Oil stocks / TGS Nopec “Do something” or better hunker down ?

One reader clearly didn’t like what I said about TGS in my last post:

Overall I think the best advice in such a situation is: Either you panic early or you don’t panic at all. For the early panic it is already too late for oil related stocks in my opinion, so the only alternative is to sit it out.

IMHO this is a quite bad, perhaps even dangerous advice.

I think it is OK to revisit and reassess the single share in regular periods only, like once a year, and not everyday. But blindly holding a share only because you missed selling it in better times is IMHO not much different to throwing good money (the remaining money in the share) after the bad (the money already lost due to a missed time of selling.)
When reassessing the share the question should be “Feel I comfortable with the share for this price right now?”, but not “How much did I win or loose with thisshare in the past, so can I afford to sell it?

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Short cuts: Greenlight Re, Hornbach & TGS Nopec

Greenlight Re:

One reader Emailed me that I had made a mistake in my initial post with regard to the book value and P/B ratio. This is what I wrote in December:

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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
P/B Ratio 1,24 0,96 1,23 1,23 1,08 1,03 1,19 1,05 0,78
P/B Ratio adj. B Shares 1,48 1,15 1,46 1,47 1,29 1,23 1,42 1,25 0,93

For some reason, the official Bloomberg ratios do not include the class B shares held by David Einhorn, so I adjusted them accordingly.

Actually, the B shares are included in the stated Bloomberg Ratios despite showing the wrong number of shares, so the “true” P/B ratio is around ~0,79 which then of course makes the “mean reversion” story even more compelling.

Additionally, Greenlight already released the monthly investment return for December which was -0,1% against -1,6% for the S&P 500. So at least its going into the right direction.

Maybe one quick point on comparisons of Greenlight Re to Berkshire, Markel or Fairfax: Although it is true that the other companies have better track records, I do think that Greenlight has one big advantage: The company is transparent and relatively easy to value as the whole investment portfolio is marked-to-market. And as I pointed out, Greenlight for me is not a long-term compounding story but a mid-term special situation betting on a David Einhorn outperformance.

Hornbach

After Hornbach’s profit warning in December, a lot of people asked me: What are you going to do ? Are you selling now ? Why do you own Hornbach at all ?

First thing: I wil do nothing and watch. For me , the profit warning was very surprising as I thought that they are on a good track and have the right strategy, although the business they are in is very tough.

For me, Hornbach is a pretty low risk position. My expectation was that I can make around 10-12% p.a. with very little risk. Until Q3 2015, that was on track but now of course it looks like a clear underperformer.

One of the reasons for this is clearly the fact that in contrast to almost any other stock in Germany, Hornbach did not enjoy any multiple expansion over the last 5 years. For a capital intensive, real estate dominated business like Hornbach, book value is one of the relevant measures. If we look at this we can clearly see that Hornbach now is valued at the low end of the historical range of P/B which ranged from ~0,8 – 1,8 in the past 15 years:

P/B BV/Share
30.12.1999 1,86 8,335
29.12.2000 1,46 8,679
28.12.2001 1,07 11,654
30.12.2002 0,99 11,642
30.12.2003 1,09 12,103
30.12.2004 1,10 13,201
30.12.2005 1,17 13,661
29.12.2006 1,33 15,182
28.12.2007 1,31 16,441
30.12.2008 0,81 18,784
30.12.2009 0,89 20,584
30.12.2010 1,09 22,947
30.12.2011 0,93 24,900
28.12.2012 0,99 25,881
30.12.2013 1,03 27,101
30.12.2014 1,04 29,023
Jan 16 0,84 31,230

Obviously, Hornbach does have some issues. Personally I think one needs to watch the E-Commerce issue most closely. So far I thought that DIY does not have big issues with Amazon & CO but this now needs to be tested.

TGS Nopec

Tgs Nopec released preliminary 2015 figures and a first outlook for 2016. Naturally, the outlook is rather subdued. Combined with the drop in oil prices, the stock got hammered. For shareholders, the only positive aspect is that TGS still is doing a lot better than its capital-intensive competitors, for instance PGS or CGG:

For the moment I will not do anything. Clearly the oil price went lower than I ever thought but TGS has net cash and will manage the cycle conservatively. So I don’t think one has to panic now.

Overall I think the best advice in such a situation is: Either you panic early or you don’t panic at all. For the early panic it is already too late for oil related stocks in my opinion, so the only alternative is to sit it out.

