Category Archives: Outsider company

Metro Bank Plc – Terminal decline or Deep Value opportunity ?

Warning: This is not investment advice. The author recently had a very disappointing track record so you might want to stay away as far as possible from this stock. DO YOUR OWN research.

Some three and a half year ago I briefly looked at Metro Bank, then the much hyped “Apple of Banking” and I didn’t like it that much. My summary back then was as follows:

Fundamentally, I do think that at the current share prIce the stock is already very “richly” valued as I don’t see a sustainable business model to earn the required returns on equity in the long run.I see a large risk that Metro Bank is rather a “one-trick pony” which worked well once but most likely not a second time.

At some point in time in the future this could even turn out to be an interesting short opportunity when growth is slowing and defaults start catching up.

In the meantime a couple of things happened:

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My 20 Investments for 2020

My “resident blog troll” might interpret this post as “The 20 Stocks to stay away from in 2020” due to the underwhelming 2019 performance, but these are the stocks that are in my blog portfolio in the beginning of 2020.  Every reader can do whatever he wants with that list, either ignore it, go short or whatever.

I do a brief recap of each investment case including a short outlook from a portfolio perspective.

The summaries of the previous years can be found here:

My 22(+1) Investments for 2019
My 21 investments for 2018
My 27 investments for 2017
My 27 investments for 2016
My 28 investments for 2015
My 24 investments for 2014
My 22 investments for 2013

1. Miko (4,1% weight)


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My 22 (+1) investments for 2019

Edit: I actually forgot to include Expedia…..

This post has become now a small tradition at the end of December and is also very helpful for me to review my holdings.

The summaries of the previous years can be found here:

My 21 investments for 2018
My 27 investments for 2017
My 27 investments for 2016
My 28 investments for 2015
My 24 investments for 2014
My 22 investments for 2013

From the 21 stocks of last year, 4 have left the portfolio:

Silver Chef and Metro were clear mistakes from my side and I exited them as discussed with significant losses. IGE & XAO was a much more positive case. The company received a buy-out offer from Schneider SA and I exited at 138 EUR per share. DOM Security finally was merged into the main shareholder company SFPI. Luckily, I could sell 40% of my holdings at 75 EUR/ share.

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Softbank & Masa Son – Mad Genius pumping the Start up bubble or Visionary Capital allocator ? (Part 1)

In the comments to my Kinnevik post some weeks ago, a reader recommended me to have a look at Softbank, the famous Tech conglomerate built by Masa Son. Well sometimes I indeed take suggestions…..


Masa Son – Founder and “Godfather”

In Softbank’s case it makes sense to start with its founder, CEO and major shareholder (21%) Masayoshi (“Masa”) Son.

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AQ Group (ISIN SE0000772956) – a 15 year “42- bagger” without a Moat ?

Would you consider to invest into a company which at every occasion states the following:

AQ possesses no amazing patents or other security, we rely on having the best crew.

For a “Buffett/Munger” style value investor, this would be tough as there is clearly no moat or anything close and according to Buffett, the business economics always win in the long run, no matter how well a company is run.

Welcome to AQ Group, a Swedish “non moat” manufacturing company



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Kinder morgan (KMI): Asymmetric upside potential

So let’s move on from focusing on the bad things and look at the the things that I like at Kinder Morgan. While I was writing this post, I found a very good blog post from Glenn Chan from 2 years ago which I can only recommend and includes a lot of interesting points about Kinder Morgan.

The Management:

Rich Kinder, age 71 owns 11% of the company and was famous for paying himself only 1 USD salary during his time as CEO.


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A deeper look into Svenska Handelsbanken (With a little help from Warren Buffett)

This is the follow up post on my first post where I compared Handelsbanken to Deutsche Bank.

Whenever I start to look at a company more seriously, I do a quick Pro/con list, starting with the Cons first in order to cool down my desire to quickly buy a stock:


1. It’s a bank
2. Avg P/E over the last 15 years has been ~11 compared to 17 now (so historically expensive)
3. current P/B at 2,0 is higher than 15 Year average (1,7)
4. current price/tangible book at 2,2 vs. 15 year average at 1,95
5. Almost 100% more expensive (P/B) than most European banks
6. high exposure to potentially “frothy” Nordic real estate markets
7. significant amount of capital market funding (deposit to loan ratio clearly below 0)
8. past performance also due to "Luck" of not being active in Southern Europe, many Nordic banks look good, especially Swedish banks
9. threat of continued technological change (online banking, peer-to-peer lending, etc.)
10. analysts are extremely negative, significantly below all peers (on Bloomberg, from 33 analysts, only 1 has a buy, 16 holds, 16 sells). Handelsbanken is Number 600 of analyst consensus in the Stoxx 600.
11. we are current in a frothy stock market environment and the stock chart looks aggressive

Let’s look into more detail into these issues.

