Search Results for: AER

Agfa Gevaert (ISIN BE0003755692) -An Ugly Duck with some Golden Eggs in its nest ?

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Disclaimer: This is not investment advice. PLEASE DO YOUR OWN RESEARCH !!!

Intro

Agfa-Gevaert was on my research list for some time now. Fellow blogger Undervalued Shares than triggered my renewed interest with their post from a few days ago and one of my best “Special situations” ideas ever was a Belgian company (Sapec).

I’ll try to summarize the part of the post that deals with Agfa:

  • Active Ownership, a relatively new but successful German activist fund (Stada) has build up a position (~14%] and board membership (actually the Chairman) in Agfa Gevaert, the traditional German-Belgian film / imaging company
  • Despite having some interesting assets, Agfa didn’t create shareholder value over a long time
  • opaque reporting and a 1 bn EUR pension liability made it unattractive to stock market investors
  • In 2020, Agfa managed to sell part of its Healthcare IT segment for 975 mn EUR
  • Initially, the stock went up to ~5 EUR based on the first info on the sale but hasn’t fully recovered yet

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AerCap Holdings N.V. part 2 – Less tangible at a second glance

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So after my first look into David Einhorn’s long pick AerCap last week, I want to follow up with some more detailed analyis in a second step.

By the way, a big “thank you” for all the qualified comments and Emails I got already after the first post, that’s the best return on investment on a blog post I can get !!!

The book value story growth

This was for me one of the core slides of Einhorn’s deck:

aercap

I mean you don’t have to be a genius to understand this: A company which trades near book value and compounds 20% p.a. is pretty much a no brainer. However, if I look at the developement of book values for financial companies, I always look at both, stated and tangible book value per share.

In AerCap’s case, the comparison looks interesting:

BV per share TBV share
2006 8,83 8,3493
2007 11,18 10,6041
2008 13,04 12,4083
2009 14,79 14,3448
2010 14,82 14,3798
2011 15,26 15,0608
2012 18,72 18,5592
2013 21,32 21,2334
2014 37,04 16,174
     
CAGR 19,6% 8,6%
CAGR 2006-2013 13,4% 14,3%

This table shows two things: Before the ILFC transaction, stated book values and tangible book values were pretty much the same and compounding around 13% p.a. Still pretty good but clearly not 20%. In 2014 however, with the ILFC deal something interesting happened: The book value per share doubled but tangible book value dropped.

The ILFC deal

So this is the right time to look into the ILFC deal. The two main questions for me are:

a) why did the book value per share increase so much ?
b) why did tangible book value per share actually decrease ?

This is how AerCap presents what and how they paid for ILFC:

Aercap2

So AerCap paid the majority of the purchase with own shares, 97,56 mn shares valued at 46,49 USD. Issuing new shares always has an impact on book value per share if the issue price is different from the book value. Let’s look at an example:

We have a company which has issued 100 Shares at 50 EUR book value per share and 100 EUR market value (P/B =2). So the total market value is 10.000, total book value is 5000. If the company now issues another 100 Shares at 100 EUR market value, we have 200 shares outstanding and 5000+10000 = 15.000 EUR total book value. Divided by 200 stocks we now have 75 EUR book value per share or a 50% increase in book value per share for the old shareholders. So issuing shares above book value increases book value per share automatically.

In AerCap’s case, it worked more or less the same way: AerCap had ~113 mn shares outstanding with a book value of around 21,30 USD per share. So issuing 97,56 mn share at a steep premium at 46,49 of course increased book value per share dramatically. The transaction alone would have increased the book value to ((113*21,30)+(97,56*46,49))/(113+97,56)= 32,97 USD per share or an increase of ~50%.

So how is this to be interpreted ? Well, clearly it was a smart move from AerCaps management to pay with its owns shares at such a nice price. On the other hand, one should clearly not mistake this a a recurring kind of thing. I would not use the historic 20% p.a. increase in ROE as expectation for the future but rather something like 13% or so in the past.

Intangibles

After looking into how much and in what form AerCap was paying, let’s look now what they actually got:

aercap3

Yes, they got a lot of planes and debt. Interestingly they assumed more debt than book value of the planes. Altogether they did get a lot of intangible assets. All in, AerCap bought 4,6 bn intangibles which is around 80 mn more than equity created through the new shares. So at the end of the day, one could argue that the new shares have been exchanged more or less 1:1 against intangible assets.