Performance review 2015 & 5 years 2011-2015

Performance 2015

2015 is now in the books. For the full year, the portfolio gained 14,13% (including dividends, excluding taxes) vs. 12,47% for my Benchmark (Eurostoxx50 (Perf.Ind) (25%), Eurostoxx small 200 (25%), DAX (30%), MDAX (20%)). With +1,7% the relative performance was very small but nevertheless positive. However if we look at the monthly returns for 2015, we can clearly see that for most of the year I was trailing the benchmark:

perf 2015

After trailing the benchmark almost -9% in the beginning of the year, the pull back in autumn brought the portfolio back above the benchmark for the year, overall the outperformance for 2015 is clearly in the “not significant” range of outcomes.

The top performers in 2015 were (incl. dividends, in EUR):

TFF Group (+54,3%)
Miko (46,1%)
Admiral (43,3%)
NN Group (37,9%)
Gagfah (30,0%)
Van Lanschott (29,4%)
Bouvet (28,5%)
IGE & XAO (26,6%)

The major detractors were:

Romgaz (-16,7%)
Depfa TRY Zero (-16,7%)
Koc Group (-15,3%)
TGS Nopec (-13,9%)

If you had asked me end of 2014 which stocks would have been my favourites in 2015, only Admiral would have been in my list. I clearly did not expect Stocks like Miko and TFF perform so strongly. This is also one of the reasons why for me too much concentration wil lmost likely not be value enhancing.

The 2015 performance was OK, although compared to the overall performance of European small and Midcaps it was not spectacular. Actually for anyone investing in the European small and midcap area, 2015 was an extremely good year. The German MDAX increased around 23%, the SDAX around 27% and the tech oriented TecDax even 34%. Also the French CAC 90 small index gained 30% and the Italian Star index around +40%. So you will see some European funds posting spectacular results for 2015 if they invested mostly in those markets. However many of those markets are now very expensive, trading at trailing P/Es of high 20ies to high 30ies. It remains to be seen if they can hold those valuations in 2016, I am somehow sceptical. I think in those markets too much growth is priced in already into many of the stocks.

My “adventure” with Emerging markets clearly was negative for the 2015 performance. If I would have stuck to my “core competency”, European small and Midcaps, I would have certainly performed a lot better. In the long run however, I do think that there is a pretty good chance that this pays off as those markets will come back at some point in time. Es with the European stocks, I think it is very important to get familiar with those markets already when they go down. I do think it is unrealistic assuming to be able to enter any such market at the bottom. There will always be some pain in the beginning when you extend your circle of competence.

Portfolio transactions in 2015:

The current portfolio can be found as always on the portfolio page of the blog.

Stocks bought in 2015:

Lloyds Banking Group
Pfandbriefbank
Greenlight Re
Gagfah
Partners Fund
Aggreko

Stocks sold in 2015

Energiedienst
Cranswick
Kas Bank
Trilogiq
Gronlandsbanken
Depfa LT2 (maturity)

Interestingly, 4 out of 6 new stocks were special situations and one of my new value picks was a fund. So I only found one “core value” stock in 2015. Of the sold ones, Cranswick was clearly a mistake. Though it now looks very expensive, I clearly should have captured more of the positive momentum as the stock increased another +40% since I sold it. This has cost me around 2% of portfolio performance.

5 year performance review 2011-2015

Bench Portfolio Perf BM Perf. Portf. Portf-BM
2010 6.394 100      
2011 5.510 95,95 -13,8% -4,1% 9,8%
2012 6.973 131,81 26,6% 37,4% 10,8%
2013 9.017 175,04 29,3% 32,8% 3,5%
2014 9.214 183,60 2,2% 4,9% 2,7%
2015 10.363 209,53 12,5% 14,1% 1,7%
           
Since inception   209,53 62,1% 109,5% 47,5%
CAGR     10,1% 15,9%

So 2015 was the fifth year with a outperformance in a row although a very insignificant one. Since inception, the portfolio now has more than doubled. The annualized return has been a healthy 15,9% compared to 10,1% for the benchmark. Looking at the performance graph one can already see that this has been achieved with less volatility compared to the benchmark:

5 jahres perf

For statistic freaks a few maybe interesting stats for the 5 year period:

– there were 24 months with negative performance. On average the portfolio participated only with 67% of the negative performance
– there were 36 months with positive performance. On average the portfolio participated with 115% of the positive performance
– The Sharpe Ratio for the 5 year period is 1,53
– the highest monhtly loss for the benchmark was -15,1% in August 2011, but only -7,4% for the portfolio in the same month
– The highest monhtly gain for the benchmark was +14,9% in July 2011, however for the portfolio the best month was January 2013 with +8,6%
– in relative terms the worst month for the portfolio was July 2011 with a -11,0% underperformance
– in relative terms the best month was June 2011 with +9,2% outperformance

As I have mentioned several times, the portfolio does show some time lag. In months with very strong benchmark returns, the portfolio sometimes underperforms significantly but then manages to catch up. I think this is very typical for less liquid and out of favor stocks in general, they are not leading any market advances.

How to explain the 5 year performance

First and foremost I think the start of the blog and the portfolio was lucky in regard to timing. In 2011, there were many “casualties” from the finanical crisis available, both on the “special situation” side as well as within “normal” value stocks. A relatively risk free bond like the 2015 Depfa LT2 which matured a few weeks ago could be bought with a yield to maturity of 20%. Even in 2012 solid UK companies like Dart Group could be bought at incredibly low prices at a 5x trailing P/E.

Then the “Euro crisis” in 2012/2013 offered a further chance to buy very cheaply into Italian and French quality stocks at very low prices like SIAS or G. Perrier at low single digit P/Es.

Besides lucky timing of starting the blog and the portfolio, I think the main reason for the relatively good performance was not what I did but what I didn’t do. Some examples for this:

– I didn’t try to time the market
– avoided most stories, trends and “Fads” like “Real assets”, “Chinese consumer”, BRICs forever etc.
– stayed away from optically “falling knifes” with structural problems
– stopped selling short when I found out that I am not good at it

My biggest achievements within those 5 years were that I manage to hold my winners longer and that i corrected my mistakes usually quite fast.

Outlook & Strategy 2016-2020

I think the probability is high that the next 5 years will be not as good as the last five years, both in absolute terms as well as in relative terms for my portfolio. “Value” in the areas of my core competency (boring European small caps) has become extremely rare. Maybe my shift to larger cap companies and Emerging market related stocks will work out, maybe not. On the other hand, if someone would have asked me five years ago if I would more than double the portfolio within 5 years I would have clearly said “no way”.

As my readers know, I don’t make predictions about future stock prices. I do think that there is some value out there but mostly in areas where I am not an expert. So one of my tasks will be to learn more in areas where I only have very superficial knowledge such as Emerging markets, commodities and energy.

Will there be a big crash at the stock market in the next 5 years ? I don’t know and I wouldn’t bet on it. Market timing for me is something which clearly doesn’t add value and spending too much time on macro economic issues is also not time well spent.

So for me the strategy will remain the same as for the past 5 years: Analyze company by company, buy if they are cheap, sell when they become to expensive. Maybe the companies that I analyze wil become a little bit more exotic.

My “slow investing” philosophy so far has clearly not directly improved my returns but my nerves. So I will stick to the maximum of 1 transaction per month. The only thing I might change is that I will maybe allow myself to exchange one position per month. Otherwise I will have some indirect market timing if I sell first, then go in cash and invest again with a 1 month time lag.

Some Links

As aways, don’t miss Eddie Elfenbein’s annual 20 stock buy list which has an incredible good track record

Clark Street Value’s 2015 portfolio review with a nice list of very unusual positions

A good write up of Leucadia

Unfortunately only in German: A 45 minute documentary about the Samwer brothers (Zalando, Rocket Internet)

Great advice from Farnamstreet blog how to get your reading done

The 2015 review from Frenzel and Herzing

A good summary of links on what is going on in Brazil (H/T Abnormal Returns)

My 27 investments for 2016

Over the years I found it quite helpful to list my current investments at the end of each year and try to explain (to myself) the investment case in a few sentences.

Former posts can to be found here:
My 28 investments for 2015
My 24 investments for 2014
My 22 investments for 2013

Compared to last year, Sberbank, Gronlandsbanken, Cranswick, Trilogiq, KAS bank and Energiedienst were sold, the Depfa LT2 matured. New positions bought in 2015 are Aggreko, Partners Fund, Lloyds Banking, Gagfah, Pfandbriefbank and Greenlight Re. With 27 stocks, the portfolio is still maybe a little bit too diversified, my preference would be to have not more than 25 positions. Interestingly, only 5 stocks of the 2013 list are still in the portfolio, so there has been some turn around.

