Summer Break
No posts for the next 2 weeks or so.

No posts for the next 2 weeks or so.

Interesting article about an US fund manager who is bullish on European banks
Investing checklist
Interview with Zeke Ashton (Centaur Capital)
Stefan from Simple Value Investing is starting a parallel blog in English. Highly recommended !!!
I don’t know if I had already explicitly linked to the excellent Long Term Value Blog. Check out the Half Year portfolio review, a very interesting and unique portfolio.
Finally, in case you are interested how Mexican Drug cartells build their “moats”, read here
I don’t want to transform this blog into a macro blog, as I do not have the competence to really talk about macro events. However I wanted to follow up on the Bull case for Europe post to quickly look at the results of last week’s EU summit
As it is always best to ignore most of the press stuff, let’s look at the original statement:
In my opinion, the 120 bn “growth budget” is less important, as well as the intention to move to a fiscal union. The most important part in my opinion is this one:
Euro area summit statement
Eurozone heads of state or government decided:
to establish a single banking supervisory mechanism run the by the ECB, and, once this mechanism has been created, to provide the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with the possibility to inject funds into banks directly.Spain’s bank recapitalisation will begin under current rules, i.e. with assistance provided by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) until the ESM becomes available. The funds will then be transferred to the ESM without gaining seniority status.
It was also agreed that EFSF/ESM funds can be used flexibly to buy bonds for member states that comply with common rules, recommendations and timetables.
The Eurogroup has been asked to implement these decisions by 9 July 2012.
I would call this decision the “Spanish bank circuit breaker”. Up to now, everyone was aware of the potential death spiral, if the ESM gives money to Spanish banks only via the government because this further incrases the debt load.
Interestingly, they did not specifiy what instruments should be used, My assumpton would be someform of “Contingent Convertible” which would provide much needed Tier 1 capital to Spanish banks. The ESM original document speaks of “lending”, but CoCo loans or bond would not violate this.
So in theory, we now have the “full package” for any Eurozone bank:
1) unlimited liquidity from the ECB plus
2) a big pot of potential bank equity from the ESM.
Draghi’s bazooka from last year was only a small bonfire without the possibility to inject capital.
For those who still remember the beginning of the crisis, this was exactly how the US TARP developed. The 700 bn USD fund was initially planned to buy mortgages etc. but was then used to inject money directly into banks. The “vicious circuit” was only broken, when Bazooka Paulson forced his Tarp funds into any large US banks.
So does this end the crisis ? Are banks stocks now good investments ?
I don’t think so, but this feature definitely reduces both, the probability and severity of a tail risk event.
As expected, the usual suspects again come out and say: This is not enough.
Like Nobel laureate Paul krugman, who of course demands a complete solution to any problem being implemented right now.
However, for me it looks like a necessary and logical next step. No solution but risk mitigation. And therefore important and good. I hope it leads to ample supply of loans for PIIGS companies in order to have time to implement necessary other reforms.
At some point in time one might want to start to look into PIIGS bank subordinated securities…….
Always worth to spare some minutes: Jim Chanos Interview on short selling
Final post of Damodaran’s series about value investing
Royce funds on diversification and valuation levels
A couple of more or less interesting presentation from a US value conference
Even the razor blade business model seems to get into some trouble
Avenue capital on the opportunities in Europe
Mark Cuban on High Frequency Trading and the purpose of stock makets
I have been looking at only a few UK stocks so far in more detail, mainly Creston PlC, Colefax and Home Retail Group.
So far, the results have always been rather dissapointing. Nevertheless I still find depressesd sectors such as UK retail interesting from a contrarian point of view. Also from a portfolio risk point of view, I could afford some UK exposure as with the exeption of Total Produce, I have virtually no exposure to UK stocks or markets.
Let’s look at Halfords Group Plc:

According to the website,
Halfords is the UK’s leading retailer of automotive and leisure products and leading independent operator in garage servicing and auto repair
The Halfords Group comprises two strategic business units — “Retail” in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Republic of Ireland (ROI) and “Autocentres” in the UK.
Halfords Retail operates through a national network of stores and an innovative online offer. The product ranges are divided into three categories: Car Maintenance, Car Enhancement and Leisure (Travel Solutions & Cycling).