Re 1: It’s a bank

Many value investors stay away from banks, mostly due to the 2008/2009 crisis where former highly regarded banks (Lehman, Bear Stearns;WaMu, Countrywide) basically disappeared over night. On the other hand, Warren Buffett’s single biggest stock investment is a bank, Wells Fargo at around 27 bn USD for their ~10% plus stake.

One of the great things about Buffett is that he usually explains what he does. Wells Fargo is not different. He actually explains it in his 1990 annual report.

He starts explaining why they don’t like banks in general:

The banking business is no favorite of ours. When assets are twenty times equity – a common ratio in this industry – mistakes that involve only a small portion of assets can destroy a major portion of equity. And mistakes have been the rule rather than the exception at many major banks. Most have resulted from a managerial failing that we described last year when discussing the “institutional imperative:” the tendency of executives to mindlessly imitate the behavior of their peers, no matter how foolish it may be to do so. In their lending, many bankers played follow-the-leader with lemming-like zeal; now they are experiencing a lemming-like fate.

Because leverage of 20:1 magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly managed bank at a “cheap” price. Instead, our only interest is in buying into well-managed banks at fair prices.

So this is pretty clear statement from Buffett: If you buy a bank, buy a good one.

Let’s look at the next paragraph:

With Wells Fargo, we think we have obtained the best managers in the business, Carl Reichardt and Paul Hazen. In many ways the combination of Carl and Paul reminds me of another – Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Capital Cities/ABC. First, each pair is stronger than the sum of its parts because each partner understands, trusts and admires the other. Second, both managerial teams pay able people well, but abhor having a bigger head count than is needed. Third, both attack costs as vigorously when profits are at record levels as when they are under pressure. Finally, both stick with what they understand and let their abilities, not their egos, determine what they attempt. (Thomas J. Watson Sr. of IBM followed the same rule: “I’m no genius,” he said. “I’m smart in spots – but I stay around those spots.”)

He clearly invested in the people running the bank. That somehow contradicts other statements from him where he claims only to invest in businesses which could be run by idiots. Anyway, the second learning is: Buy good banks with good management..

Let’s look next, why and when he bought:

Our purchases of Wells Fargo in 1990 were helped by a chaotic market in bank stocks. The disarray was appropriate: Month by month the foolish loan decisions of once well-regarded banks were put on public display. As one huge loss after another was unveiled – often on the heels of managerial assurances that all was well – investors understandably concluded that no bank’s numbers were to be trusted. Aided by their flight from bank stocks, we purchased our 10% interest in Wells Fargo for $290 million, less than five times after-tax earnings, and less than three times pre-tax earnings.

As we have seen the 2008/2009 financial crisis, Buffett seems to like buying banks especially in crisis situations where they sell really really cheap. This somehow also contradicts the first paragraph. Clearly Buffett prefers to buy cheap if he has the chance.

In the following part, we can clearly see how far Buffett’s thinking went those days:

Of course, ownership of a bank – or about any other business – is far from riskless. California banks face the specific risk of a major earthquake, which might wreak enough havoc on borrowers to in turn destroy the banks lending to them. A second risk is systemic – the possibility of a business contraction or financial panic so severe that it would endanger almost every highly leveraged institution, no matter how intelligently run. Finally, the market’s major fear of the moment is that West Coast real estate values will tumble because of overbuilding and deliver huge losses to banks that have financed the expansion. Because it is a leading real estate lender, Wells Fargo is thought to be particularly vulnerable.

Interestingly, real estate prices look expensive in 1990, even before the big 20 year boom. He then gives us a hint how he actually puts numbers on risk:

Consider some mathematics: Wells Fargo currently earns well over $1 billion pre-tax annually after expensing more than $300 million for loan losses. If 10% of all $48 billion of the bank’s loans – not just its real estate loans – were hit by problems in 1991, and these produced losses (including foregone interest) averaging 30% of principal, the company would roughly break even.

In any case this did not deter him from buying Wells Fargo and they have been a great investment for him. Just for fun, I checked out the performance of Wells Fargo since 01.01.1990. Including dividends, Wells fargo made 15,6% p.a. since then, that is even 2% p.a. better than Berkshire returned for its shareholders in the same time period !!!!

Re 2: Avg P/E over the last 15 years has been ~11 compared to 17 now (so historically expensive)

This is clearly an issue. As we have seen above, buying banks at distressed prices is much more fun. One counter argument is that current margins at Handelsbanken are also below their historical means. If you assume mean reversion for instance to the 10 year average net income margin, than this would lead to an overall average valuation level. So no reason to worry here but it is clearly not a bargain either. On the other hand, Wells fargo for instance would have been a great investment for Buffett in any case as long-term for such a great company the entrance point has less relevance.

