Category Archives: Value Stocks

Duell: Colefax Plc vs. AS Creation AG – part 1

AS Creation is one of my core holdings. It is the clear market leader for wallpaper in Germany, however subject to an Anti Trust probe. Historically, AS Creation has produced rock solid returns. Currently there is some grwoth potential in the stock as they are building up a significant joint venture in Russia.

I was not aware that there is a UK listed company specialising in wallpaper as well. Interactive Investor Blog (highly recommended by the way) had a very nice summary post on Colefax Plc a few days ago.

So I thought it might make sense to compare the two companies “head to head”. I am not sure if Colefax and AS Creation are really competitors. Colefax sells most of its products in the US and the UK and only a relatively small part in Europe, whereas AS Craetion is more focused on Germany with some French wholesale activities.

Colefax has a market Cap of ~31 mn GBP, AS Creation around 62 mn GBP.

Let’s have a quick look at “traditional” valuation metrics

Colefax AS Creation
P/B 1.19 0.77
P/B tang 1.19 0.86
P/S 0.41 0.36
P/E 7.7 11.1
EV/EBITDA 3.31 4.75
EV/EBIT 4.6 9.1
Debt/Capital 0% 27%

Apart from Price/Book and Price sales, Colefax looks a lot cheaper than AS Creation. AS Creation has some debt on its balance sheet vs. Colefax which actually shows net cash. AS Creation used to have little debt or net cash as well, however the investments in the Russian JV have been funded with debt.

Let’s look at historical profit margins next:

Net margin  
  ACW CFX
1999 5.66% 4.67%
2000 5.75% 5.61%
2001 5.38% 3.77%
2002 5.23% 2.78%
2003 3.94% 3.05%
2004 5.00% 3.43%
2005 5.33% 4.13%
2006 6.68% 5.49%
2007 5.95% 5.20%
2008 5.06% 2.51%
2009 4.14% 3.43%
2010 4.55% 5.88%
avg 5.22% 4.16%

From 1999 to 2010, AS Creation managed to earn 1% more margins on average with a lower volatility than Colefax. So one could conclude that AS Creation at least historically had better pricing power than Colefax.

However if we look at ROE and ROIC, the picture changes completely:

AS Creation   Colefax  
  ROE ROIC ROE ROIC
1999 12.98% 6.90% 26.01% 17.82%
2000 14.87% 8.19% 30.92% 20.42%
2001 13.52% 10.39% 17.72% 13.15%
2002 12.42% 9.83% 12.83% 10.37%
2003 8.79% 7.74% 14.83% 12.81%
2004 11.53% 9.63% 17.55% 19.24%
2005 12.41% 11.05% 20.22% 18.01%
2006 14.93% 12.54% 25.34% 22.55%
2007 13.45% 10.42% 23.57% 26.94%
2008 11.36% 7.86% 9.07% 22.37%
2009 9.14% 7.97% 10.75% 16.55%
2010 9.73% 8.00% 18.85% 21.06%
avg 12.10% 9.21% 18.97% 18.44%

Colefax shows almost twice the returns on equity and invested capital compared to AS Creation. The absolute amount achieved by Colefax is remarkable as well, even if some of the difference could be explained by differences in UK and EUR interest rates.

Before jumping to the conclusion that Colefax is the cheaper and more capital efficient company, we should chekc 2 major items which may distort return on capital numbers and Enterprise Value (EV) multiples:

– pension liabilities
– operating leases

Pension liabilities:

Interestingly enough, Colefax seems to be a very untypical UK company. They have only a tiny defined benefit plan (DBO) with liabilites of 1 mn GBP. AS Creation’s DBO liablities are higher at around 7 mn EUR. So no big impact in both cases (remark: to be on the safe side, DBO should always be added to finanical debt)

Operating leases

This is more interesting. AS Creation only records 600 tsd EUR of Operating leasing liabilities whereas Colefax has around 25 mn GBP gross liabilites. If we look at the different components of assets required to run the busines we see some intersting numbers:

Colefax AS Creation
Sales 77,722 184,603
Non-Current Assets 7,282 50,770
Net WC 11,881 66,424
Operating Leases 25,258 600
 
NCA/ Sales 9.4% 27.5%
NCA+OL/Sales 41.9% 27.8%
Net WC/Sales 15.3% 36.0%
 
NCA + NWC+OL 44,421 117,794
in % of Sales 57.2% 63.8%
 
EV/EBITDA 3.31 4.75
EV/EBITDA OL 7.20 4.80
 
Net Debt+OL+pension/total Assets 47% 14.4%

Non Current Assets (ex Goodwill) at Colefax in percentage of sales is only a fraction of AS Creations non -current assets. However taking into account the (gross) operating leases, the picture suddenly shifts dramatically.