Halfords Autocentres offers MOTs, car servicing, repairs and tyres to both private motorists and fleet clients throughout the UK. It provides customers with dealership quality service at more affordable prices backed by the guarantee of Halfords’ trusted brand.
Fundamental overview:
As always, let’s start with a quick overview of traditional valuation metrics:
P/E: 7.0
P/B: 1.67
P/B tangible: neg.
EV/EBITDA (12m): 4.8
Div. Yield: 10.2%
A quick look into the history (since the IPO in 2004) shows relatively consistent and high profitability and cash flow generation:
| EPS | FCF | ROIC | dvd | Net margin | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31.12.04 | 0.24 | 0.29 | 16.3 | 4.11 | 8.1 |
| 30.12.05 | 0.24 | 0.17 | 16.4 | 13.67 | 7.9 |
| 29.12.06 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 16.8 | 14.56 | 7.7 |
| 31.12.07 | 0.29 | 0.23 | 17.5 | 15.83 | 8.0 |
| 31.12.08 | 0.27 | 0.27 | 17.7 | 17.06 | 6.9 |
| 31.12.09 | 0.37 | 0.63 | 19.4 | 18.78 | 9.3 |
| 31.12.10 | 0.41 | 0.47 | 21.3 | 24.44 | 9.8 |
| 30.12.11 | 0.34 | 0.36 | 17.1 | 24.44 | 7.9 |
So clearly, Halford’s is not an asset play but a cashflow play. Which is not a surprise as before its IPO, Halford was owned by PE inevstor CVC.
A quick look at the stock chart shows some serious negative momentum:
Potential issues to look at
For A UK retail Group, I would like to look first if anything is lurking in both, Operating Leases and pensions. As a reference, I use the PDF version of the 2011 annual report.
Pensions
The only reference to pension I could find was this statement:
24. Pensions
Employees are offered membership of the Halfords Pension, which is a contract based plan, where each member has their own individual
pension policy, which they monitor independently. The costs of contributions to the scheme are charged to the income statement in the period
that they arise. The contributions to the scheme for the period amounted to £2.8m (2010: £3.2m).
So I assume that they only have defined contribution plans and no DBO’s (defined benefit obligations), which is VERY GOOD.
Operating Leases
One of the big issues for retailers in a declining market are often the leases which represent to a certain extent fixed liabilities but do not show up on the balance sheet under current accunting rules.
Halford’s as well doesn’t own its retail outlets but leases them.
For 2011 they state 87 mn GBP property rent payments and income of 7 mn GBP from subleases. In the notes they show around 740 mn GBP total lease commitments on a gross basis which translates into a ~8.5 year average duration.
As future lease commitments include interest and pricipal, one should try to adjust for this by a factor. If we assume for instance an implicit interest cost of 5%, then we would have basically 8 x 5% “coupons” include in the obligation. So to derive a “real” liability”, we would need to deduct the interest.
With a very simple calculation and assuming 5% interest on 8 years, we would get =740/1.4 ~ 530 mn GBP “on balance sheet” liability.
We can then recalculate EV/EBITDA by adding net rent income 80 mn GBP to EBITDA and add 530 mn GBP to EV.
Current EV is stated by Bloomberg at 618 mn GBP, EBITDA at 618/4.8= 129 mn GBP.
Restated EV/EBITDA would then be (618+530)/(129+80)= 5.45 . So not as cheap anymore as before (4.8) but still Ok.
A quick look at other factors:
Share buy backs: Additionally to dividends, the company has a history of significant share buy back programs since 2007. Total share count has been reduced from 227 mn shares to currently 190 mn shares.
Management & Compensation: At a first glance positive. Moderate salaries howver ongoing share option programs which slightly increase sharecounts.
Shareholders structure
Company is widely held by investment management companies (Capital Research, Artemis, Blackrock). So a take over could happen and should protect the stock to the extreme down side, on the other hand maybe long term investments are not popular. So far I would say the company is very shareholder friendly which is good.
Analyst sentiment
Stock is covered pretty well by analysts, but sentiment is pretty bad, some analysts (JP Morgan,HSBC, Deutsche) just downgraded the stock. From a contrarian point of view, bad sentiment is good.
Known Problems
The biggest problem for Halfords is the shrinkage in its core Retail segment (they acquired the auto repair segment only in 2010).