The largest part of this is a 4 bn USD position called “Maintenance rights intangible” which for me is something new. This is what they say in their 20-F filing:

Maintenance rights intangible and lease premium, net
The maintenance rights intangible asset arose from the application of the acquisition method of accounting to aircraft and leases which were acquired in the ILFC Transaction, and represented the fair value of our contractual aircraft return rights under our leases at the Closing Date. The maintenance rights intangible asset represents the fair value of our contractual aircraft return right under our leases to receive the aircraft in a specified maintenance condition at the end of the lease (EOL contracts) or our right to an aircraft in better maintenance condition by virtue of our obligation to contribute towards the cost of the
maintenance events performed by the lessee either through reimbursement of maintenance deposit rents held (MR contracts), or through a lessor contribution to the lessee. The maintenance rights intangible arose from the application of the acquisition method of accounting to aircraft and leases which were acquired in the ILFC Transaction, and represented the fair value of our contractual aircraft return rights under our leases at the Closing Date. The maintenance rights represented the difference between the specified maintenance return condition in our leases and the actual physical condition of our aircraft at the Closing Date.

For EOL contracts, maintenance rights expense is recognized upon lease termination, to the extent the lease end cash compensation paid to us is less than the maintenance rights intangible asset. Maintenance rights expense is included in Leasing expenses in our Consolidated Income Statement. To the extent the lease end cash compensation paid to us is more than the maintenance rights intangible asset, revenue is recognized in Lease revenue in our Consolidated Income Statement, upon lease termination. For MR contracts, maintenance rights expense is recognized at the time the lessee provides us with an invoice for reimbursement relating to the cost of a qualifying maintenance event that relates to pre-acquisition usage.

The lease premium represents the value of an acquired lease where the contractual rent payments are above the market rate. We amortize the lease premium on a straight-line bases over the term of the lease as a reduction of Lease revenue.

This sounds quite complicated and for some reason part of the sentences seem to have been duplicated. If I understand correctly, they assume that the underlying value of the aircraft is higher than the book value of the acquired planes. To be honest: I do not have any clue if this is justified or not.

However, as those intangibles are significant (more than 50% of book value), the case gets a lot less interesting for me. Intangibles created via M&A activity are in my experience always difficult, especially if it is esoteric stuff like this. It’s also a big change to the past of AerCap. Historically, they were carrying very little intangibles.

Funding cost & ROE

This was Einhorn’s prospective ROE calculation:

aercap roe

One of the key assumptions is a 3% funding cost. So let’s do a reality check and look at the expected pricing of AerCaps new bond issue. This is from Bloomberg:

Aercap $750m TLB Talk L+275, 99.75, 0.75%; Due April 30
By Krista Giovacco
(Bloomberg) — Commits due April 30 by 12pm ET.
Borrower: Flying Fortress Holdings LLC, a subsidiary of AerCap Holdings and International Lease Finance Corp., largest independent aircraft lessor
$750m TLB due 2020 (5 yr extended)
Price Talk: L+275
OID: 99.75
Libor Floor: 0.75%
Call: 101 SC (6 mos)
Fin. Covenants: Max LTV test
Existing Ratings: Ba2/BB+ (corp.); Ba1/BBB-, RR2 (TLB)

So AerCap is funding at a spread of 2,75% vs. LIBOR. With the 10 year USD LIBOR at 2,00%, funding would be way more expensive than the 3% assumed by Einhorn. Maybe the fund floating rate, but then the whole company would rather be a bet against rising interest rates than anything else. On a “like for like” basis without structural interest rate risk, I don’t think AerCap will generate a double-digit ROE at current spreads.

Business case & competitive environment

Within the comments of the first post, some people argued that the company is not a financing company but that the access to Aircraft is the value driver. Buying cheap aircraft from manufacturers and then selling (or leasing) them with a mark-up to clients then looks like some kind of Aircraft trading business.

For me however there is one big problem with such a business model. Retailing or wholesaling any merchandise is then most attractive as a business when 3 criteria are met:

– there are a lot of suppliers
– there are a lot of clients
– you can create a competitive advantage via physical distribution networks

In AerCap’s case, the biggest problem is clearly that there are not that many suppliers but only 2, Boeing and Airbus. Both don’t have much incentive to let any intermediary become too large so they will most likely encourage competition between Aircraft buyers.

Secondly, as far as I understand, there is no physical distribution network etc. behind AerCap’s business. So entering the market and competing with AerCap in the future doesn’t look so difficult for anyone with access to cheap capital.

Clearly, as in any opaque trading business, an extremely smart trader can always make money but it is important to understand that at least in my understanding there are no LONG TERM competitive advantages besides the purchase order flow from ILFC.

That the barrier to entry the business is not that high is proven by no other than Steven Udvar-Hazy the initial founder of ILFC and his new company Air Lease.

IPO’ed in 2010 and now the company is already a 4 bn USD market company 5 years later. Interestingly, AIG sued Air Lease in 2012 because they

were able “to effectively steal a business,” and reap a windfall at the expense of ILFC, the world’s second-largest aircraft lessor by fleet size. It described how some employees, while still working at ILFC, downloaded confidential files and allegedly diverted deals with certain ILFC customers to Air Lease, before leaving to join that firm. The companies are in the business of buying aircraft and leasing them to commercial airlines all over the world.