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Greenlight Re (GLRE): Poor man’s Berkshire or interesting bet on a David Einhorn Comeback ?

Management Summary:

Greenlight Re is an interesting special situation in my opinion combining 2 bets in one stock:

1. It is a bet that David Einhorn will come back after his worst year ever and 4 years of underperformance
2. Greenlight Re, the Reinsurance company whose investments he manages “mean reverts” at least closer to its historical price book ratio.

This “bet” should be relatively uncorrelated to the overall market and due to the construction of the investment mandate, Einhorn can charge only half of the performance fee for some time.

Disclaimer: This is not investment advise. DO YOUR OWN RESEARCH !!!

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Some links

Muddy Waters is short Casino and thinks parent Rallye is worth zero. Good that I filtered Rallye out quickly. Last year, Rallye was still presented as a “value investment” (Never buy a story)

The Brooklyn Investor takes a look at Ametech, a stock held by Lou Simpson

A hard value investing lesson from the Oil & Gas sector

The big Fintech bubble already shows some weakness

John Hempton’s (Bronte) somehow sceptical November report

Finally a video of a lecture from “deep value” guru Peter Cundill (2005)

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Time flies !! 5 years of Value & Opportunity

Almost exactly 5 years ago the first post (still in German) went online.

Those anniversaries are always a good occasion to step back a little bit and reflect what happened and what changed.

Big “Thank you” to all readers !!!

First of all, I want to say “Thank you” to all my readers. Especially for those who comment on a regular basis because this feedback is really important. It is like having a really sophisticated investment committee to which I have to “Pitch” my ideas where any weak point will be highlighted directly. Also a big “thank you” to all readers who send me Emails. Actually I feel more motivated than ever to continue with this “hobby”, so let’s look forward to the next 5 years !!!

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Investment strategy: It’s hard to find the winners but maybe easier to identify (and avoid) losers ?

By coincidence, I read the following posts on the same evening:

Why indexing beats stock picking

39% Of Stocks Have A Negative Lifetime Total Return

Picking winners is hard

The Bloomberg article refers to a paper which can be summarized as follows:

But it is much harder to explain why most active equity managers fail to keep up with the benchmark index, a shortcoming that implies these investment professionals are doing something that systematically leads to underperformance.

The answer, we believe, lies in the fact that the best performing stocks in a broad index perform much better than the other stocks in the index, most of which perform relatively badly. That means average index returns depend heavily on the relatively small set of winners.

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Book review: “Think like a Freak” (Levitt/Dubner)

think like a freak

 

“Think like a Freak” is not an explicit  finance book. I had read both predecessor books and I liked the original “Freakonomics” a lot, the second book not so much.

For those who haven’t read them: The Freakonomics books look at how every day life and real life problems can be explained by economic variables like incentives etc. often with very surprising and not really obvious connections.

The third book in my opinion is very good. They want to encourage readers to “think like a Freak”. This means among other things, trying not to tackle big problems head on but trying to solve little problems that might then have large effects or do things differently. And mostly the way to solve those problems is very unique.

One example for instance was David Lee Roth (the singer of Van Halen) who was famous for demanding a very detailed list of things for his concerts, among others a bowl of Smarties but without the brown ones.

The reason for this seems not to have been pure vanity but a test if the people organizing the concert halls actually had also read the other stuff, especially with regard to the technical equipment. So the first thing he did when he arrived at any stage was to check the Smarties bowl. If the brown ones were still in, they directly went to checking all the equipment really thoroughly, in order to make sure that everything really worked. If the brown Smarties were out, they just made a standard test and saved a lot of time and effort.

Interestingly, I actually could make a connection to investing when I read the book.

I do think that value investing is actually very similar to “Invest as a freak”. As a value investor, you don’t really care about the big problems like “will the stock market go up or down”, “what will GDP growth be” etc. Rather you concentrate on “small” problems, looking at company by company without caring so much about the “big picture”.

I think it is also important for an investor to develop some kind of “brown Smarties” test similar to David Lee Roth. For me for instance this is the comprehensive income line. If I see something strange there I know I have to be really really carefull when I further analyze the stock.

Anyway, even without making the connection to Value Investing, “Think like a Freak” is a very entertaining book. HIGHLY RECOMMENDED !!!

 

 

 

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