In the 2011/2012 statement, retail shrank like for like by -2.7%, which is still better then the -5.5% decrease in 2010/2011. If one considers the relatively high inflation rate in the UK, the decrease in real term is even more significant.
Especially in car audio and sat nav systems, Halfords is clearly suffering thorugh the disintermediation of Amazon and Co. Howver, management seems to have reacted to the trend and seems to concentrate now on services and “i need them now” items and services.
For me how ever it is really difficult to evaluate how much of the “retail segment” is stil exposed to the structural shift and how succesful Halfords own online sales will be.
Quick view at valuation
The question is of course what could Halford be worth ? A very rough indicator would be the average 5 year free cashflow of 39 cent and a discount rate of 10% which would indicate a´”going concern” value of 390 pence or a healthy 63% upside.
The simplified 7 year Boss Score would be 2.74 which is very good and would also imply signifcant upside, howver assuming constant profits.
Momentum / relative strength
So now we come back to relative strength and momentum. The following table shows the relative performance against the index over the last relevant periods:
| REL_5D | REL_1M | REL_3M | REL_6M | REL_1YR | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| hfd ln equity | -14.0% | -5.5% | -11.2% | -21.2% | -34.2% |
We see negative relative performance over the last 12 months in every period. Under my current leanring experience regarding momentum, this is a clear warning sign that despite the big repurchase program, the performance is so bad.
Summary:
+ Halford is very shareholder friendly and cash generative
+ valuation on looks quite attractive for a “FCF play”
+ no hidden pension liabilities etc.
+ very transparent reporting, clear communication
– due to private equity pasts no significant assets to protect downside
– business model is in a transition phase, main business line still deteriorating and shrinking
– negative stock price momentum
I could live either with a shrinking core business or negative momentum but not with both. So for the time being, I will put Halford on “watch” only and wait for either a turn around in sales in their core business or at least “neutral” relative price momentum before investing here.
David Einhorn is a guy which is clearly moving the markets these days. When he spoke at the famous Ira Sohn hedge fund conference last week, he even managed to move a stock by not speaking about it (Herbalife).
However, the second part of his presentation which I linked to in the “Weekly links” did not get so much attention but for me, as a Corporate Finance/ capital structure guy is much more interesting:
The “Greenlight Opportunistic Use of Preferreds” – Short Go Up.
First thing to notice: If you want to promote something, make sure you have a great acronym for it…….
Those “Go Ups” should work as follows:
1) A company creates a new class of preferred shares which have a liqidation preference and carry a 4-6% coupon hich only has to be paid at full discretion by the issuing company (although he mentions unpaid coupons are “cumulative”)
2) Those pref shares then get distributed “for free” to the shareholders like with a normal stock split
His basic argument to support is very simple and sounds convincing enough:
There are many great companies with great balance sheets that suffer from low valuation multiples in the current environment, when market participants have enormous appetite to pay for yield, but little appetite to pay for earnings. The traditional advice to such companies is to offer a dividend, but dividends often don’t work. A stock with a low P/E multiple often just becomes a stock with a low P/E and an attractive dividend.
He then adds a spreadsheet which shows his assumption for a couple of cash rich companies like Apple, Microsoft, Dell, Marvel and GM.
To take Microsoft as an example, he calculates the following way:
Microsoft has now a share price of USD 30.21 USD and a market cap of 255 bn USD. With 6.56 USD cash per share and an estimated 2.84 USD Earnings for 2012, you get an P/E of 10.6 including cash and 8.3 excluding cash.
In the next step, he assumes that Microsoft will issue 250 bn of “Go Ups” carrying a coupon of 4% and distributes them pro rata to shareholders (so shareholder would get a nominal of around 30 USD pref on top of the existing shares).
When he then compares the result with the initial market cap, he makes the following assumptions:
1. the 4% pref share trades at par
2. the Microsoft Share trades at the initial “after cash P/E mupliple” of 8.6 based on the reduced earnings (1.66 USD after ref share dividend) plus the unchanged cash position
The sum of that than is 65% higher than current market cap and this is “value unlocked”.
So let’s stop here and summarize what Einhorn is proposing:
If you divide existing cashflows of a company into two seperate securities, the “sum of parts” will be significantly higher than the previous security. This is of coure a punch in the face of all “efficient market” fans who would argue (apart from tax effects) that in theory the total value (Enterprise value) of a company does not change due to capital structure.