Both, EV/EBITDA and leverage ratios suddenly shift to AS Creations favour if one accounts for the operating leases.

Colefax still uses less capital in percentage of sales, but this is “only” due to much lower working capital requirements.

I don’t really understand why Colefax needs to rent such a large amount of land and buildings if they are not producing the stuff. Do they have a warehouse in Central London ?

Business models

One thing I forgot to mention is that the two companies have very different business models, despite both selling mostly wallpaper. Colefax only designs and distributes their products, whereas AS Creation creation really produces all the wallpaper themselves.

“Producing” wallpaper is basically only a specialised version of printing, with the big advantage that at least so far the internet has failed to come up with a paperless alternative in contrast to many other printing products.

Despite having outsourced production, Colefax employs 305 persons (fy 2011) for 77 mn GBP in sales whereas AS creation generates 172 mn EUR sales with 706 employees (2010).

The differences in the business model can be easily seen if we look at the major cost blocks compared to sales:

Colefax AS Creation
Staff cost 14,933 39,336
– in % of sales 19.2% 21.3%
Marketing, distribution & admin 36,345 27,166
– in % of sales 46.8% 14.7%
COGS 34,929 96,064
-in % of saless 44.9% 52.0%

Colefax needs to spend a lot more on advertising and administrative expenses than AS Creation. I am somehow surprised that Colefax seems to buy their merchandise cheaper in relation to sales than AS Creation has to pay for the raw material.

Staff costs are relatively comparable, which is interesting as well.

First results:

– Colefax “design and distribute” model is less capital intensive than AS Creation’s “full production” operations
– taking into account operating leases, the major advantage seems to be a lower amount of required working capital
– surprisingly, Colefax seems to require a lot of fixed investments if one includes operating leases
– however return on invested capital is still higher for Colefax despite slightly lower profit margins
– the higher voltality in Colefax profit margins ist most likely due to higher leverage through off balance sheet operating leases
so far I can see no clear “winner” between the two companies. Both copmpanies have problems but also opportunities.
– Colefax might be a good diversification in order to gain exposure to UK and US housing recovery while AS Creation has growth opportunities in Russia and benefits from a still strong domestic market

In the second part I will try to come up with a valuation for Colefax Plc to see if it is an interesting investment for the portfolio.

Autostrada – the real Italian job !! (Holy Cow edition)

Holy Cow !! (pardon my French..).

After I posted last week about a potential “Italian Job” at Autostarda / SIAS with the sale of the South American activities, the real Italian job now emerged:

Autostrada just released a “breaking news item” that they intend to:

– buy in total 30% of the Italian construction company Impegrilo from it’s parent and Insurance company Fondiaria at a total amount of 237 mn EUR
– The purchase price is above the current market price of Impegrilo shares
– additionally, they want to increase their capital by up to 500 mn EUR which based on the current market cap of 620 mn EUR is a lot.

I have to admit that this is really unexpected and hard to value. In any case, it completely changes the investment case and I am inclined to directly sell the shares or exchange them into SIAS.

One thing is a little bit strange: They say that they pay above market price (3.65 EUR for the Fondriaria part and 3 EUR from the parent company) and spend 237 mn EUR in total. However, those 120 mn shares are actually worth something like 312 mn EUR at the current price of 2.66 EUR for Impgegilo.

Edit:

I have just seen that Fondiaria actually issued a press release in December 2011 about the first part of the transaction:

Argo Finanziaria S.p.A., Immobiliare Fondiaria-SAI S.r.l. and Immobiliare Milano Assicurazioni S.r.l. announce the signing today of the acquisition by Argo Finanziaria S.p.A. of 8,040,000 ordinary shares of IGLI S.p.A., held by Immobiliare Fondiaria-SAI S.r.l. and Immobiliare Milano Assicurazioni S.r.l. and comprising 33.33% of the share capital of IGLI S.p.A.. As previously reported, IGLI S.p.A. in turn holds 120,576,293 Impregilo S.p.A. ordinary shares – 29.96% of the share capital with voting rights. The acquisition price of each IGLI S.p.A. share subject to the agreement was established at Euro
10.89572, based on the forecast balance sheet of IGLI S.p.A. at December 31, 2011, with each ordinary share of Impregilo S.p.A. attributed a value of Euro 3.65.
Argo Finanziaria S.p.A. may designate its subsidiary Autostrada Torino Milano S.p.A. to acquire the IGLI S.p.A. shares held by Immobiliare Fondiaria-SAI S.r.l. and Immobiliare Milano Assicurazioni S.r.l. .