Re 3. current P/B at 2,0 is higher than 15 Year average (1,7)
Re 4. current price/tangible book at 2,2 vs. 15 year average at 1,95

Similar to 2, both measures look expensive compared to the past. “Normalized” the look better but clearly not a bargain.

Re 5. Almost 100% more expensive (P/B) than most European banks

This doesn’t worry me much. As Buffett mentioned, you should buy “good banks” not weak banks below book value.

Re 6. high exposure to potentially “frothy” Nordic real estate markets

Here we can use Buffett’s sample calculation:

At the end of 2014, Svenska had around 1.114.000 mn SEK property loans. If we assume 10% of them defaulting with a loss of 30%, we would end up with an expected loss of ~ 33.000 mn SEK. Compared to the net income of 15.000 SEK for Handelsbanken in 2014, this would mean a loss 2 times their annual profit. Not as comfortable as Wells Fargo back then, but US Banks in general have higher margins. On the other hand, there are no “no recourse” loans in Scandinavia, so one could assume that the stress scenario might be lower.

Re 7. significant amount of capital market funding (deposit to loan ratio clearly below 0)

The dependence on capital market funding was the major problem for banks in the 2007/2008 crisis. Now however, the situation has turned. With negative rates, many deposit rich banks have huge problems because you can’t really charge your retail customers for deposits (yet) but you “earn” negative rates on excess deposits. For Handelsbanken, this is much easier because they don’t have a lot of excess cash on the balance sheet. So in the current environment, this is actually an advantage.

Ee 8. past performance also due to "Luck" of not being active in Southern Europe, many Nordic banks look good, especially Swedish banks

That is absolutely true, however Handelsbanken long-term ROEs etc. are the best even within this Group.

Re 9. threat of continued technological change (online banking, peer-to-peer lending, etc.)

This is a very interesting aspect. Many banks here in Germany are closing branch after branch, whereas Handelsbanken aggressively expands by opening new branches. Their focus on branch banking is clearly counter cyclical and I am not sure how this will work out long-term. I do think that there will be continued demand for “In person” bank services but I have no idea to what extend.

Re 10. analysts are extremely negative, significantly below all peers (on Bloomberg, from 33 analysts, only 1 has a buy, 16 holds, 16 sells). Handelsbanken is Number 600 of analyst consensus in the Stoxx 600.

This is actually a big plus from my side. I own other stocks (Admiral, TGS) which score equally poorly in analyst’s ratings. In my personal opinion, analysts mostly run their ratings on a top down approach. They start with the sector and if they don’t like the sector, most companies within that sector will get bad ratings. Very often in a next step they then rank companies badly which look “expensive” compared to similar companies. They almost never look a more specific aspects. A relatively expensive company like Admiral in a tough sector will get a bad rating, non withstanding any long-term significant competitive advantages etc.

For me, badly rated companies in tough industries but with long-term competitive advantages are one of the few corners of the markets where I can find value. So this would be a clear plus for Handelsbanken as a potential investment.

Re 11. we are current in a frothy stock market environment and the stock chart looks aggressive

Looking at the chart, it is quite interesting how the stock price accelerated despite the bad analyst ratings:

looking at the shareholders list one can see that US funds seem to like the stock and buy into it, especially Capital Group, T. Rowe Price and others. Skandinavian funds rather seem to be more cautious. Personally, I am also hesitant buying into such a chart, but int theory one should better ignore it as this could be very similar to “Anchoring” a very common behavioural bias.


Looking at the “Cons” which I have identified int he first step, I don’t see a deal breaker against investing. However, the current price level is rather “fair” than cheap. This could be justified if there would be a clear upside with regard to growth and/or growing profitability.

As the post got quite long already, I will look into the upside potential in a separate post which should hopefully follow soon.

Svenska Handelsbanken vs. Deutsche Bank – what to look for when investing in banks

Many value investors are of the opinion that banks are not investable. Either because they say the business is too complex or because they think banks are doomed anyway. Maybe due to the overall low valuations of banks, I get regularly requests on writing about how to value bank,s so at least some people seem to be interested. The greatest value investor of all obviously has no problems with investing into banks. Wells Fargo is the biggest position of Buffett at around 26 bn USD and he holds various other bank assets like the Bank of America Warrants.

A few days ago, a good friend recommended me to look at Handelsbanken from Sweden as an example how a well run bank should look like.
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Short cuts: Installux, Gronlandsbanken, Admiral


Compared to Poujoulat and other French company, Installux released almost sensationally good 6M results. Sales went up +3% which is quite impressive for a domestic, France focused company and net result went up almost +14%.