So let’s quickly look at the main assumptions of Einhorn which support his case:
1. Equity multiple
His argument is: The stock will trade at the same multiple before and after the “spin off” of the preferred. I would argue that this is at least “optimistic”.
Somwhere in the presentation he mentions that the preferred dividend should be cumulative, meaning that non paid dividend will accumulate and have to be paid at a later date. This is important !!!
If we go back to the Microsoft example, we have the following EPS before and after Go Ups:
2.84 USD per share before Go Up, 1.66 USD after Go Up (1.18 are Go Up interest).
So what happens, if the profit of Microsoft for some reasons falls by -20% ? Without go ups, of course profit per share drops by 20% to ~2.27 USD per share.
With Go Ups, however, we have to distribute the 2.27 USD between the fixed interest of Go Ups (1.18) and shares which results in a 1.09 EPS including Go Ups. Not surprisingly, the change in EPS of (1.66-1.09) = -0.47 is percentage wise much higher with (0.47/1.66) =-27%.
So his first assumption implies that shareholders are indifferent about a higher leveraged EPS which I think is unrealistic.
2. Valuation of Pref share
Einhorn assumes,that the Go Us will trade at par after issuance. How realsitic is that ?
A 4% Microsoft pref share will have a duration of around 26 years. This is even longer than a 30 year treasury bond. 30 Years treasury yield at the moment is around 3%. So Einhorn assumes a 30 year (deeply) subordinated spread for Microsoft is only 1% p.a.
I don’t know how realistic this is, but a deeply subordinated security is of course much more risky than a corporate bond. For instance if Microsfot starts to issue more senior bonds, the subordinated bonds get less and less liuidation value.
It is also important to mention, that such a Go up will react quite sensitive to any changes in interest rates or credit quality of the underlying. If for instance 5% would be th correct yield, with a constant duration of 26, the Go Up will drop 26% in value.
So to summarize this:
Einhorn’s underlying assumptions are very very “optimistic” if not to say (totally) unrealistic. So why is he doing this ? He is for sure one of the smartest investors alive and knows all this stuff much better than I do ?
I think his startegy could work quite well in the short term:
Under his proposal, “normal investors” of course would feel richer. Imagine, you own a Microsoft stock at USD 30 and you suddenly get a 30 USD bond “for free”. The bond (Go up) will be very difficult to value. This leaves a nice “window of opportunity” for the smart guys to profit from mis pricings as the stock price might not dirctly reflect the “true discount” and the Go Ups might trade above “intrinsic value” for some time.
So Einhorn basically tries to create a what I call “special situation” where normal share holders most likely do not know what to do or value the secrities correctly. I am pretty sure, in the long run this will not increase the total Enterprise Value of the sample companies. But in the short run, it could create a nice arbitrage opportunity for hedge funds like Einhorn’s Greenlight and give the stocks a “quick pop”.
As Einhorn owns most of those stocks, one could summarize Einhorn’s proposal as “talking his own book”. Perfectly fair but one should be aware of this. I nevertheless highly doubt that this is changing the theory of Corporate Finance…..
Ruechzugsgut has 2 good posts about Megacycles and the Ennismore value fund
Wexboy on Alternative Asset Managers
Oddball analyses French stock HF Company
China: Chovanec with two scary posts about the detoriating situation in China: Real estate and Guarantee companies. Fortunatly, German investors still like Chinese IPOs.
The fine wine bubble seems to pop any minute
David Einhorn with a new idea: “Go Ups”
WMF
According to a Boersenzeitung article, for some reason WMF is considering exchanging the Pref shares into ordinary shares (full article can be found in the W:O Thread)
I do not really understand how Capvis could profit from an exchange, unless they already have bought a lot of Pref shares. Then it would be a good deal for them.
Interestingly, the Pref shares now more or less are back to the level of the regular shares.
Maybe time to sell on good news ? Q1 numbers seem to have been really good. For the time being: no action.
Walmart
Walmart issued unexpected positive Q1 numbers today. Here I will definitely ue the momentum and sell the shares at today’s VWAP.
For some reason I do not believe in the US recovery story, at least not for “physical” retailers. Even if Warren is still buying…..It was never a “high conviction” play anyway, although it made good money.
