond from 2007 which would have matured end of 2012. Total outstanding amount is 132 mn EUR.

This bond is trading at 4% (!!! not 40%) of nominal value.

So in order for the shareholders to see a single cent of any liquidation proceeds, the bondholders will have to be paid in full. The likelyhood for this happening seems to be extremely low according to the bond price. The reason for this is that most of the asstes have been pledged for the bank loans after a debt restructuring in 2010.

One could now anaylse if the bond is correctly valued, but after any metric, the recovery rate for the bond will be significantly below 100%, which means the shareholders will get nothing.

So why on earth is someone willing to pay 30 cents for something thatr is worth nothing ? There are some theories about option value, but in my opinion the reason is most likely ignorance and “animal” spirits.

Fundemantally, Solon SE is a stock one can safely short down to zero, provided one can stand the volatility. For the portfolio I will initiate a short position of max. 2% from today, again following the 20% VWAP rule.

Edit: I have looked at the funding structure and my conclusion is that also the bond is a ZERO, but I would not want to bet on it. The safe bet is the stock.

Kabel Deutschland – How relevant is negative net equity combined with a lot of debt for a “wide moat” business ?

Background: Kabel Deutschland is one of the short positions of the portfolio and currently the only one which didn’t work out yet…

In one of the blog posts, reader Stairway commented with an interesting analysis.

I hope it is fair to summarize the argument as follows:
Read more

Best Ideas Summaries Part 1: Draegerwerk Participation Rights (ISIN DE0005550719)

One of my best investment ideas at the moment are the Dragerwerk “Genußscheine Serie D” (ISIN DE0005550719)

Draegerwerk produces medical devices, safety and aerospace equipment. Draegerwerk has managed to achieve a remarkable turnaround which resulted in a very strong performance of the shares

They have a fairly complicted capital structure, with normal voting shares, preferred shares and participation rights.

The most liquid securities are the Non-Voting Preferred Shares which trade at the following multiples:

Price/Book 2,2
Price/Sales 0.61
Trailing PE 15.3
EV/EBITDA 6.1
Dividend Yield 1.48%

They are up YTD 34.2%, making them the 4th best perfomer in the German Top 100 HDAX.

The numbers above don’t look too compelling, so what’s the deal here ?

So now let’s look at the “Genußscheine”: Draegerwerke has issued 3 different series, the most liquid beeing the “D series” (ISIN DE0005550719).

In contrast to “regular” German style particpation rights which are more like a subordinated bond, they have some special features:

– they don’t have a fixed coupon or nominal value
– instead they simply pay 10 times the dividend of the Preferred Shares
– they cannot be called or cancelled. In the initial terms the only way to redeem them by the issuer was to exchange them into 10 Preferred shares
– in the case of a capital increase holders will be “compensated” for dilution in the form of cash (no new participation rights)

The last point raised some issue when Draegerwerk issed new shares in 2010 in order to pay for an acquisition (50% of an existing Joint venture with Siemens). in my opinion they paid out the fair amount, however with a 9 month delay.

To sum up the situation: The so called “Genußschein” is very similar to a preferred share, the main difference being that it pays 10 times the dividend.

Now the “Genußschein” currently trades at around 160 EUR which is roughly 2.0 times the price of a preferred share.

Or put it differently, through the Genußschein one could gain exposure to Draeger at the following multiples:

Price/Book 0.44
Price/Sales 0.12
Trailing PE 3.1
EV/EBITDA 1.2
Dividend Yield 7.5%

Now this looks like a value investment to me. There are two ways to play this:

1. Outright Ivestment
2. Relative Value long / short

For the Blog Portfolio, I have combined the long position in the “Genuscheine” with a short Position in the Preferred Shares in order to establish a “market neutral” position while harvesting the positive carry of 8 preffered dividends (short 2 shares /dividends, long 10 dividends).

As one could see, the are not perfectly correlated, so a long short position requires some “buffer” for diverging prices:

Over the medium term, the Genußscheine should perform better than the Preferred shares, especially if Drager further raises the dividend. If I were the CFO or Treasurer of Draeger I would be desperate to buy back the Genußscheine at the current level, so we could see some tender offer going forward.

Summary: Although the Dragerwerk Genußscheine are not called shares, they offer the same Exposure to Draegerwerk than the widely held Preferred Shares at a 80% discount. A long Genußschein / short Preferred share position offers a interesing risk / return profile with a nice carry.

« Older Entries Recent Entries »