So this was not exectly “brand new” news, but this potential “designation” was never mentioned anywhere on Autostrada’s website.

So let’s wait and see what the stock does tomorrow. Maybe I was the only one who did not know about this…..

Quick update: After a short suspension, the stock now trades down “after hour” at around 6,90 EUR from 7,10 earlier on the day. So I will try to sell them tomorrow with a limit of 6,75 EUR per share.

EDIT: I decided to skip the limit and sell at today’s VWAP without limit. Sell first, ask questions later….

Autostrada – another Italian job ?

As an investor in Italian companies, one should always be prepared for some surprises, as the EMAK example showed. In the case of Autostrada, it is the following news from the Week end:

Italian toll-road operator Atlantia SpA (ATL.MI) said it has gained complete control of Autostrade Sud America Srl, a subsidiary in South America, in the latest of a series of deals that will enable it to generate a third of its profit from activities overseas in the coming years.

And:

Through its unit Autostrade per l’Italia SpA, it acquired a 45.8% stake from the Gavio family’s holding SIAS SpA for EUR565.2 million.
It gave SIAS a call option to buy 99.98% of Autostrada Torino-Savona SpA for EUR223 million.

Autostrade Del Sur was one of the Peter Cundil like “hidden” Assets of SIAS / Autostrada. Last year, they estimated it to be worth 640 mn EUR, now they sold it for ~15%. Less. Nevertheless, this represents almost 2 EUR cash in per share which in my opnion was not adequatly reflected in the valuation.

For some reason, they did not publish anything on their website, however there was a press release at SIAS, the operating subsidiary.

Interestingly, the full text reads as follows:

The sale price of the stake in Autostrade Sud America S.r.l. being sold under the above mentioned sale-purchase agreement has been agreed in the amount of Euro 565.197.750; the execution of the agreement will imply, for SIAS the discharge of about Euro 180 million of guarantees (value as at December 31st, 2011) issued in connection to the Chilean subsidiaries; consequently the benefit concerning the “consolidated financial net debt” of SIAS Group will amount to about Euro 750 million.

So I read this as a total consideration of 750 mn EUR, as consolidated debt is transfered to Atlantia as well, which is GREAT NEWS !!!!

If we compare this to the disclosure from the 2010 report of SIAS:

The “consolidated net profit” of the ASA Group for FY 2010 totalled EUR 38.2 million (with an increase of EUR 11.1 million compared to the corresponding “pro-forma” figure for 2009).

We can see that 100% of the South American business made 38 mn EUR profit, the 46% stake of Sias translates into ~18 mn “at equity” profit of this participation in SIAS books. The participation had a book value of 130 mn EUR in SIAS books as of December 2010, so the sale for 565 mn EUR translates into a gain of potentially 435 mio EUR for SIAS or around 2 EUR per share.

I am not sure what to make of the purchase option:

The potential exercise of the call option by SIAS (that has reserved for itself the right to appoint a subsidiary as the
purchaser of the above mentioned stake) can occur by September, 30th, 2012 for a price consideration equal to Euro
223 million. The execution is subject to, amongst other conditions, the issue of all the possibly necessary authorizations from the
competent authorities, ANAS and Antitrust authority included. ATS manages a motorway concession of about 130 km expiring in 2038. According to the reported figures as at December 31st, 2012, “net toll revenues” amount to Euro 68 million and “EBITDA” amounts to Euro 31 million; the “net
financial debt” amounts to Euro 36 million.

At about 8 times EV/EBITDA, it is not really cheap but operationally it might be a great fit for the existing toll road network. SIAS itself is valued at 7x EV/EBITDA, so its a small premium. From a technical point of view it might be intersiting tosee that for only 40% of the proceeds SIAS and Autostarda will show more profit in the P&L than the previous at equity participation.

Interestingly, the stock price of Autostrada didn’t move at all, wheras SIAS slightly increased.