According to the half year report, cash is now around ~86 EUR per share. Only with the 15,80 EUR 6M Earnings per share, Installux would trade at a single digit p/E ex cash even if they make no profit at all in the second 6 months. With a realistic 25-30 EUR per share for the whole year, we are at an cash adjusted P/E of somewhere between 5-6. In my opinion, despite the illiquidity, Installux still offers a great return/risk profile.


Grondlandsbanken delivered very strong 6 month numbers. 6 month profits of 30 DKK per share were almost 20% higher than in 2013, althhough there were significant positive one time effects included (valuation and disposal gains). Nevertheless, operating results also increased yoy despite overall still muted economic activity. What I found most interesting in the report was this statement from the outlook:

After a weak socio-economic growth and negative GDP in 2012 and 2013, no or a weak growth in the Greenland economy is expected in 2014, however, still with much uncertainty. In the expectation that the prices and
quantities of fish hold steady, that no raw material projects are initiated, but that large construction activities will start in the second half of 2014, the bank expects an increase in activity in 2014. It is, however, si gnificant that the activity in Nuuk remains low, while there is in creased activity in a number of coastal towns. A noticeable activity increase is thus essentially not expected until 2015.

So it seems to be that finally the big projects will be realized with a delay. As Gronlandsbanken has shown that they can increase earnings even without economic growth, I think the stock is “worth” to be upgraded to a “half position”. I will therefore increase the position from 1,9% to around 2,5% at current prices.


Already a few days ago, Admiral released H1 2014 numbers. Looking at the stock price, many investors seem to have been dissapointed:

Analysts have mostly lowered their ratings and/or price targets:

Firm Analyst Recommendation Tgt Px Date↑ 1 Yr Rtn BARR Rank
Credit Suisse Chris Esson neutral 1350 08/18/14
Canaccord Genuity Corp Ben Cohen sell 1220 08/15/14 4th
Berenberg Sami Taipalus sell 1168 08/14/14
Nomura Fahad Changazi buy 1493 08/14/14 10.64% 4th 5th
Exane BNP Paribas Andy Hughes underperform 1070 08/14/14
Deutsche Bank Oliver Steel hold 1260 08/13/14 2nd
Keefe, Bruyette & Woods Greig N Paterson market perform 1227 08/13/14
Oriel Securities Ltd Marcus Barnard sell 900 08/13/14 6th
Numis Securities Ltd Nicholas Johnson add 1720 08/12/14 10.97% 3rd
Barclays Andrew Broadfield equalweight 1428 08/12/14 3rd

Tha analyst “consensus” rating in Blommberg is 2,57 which is pretty bad and one of the worst for all European insurers.

Actually, Admiral posted higher profits than the comparable 6 months in 2013, however the released above average reserves. On the other hand, they still invest a lot, especially in US price comparison and the international business. For me, the results were pretty inline with what management has been saying all along. UK car insurance is in a tough spot and will remain so for some time. Interestingly, the all important “auxiliary” income remained constant despite lower premiums which in my opinion is a very good sign.

International premium has increased by 10%, however the loss has increased as well. Allthough I usually don’t like investor presentations that much, but the Admiral presentation is extremely good. There is also a lot to learn about insurance in general, such as the claim inflation example on page 20 or the detailed reinsurance terms on page 48. Also their view on the US market is quite interesting, especially slide 35 with the acquisition cost per insurance contract. For me, this is showing that the Admiral guys know what they are doing which is unfortunately not the general rule in insurance.

The only disappointing part in my opinion is the Italian subsidiary. Admiral says that they didn’t undwrite more as prices were un attractive. Other than that the international business seems to expand nicely.

Reader Musti forwarded me a link why Morgan Stanley sold out Admiral in one of their funds.

The team became more wary of Admiral (LSE:ADM) after the 2011 turbulence in the stock price, after a scare about the potential for large personal injury claims. While the 2011 claims ratio eventually turned out to be fine, it caused a revision in our view of the quality of the name. The combination of the stock’s recovery, and long-term concerns about the effect of autonomous driving on the motor insurance industry, caused us to reduce and then exit the position.

I think this is quite interesting and revealing. They became nervous because the stock price was volatile and that caused a revision of the “qualitiy of the name”. Self driving cars is definitely something to look at but I think no one can say now how quickly this will come and what impact this will have. A self driving car will still need insurance, so much should be clear.

Overall, for me nothing has changed with regard to Admiral. If you want to see smoothly increasing earnings then you have to go somewhere else. If you want a truly great business at a fair price then you should hold or buy more which I might do if the price falls further. I plan to make this a “full” position until the end of the year.