Praktiker
Praktiker seems to have found an U Hedgefund for its “secured” loan, US Hedgefund Acnhorage. Although it is too early to assess, the downside scenario for the bonds would now be of course more severe, however the proabality of a deafult is lower. No action yet.
After my first French stock analysis Installux, let’s have a look at another of my favourite French small caps, Poujoulat SA
As this is a pretty long post, I will introduce a kind of “management summary” in the beginning:
SUMMARY:
– Poujoulat is a small family owned chimney producer in France
– company is not an asset play (P/E ~ 8, P/B 0.9) but a cheap stock which showed consistent profit growth of 15% CAGR since 1999 with little impact from business cycles
– Poujoulat has profited and profits from the secular trend to energy-efficient heating and is investing into renewable energy (wood pellets)
– if the new “renewable energy” segment really takes of, the company could be worth multiples of the current stock price, if not, the downside is relatively limited as the stock is cheap without any growth
Introduction
Bloomberg describes the company as follows:
Poujoulat is involved in the building supply and heating industries, and specializes in manufacturing chimneys. The Company, through its subsidiaries, supplies construction companies and individuals in France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Belgium.
If we look at “traditional value metrics, the stock is cheap but not spectacularly so (all information from the 2011 annual report)
MArket Cap: 62 mn EUR
P/E 2011 8,0
P/B 2011 ~0.95
P/S 0.4
EV/EBITDA ~5
Div. Yield 2.7%
So nothing special which would show up on one of the various screeners. So what’s interesting about this company ? That becomes clear if we look at the recent history since 1999:
| TRAIL_12M_EPS | NI Margin | ROE | ROIC | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1999 | 2.61 | 2.9% | 8.3% | 5.6% |
| 2000 | 3.39 | 3.4% | 10.0% | 6.1% |
| 2001 | 5.85 | 4.9% | 15.8% | 8.6% |
| 2002 | 3.81 | 2.9% | 9.3% | 5.3% |
| 2003 | 5.41 | 3.9% | 12.2% | 6.7% |
| 2004 | 5.10 | 3.4% | 10.5% | 6.3% |
| 2005 | 7.56 | 4.3% | 13.6% | 9.9% |
| 2006 | 9.76 | 4.7% | 15.2% | 15.7% |
| 2007 | 11.62 | 4.8% | 15.8% | 10.6% |
| 2008 | 14.19 | 5.0% | 16.8% | 10.3% |
| 2009 | 16.73 | 5.9% | 17.0% | 9.9% |
| 2010 | 18.15 | 5.8% | 15.8% | 9.8% |
| 2011 | 16.62 | 4.6% | na | na |
Poujoulat managed to grow its earnings relatively steady by 15% CAGR from 1999 to 2011.
NI margin have almost doubled, however with a small set back in 2011. ROE has increased to a nice 15-17%, ROIC is slightly lower because Poujoulat has some debt on its balance sheet.
So this stock looks like some nice “Growth at reasonable price” stock or GARP. GARP investing was the “Mantra” of Peter Lynch, the legendary Fidelity Portfolio manager.
The most important ratio for “GARP ers” is the PEG (or Price Earnings Growth ratio). The PEG ratio is calculated relatively easy by P/E divided through the growth rate in absolute terms.
For Poujoulat this would be
P/E = 8 , Growth 15%, PEG = 8/15 = 0.53. Everything under 1 is normally considered good, a value like here at 0.53 is even considered very good.
I have no statistical evidence if GARP really works, but all things equal, I always prefer a cheap growing stock to a super cheap no growth stock.
Business model / reason for past growth
Before we go into the valuation exercise, let’s have a look at the business itself. Chimney manufacturing is a highly localised and fragmented industry. Poujoulat calls itself “market leader in Europe” however 85-90% of their business is located in France.
As chimneys are an important part in Fire prevention, chimneys have to be certified by the respective authorities in most countries. So we have certain local barriers of entry because you cannot just import stuff from China and sell it, but I wouldn’t consider this as a really high moat.
Most chimneys are sold through the respective construction companies, so the sales organisation is more business to business than business to consumers. So we should not expect too many branding effects etc. However I could imagine that a good established b2b sales force (plus service and infrastructure) might be a competitive advantage.