So to me it’s not clear what AerCap actually bought. It seems the “secret sauce” of ILFC seems to have been transferred to competitor Air Lease already. Interestingly, the lawsuit was settled a few days ago at a sum of 72 mn USD. I found that quote from Udvar-Hazy interesting:

“I want to make it clear that there is no secret sauce in the aircraft leasing business,” Hazy told analysts on a conference call. “ALC’s success is a result of a strong management team with extensive experience and solid industry relationships.”

Summary:

My problem with AerCap is the following: The financial part of the company, which I feel that I can judge to a certain extent, does not look attractive but rather risky to me. The Aircraft “buying and trading” segment on the other hand seems to be the more attractive part but for me too hard to judge in a reasonable way.

So for the time being, this is clearly not an investment for me. To look further into AerCap, two things need to happen: First they need to regain their investment grade rating and funding cost will need to drop to the 3% that Einhorn is assuming and secondly, there should be a clear impact on the share price from a potential sale from AIG.

In the current market environment clearly anything can happen and a multiple expansion could bring nice profits but personally, in a direct comparison I prefer the LLoyd’s case.

AerCap Holdings NV (ISIN NL0000687663) – How good is Einhorn’s new favourite ?

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A friend forwarded me the latest presentation from “guru” David Einhorn where his main long pick was AerCap, an Airplane leasing company.

To shortly summarize the “Long case”:

– AerCap is cheap (P/E 9)
– they made a great deal taking over IFLC, the airplane leasing division of AIG which is several times AerCap’s original size
– they have great management which is incentivized along shareholders
– The business is a simple and secure “spread business”
– major risks are according to Einhorn mostly the credit risk of the airlines and residual value risk of the planes

There are also quite obvious reasons why Aercap is cheap and trades at lower multiples than its peers:

– share overhang: AIG accepted new AerCap shares as part of the purchase price and owns 45,6%. They want to sell and the lock up is expiring
– following the IFLC/AIG transaction, the company was downgraded to “Non-investment grade” or “junk” and has therefore relatively high funding costs compared for instance to GE as main competitor

What kind of business are we talking about?

Well, Airplane leasing is essentially a “special purpose lending business” without an official bank license, one could also say it is a “shadow bank”. What Aercap essentially does is to loan an airplane to an airline.

In order to make any money at all, they have to be cheaper than the simple alternative which would be the airline gets a loan from a bank and buys the airplane directly. As Airlines are notoriously unprofitable and often thinly capitalized, they often need to pay pretty high spreads even if they borrow money on a collateralized basis.

As any lessor funds the plane mostly with debt, the cost of debt is one important factor to make money compared to competitors. It is therefore no big surprise that GE with its AA+ Rating is the biggest Airplane leasing company in the world and that ILFC thrived while AIG was still AAA and had comparably low funding cost.

Airplane buying is tricky business

A second aspect is also clearly buying power. Planes have to be ordered many years in advance and the two big manufacturers want to be sure that they are getting paid. I assume a reliable bulk buyer gets better access to the most sought after planes and maybe even better prices. Prices for planes at least in my experience are notoriously intransparent. Nobody pays the official list prices anyway. I found this interesting article in the WSJ from 2012.

When Airbus and Boeing Co. announce orders at the Farnborough International Airshow this week, they will value the deals based on the planes’ catalog prices—which no one pays. Airline executives, when pressed for details, will probably say they got “a great deal.” But actual terms will remain guarded like nuclear launch codes.
The aviation industry’s code of silence on pricing is notable in this era of information overload. Thousands of people world-wide are involved in airplane purchases, yet few numbers spill out. That yields much mystery and speculation.

Discounts are large:

But there are ways to estimate the range of discounts. An analysis of public data by The Wall Street Journal and interviews with numerous industry officials yielded this: Discounts seem to vary between roughly 20% and 60%, with an average around 45%. Savvy buyers don’t pay more than half the sticker price, industry veterans say. But deal specifics differ greatly.

But no one wants to talk about it:

One reason for the secrecy surrounding all this, say industry officials, is psychology: Less-experienced plane buyers like to think they got a bargain and don’t want to be embarrassed if they overpaid. The safest approach then is silence. More-seasoned plane buyers also know that bragging about discount specifics would anger Airbus, Boeing or other producers and hurt the chances of striking a sweetheart deal again.

Clearly, as a large “quasi broker”, Airline leasing companies seem wo have a chance to make some money in such a intransparent market. But it is really hard to pin down real numbers. It reminds me a little bit about how you buy kitchens in Germany where the system is pretty much the same. Everyone gets a discount, but no one knows what the “true” price looks like.