Read more

Housekeeping Magyar Telecom, Tonnelerie and Vetropack

As posted on Friday, I fully exited the Magyar position already on Friday at the VWAP of 589.6 HUF,or 2.03 EUR per share.

Part of the liquidity (currently 13 %) will be used to increase Tonnelerie and Vetropack to full positions of 5% from currently 3.2% and 2.8%. This is also a “self controlling” effort in order not to “waste” the free liquidity on any half baked ideas. In my opinion, you are much more focused if you have to sell an old position first before you buy the new position.

Portfoliomanagement update – sale KSB vz.

As I plan to reduce the Draeger Vorzugs short, my cash quota will fall significantly below 10% after buying back the shorted shares.

In order to stay at my 10% threshold and as I have some ideas for new investments, I will need to reduce or sell other positions.

My current “priority selling list” looks like this:

1. KSB Vz.: As KSB is approaching the “fair value” I have estimated last year, I will start selling them today with the usual restrictions (max 20% of daily volume)

Other candidates for further sales would be:

Sto Vz. –> despite great performance in the last few years on ehas to watch closely if margins can be maintained (see Westag)
– next in line would be my 2 remaining large caps Walmart and Nestle. Despite good performance, I have a lot less conviction here than with my other position

Update Westag und Getalit

A couple of weeks ago, I decided to exit Westag and Getalit despite looking cheap and solid.

My argument was that without any visible competitive advantages, profit margins will most likely “revert to the mean” and then Westag doesn’t look so cheap any more.

Yesterday, Westag pre issued it’s 2011 results.

The results were quite sobering:

Die Westag & Getalit AG konnte im Gesamtjahr 2011 den Umsatz um 4,8 % auf 227,1 Mio. € steigern (Vorjahr 216,6 Mio. €) und übertraf damit das bisherige Rekordjahr 2008. Sehr erfreulich war die Tatsache, dass der Exportumsatz, bei deutlich schwierigeren wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen gegenüber dem Inland, überproportional um 13,8 % auf 48,7 Mio. € erhöht werden konnte (Vorjahr 42,8 Mio. €).

Das Ergebnis vor EE-Steuern betrug 11,8 Mio. € (Vorjahr 15,1 Mio. €). Die Ergebnisentwicklung in 2011 wurde durch einen sehr deutlichen Anstieg der Rohstoffpreise belastet, der nur teilweise und in Schritten durch höhere Verkaufspreise für unsere eigenen Produkte ausgeglichen werden konnte.

Der Jahresüberschuss entwickelte sich parallel zum Vorsteuerergebnis und erreichte einen Wert von 8,2 Mio. € (Vorjahr 10,7 Mio. €).

So despite solid headline growth, profit decreased significantly by almost -25%. With a 2011 profit margin of 3.6%, we are now almost exactly at the 23 year average net income margin of 3.5%. With ~1.40 EUR per share we have a trailing P/E of 12 which is quite expensive these days.

The share didn’t move much yesterday, but it clearly shows that the upside of Westag’s business model is quite limited. They don’t seem to have any kind of pricing power despite a relatively well business climate in the home market Germany.

Due to the low trading volume, I am still selling down the shares in the portfolio, currently the position still amounts to 1.46% of the portfolio.

Shares at Westag can be a good “reversion to the mean” investment, if the P/E is low AND profitablity is low by historical standards. Ohter than that it will most likely be a “value trap”.

Quick news: EMAK, WestLB and Tonnelerie

EMAK

I just saw that after the capital increase, EMAK has a new “number 2” shareholder, a company called “Girefin SpA”. Girefin SpA is a holding company which holds 55% of Landi Renzo SpA, a quoted Italian company. Girefin is controlled by Stefano Landi who was CEO of Landi Renzo before.

From a minority investor point of view this might be interesting, to have a “local” guy on board.

WestLB

There is an interesting article in the FT Germany (in German) about the current situation at Westimmo, the real estate lending sub of WestLB. If they succeed in moving the whole subsidiary into the government owned “bad bank” and maybe at book values, than the 2011 result might only show minimal losses if all. This would be very good for the 2011 “Genußscheine”.

Tonnellerie Francois Frere

There are news that Tonnelerie and listed competitor Oeneo are negotiating about Oeneo’s oak barrel business, Tonnelerie Radoux. Although the news was already out on Friday, it looks like some people who think that this is a reason to buy Tonnellerie.

However in my opinion one has to wait to see what Tonnellerie is actually paying for this and how they finance it.

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