Chimneys themselves are not only simple tubes to lead exhausts outside the house, but there seems to be a fair amount of technical knowledge involved.

In summary I would assume that there is no real moat in this business but maybe some regional competitive advantages like sales force etc.. So where did the strong growth in the last 10-12 years come from ?
The answer is relatively easy: usually you need a new chimney if you build a new house or if you change the heating system. As everyone knows, building activity itself is somehow subdued, but due to high oil prices and government incentives, heating systems are being exchanged in an ever-increasing pace.
What seems to be especially interesting is the fact that you seem to get nice tax credits in France especially for wood pellet stoves. According to this article, tax credits have evolved as follows:
In France, 30 – 40% of the population in most areas uses wood as a primary or secondary heat source. However, there was not the explosion of low efficiency polluting devices that occurred in the US in the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, the average French person does not regard wood heating as a pollution problem as many Americans are likely to.
France has had tax credits for stoves at 15% starting since at least 2001. In 2005, they rose to 40% and were as much as 50% in 2008 and 2009. In 2010 they went down to 40%, and in 2011 they were further reduced to 36%. Due to budget cuts, tax credits are likely to be reduced again in 2012 or end altogether.
Also many of the other energy-saving heating systems usually require new chimneys as exhaust fumes are colder and more humid.
So one could compare this a little bit with the German company STo AG, which produces insulation material and profited as well from the energy-saving boom.
If we compare the charts, we can see that at least to a certain extent the stocks performed similar to each other:
So to summarize the business case: We do not have a moat company but a company which has profited and might profit from a secular trend, in this case energy-saving.
Valuation
Even if we don’t account for growth, the company seems to be really cheap. We can buy a company below book value with an ROE of 15%. Even if we assume no growth and 10% CoC, Poujoulat should still be worth something like 160-170 EUR.
If we assume only half of the growth from the past (~7%) then the stock would could be worth 300-400 EUR.
So from a valuation point of view, I think one gets a free option on the further growth of energy-saving solutions which is not a bad deal.
Management / Shareholders / etc.
The company is led by Frederic Coirier, the son of Yves Coirier who bought the majority of the company in 1975 and is still President of the supervisory board.
Son:

Father:

The family holds around 73% of the shares, another 11% are held by three French funds according to Bloomberg. In the annual report they mention a forth fund (“Ocean”). So free float is really small, below 10 mn EUR.
Balance Sheet quality seems to be relatively good. Only small amounts of goodwill, no big acquisitions in the past. The company uses debt. Debt to capital ratios improved until 2010, but debt increased due to relatively large investments in 2011. I did not find anything with regard to hidden assets.
Unlike Installux, there is a link to the annual report on the homepage, even English annual reports are available, unfortunately only until 2009. On a quarterly basis, the company only issues sales updates.
Issues / Problems
For a “perfect” stock, Poujoulat does not generate enough free cashflow. Total Free Cashflow since 1999 is negative. This means that they actually had to invest to grow. Which is normal for a company but some investors do not seem to like companies who invest in fixed assets.
Especially in 2011, Poujoulat invested 25 mn EUR or almost a third of the market cap into fixed assets. On the other hand, if a company manages to earn 10% on invested capital and 15% ROE relatively stable across business cycles one could argue that this is actually a good sign if a company has such reinvestment opportunities.
Another issue to be aware of is of course the impact of tax credits and regulations. This is an issue all the renewable energy stocks share, the impact of the Government is huge and regulations could change quickly.
Finally trading for the stock is really illiquid and prices jump around like crazy. It is nor unlikely that from session to session, prices move by 10% without any news up or down.
New business segment
One interesting aspect is that they are actually diversifying away from producing chimneys. Starting only in 2011 they show now a separate segment “Bois energy” which I would translate as “wood based energy”. Almost 50% of new investments in 2011 went into this area, however with a negative result of -600 K EUR in 2011.
If I understood this article correctly (and Google translated well), they are actually moving into manufacturing wood pellets and logs to be used in wood heating. The new production site also seems to include a biomass electricity generation.
Normally I would see this kind of activity as “diworsification” but with Poujoulat this might be a little bit different. Due to their know how with wood heating and chimneys, they might have a relatively good inside view into this market.
So this could even be the start of a new fast growing segment for the company. As far as I know, the wood pellet market is currently quickly growing and to my knowledge, Poujoulat is the only listed company with exposure to this segment of renewable energy. I have some friends who work in Private Equity who consider this area as quite interesting.
The business segment showed a loss in 2011 although this seems to be normal if you start something like this from scratch. In another article, they say that the new processing plant went live only in Novmeber 2011. Here is a picture:

Accoring to the articel, the dried wood logs and pellets are sold through 1.400 point of sales. So this is something to watch closely, although due to the reporting of Poujoulat we will see the next results only in next year’s annual report.
If we assume a 15% growth rate for this business and a 10% ROA based on the current 25 mn EUR investment, this segment alone could be worth an additional 50-100 EUR per Poujoulat share.
Current quarter
In the first quarter 2012. as usual they only report sales divided into France and “export”. On a group level, they increased sales by a whopping 14.5%, with France actually growing 17%.I assume that this includes the wood energy segment has contributed significantly to this growth.
If the Wood energy business returns the same ROA as the other businesses, we should see some extra 3-4 EUR earnings per share pretty soon.
Summary:
As a pure building material stock, Poujoulat would not be interesting. However due to the fact that they profit over proportionally from the secular trend to energy-saving, the stock becomes more interesting. The final argument for me was the “free option” included for the new segment “wood energy” which looks promising and is not priced in my opinion.
So for the portfolio I will start accumulating Poujoulat from today with a limit of EUR 140, although due to the low trading volume it might take a while before a reach even 1% of the portfolio.
After closing the Green Mountain Short yesterday (final gain ~55%), I have only Kabel Deutschland left.
So of course I am looking for new short opportunities. As mentioned in an earlier post, the ideal short candidate should have most of the following “features”:
+ shady accounting
+ massive insider sales
+ negative free cashflows
+ pumped up growth through expensive acquisitions
+ expiring patents
+ hyped or “fad” based business model
+ very expensive valuation
+ high debt load and/or pension liabilities, operating leases etc.
Some of great sources for “shady accounting” or “accounting shenanigans” are specialised accounting blogs.
One of my favourite blogs is the fanatastic “Grumpy old Accountants” Blog. The writers, professors and assistent professors from US universities really produce superior forensic accounting analysis of US companies.
It is both, a great place to learn as well as to get some interesting short ideas.
Their latest analysis, which are all worth a read are about the following companies:
Zagg, which among other things inflates cashflow by accounting receivables as cash.
Rite Aid , the US drug store chain. I especially like the old post called “Rite Aid: Is management selling drugs or using them ?”
Personally, I think Zynga might be an interesting candidate if the Facebook IPO hype lifts their shareprice in the coming week.
Another interesting candidate they mention is Overstock.com, which is also a favourite of the initial Green Mountain critic Sam Antar at White Collar Fraud and J2 Global, a “cloud computing” company.
Another source for short ideas are of course famous hedge fund managers, most notable Jim Chanos and David Einhorn
For instance Herbalife. If David Einhorn himself is asking questions , you don’t want to bet against him.
Another “classic” is SodaStream, the company once called “the next Green Mountain”, when times were great then.
WARNING:
Many of those companies have already large short positions outstanding. Sodastream for instance has a Short interest to Free Float ratio of 58%, meaning that 58% of all freely available shares are sold short.
Another factor to watch closely is the relationship between outstanding short positions and trading volume. This measure is called “days to cover”. For an illiquid stock, even relatively low short interest percentages can lead to a long period of “days to cover” and therefore increase the risk of painful short squeezes
Let’s have a quick look at the stocks mentioned (sorted by SI / free float):
| SI/Free float | Days to cover | |
|---|---|---|
| Herbalife | 5.14% | 4.9 |
| Rite Aid | 5.70% | 3.5 |
| Zynga | 14.80% | 3.5 |
| Groupon | 15.25% | 4.8 |
| Overstock.com | 18.61% | 26.2 |
| J2 Global | 24.43% | 19.2 |
| Zagg | 44.66% | 10.8 |
| Sodastream | 58.42% | 10.8 |
Personally, I would hesitate to short anything above a 15%-20% percentage of SI/Free float although I have no “hard knowledge” to support this.
Summary: I do not have obvious short candidates yet, but I will try to enhance the watch list in order to act quickly if the opportunity comes up.