But this also leads to a problem:

With the current funding costs, AerCap would not be competitive in the long run. Let’s take as a proxy the 10 year CDS spread as a proxy for funding costs and compare them across airlines and competitors (more than 50% of AerCaps outstanding debt is unsecured):

10 year senior CDS Rating
     
AerCap 215 BB+
     
     
Clients    
Air France 96  
Singapore Airlines 105 A+
Southwest 109  
Lufthansa 195 BBB-
Thai Airways 240  
Delta 256 BB
Emirates 257  
Jet Blue 362 B
     
Competitors    
GE Capital 72 AA+
Air Lease 175 BBB-
ICBC 194 A
CIT 229 BB-

So purely from the funding cost perspective, AerCap at the moment has a problem. Someone like Air France could easily fund a loan for an airplane cheaper than AerCap, so cutting out the middle man is basically a no brainer and even the smaller competitors could easily under price AerCap when they bid for leasing deals. On top of that, a lot of non-traditional players like pension funds and insurance companies want some piece of the action, as the return on investments on those leases are significantly higher than anything comparable. Even Asset managers have entered this market and have created specific funds for instance Investec.

AerCap does have a positive rating outlook, so there is a perspective for lower funding costs. Just to give an indication of how important this rating upgrade is: On average, 10 year BB financial isuers pay 2,4% p.a. more than BBB financial issuers at the moment. The jump from BB+ to BBB- will not be that big but it would increase the investor universe a lot for AerCaps bonds.

The biggest risk for AerCap

So although I am clearly no match for David Einhorn (*), I would argue that the biggest risk for AerCap is not the residual value of the planes or the credit quality of the Airlines but quite simply the refinancing risk. AerCap has to fund a significant amount going forward and if for some reasons, spreads move against them, they will be screwed. Just a quick reminder what happened to ILFC in 2011:

Credit-default swaps on the company climbed this month as global stocks tumbled and speculative-grade debt issuance all but evaporated. The cost reached as high as 663 basis points on Aug. 11, according to CMA, which is owned by CME Group Inc. and compiles prices quoted by dealers in the privately negotiated market. The contracts have held at prices that imply ILFC’s debt should be rated B2, according to Moody’s Corp.’s capital markets group.

However if they manage to to get an investment grade rating and lower their funding cost, then it could be an interesting investment as funding is cheap and they do have access to a lot of new and sought after aircraft. Again, borrowing from Warren Buffett, with any leveraged company, management is extremely important.

And one should clearly compare AerCaps valuation and risk/return to banks and not to the currently much higher valued corporates. AerCap is much more similar to a bank than anything else. This general valuation disconnect seems to be also one of major reason why GE announced the massive reorganization just 2 weeks ago. However, as far as I understood tehy will keep the leasing business as this is unregulated.

Summary:

Although I slightly disagree with the risk assessment of Einhorn’s case, I still think AerCap could be an interesting case and is worth to dig deeper. I don not have a problem investing into financial companies and I do like those “share overhang” situations. However, I will need to dig deeper and especially try to figure out how good AerCap’s management really is.

(*) I did disagree with David Einhorn already once with Dutch Insurer Delta LLyod which was Einhorn’s long pick of the year 2011. Overall in this case I would put the score of MMI vs. Einhorn at 1:0 as Delta LLoyd did not outperform.

All Belgian Shares part 7 – Nr. 121-140

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It’s Belgian Power Week on the blog this week with a second post in the “All Belgian Shares” series. From these 20, randomly selected shares, 7 made it onto the preliminary watch list, including some really interesting companies. Let’s go !!

121. Galapagos

Galapagos has nothing to do with the Islands in the Pacific but is a Biotech company that has spiked during Covid and lost -90% since then. They do have sales and even some earnings and according to TIKR, they have a negative EV of -1,8 bn.

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My 22 (+1) investments for 2024

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Following an annual tradition, by the end of the year, I review my portfolio by writing/updating very short summaries for each individual position.  16 of the 23 positions from last year are still in the portfolio and I have added 7 new positions. That turnover has been partially driven by exits/take-overs (Schaffner, Logistec) and by finding new ideas. A more comprehensive Performance review will follow in early January 2024.

A short user guide:
My preferred style of investing is a bottom up approach, focusing on 20-30 small/midcap stocks that in my opinion have a good return/risk profile over the next 3-5 (or more) years. Many of these stocks are not household names and are unlikely to make spectacular gains in any single year. Many of them look interesting only after the second or third glance and are rather boring, which is exactly what I am looking for. So if you are looking for a “Hot stock for 2024”, this post won’t help you much.

And always remember: THIS IS NOT INVESTMENT ADVICE. PLEASE DO YOUR OWN RESEARCH.

As a special service and to offer something “fresh”, I have created a new portfolio overview chart based on holding periods which I proudly present here:

The summaries of the previous years can be found here:

My 23 Investments for 2023
My 28 Investments for 2022
My 21 (+6) Investments for 2021
My 20 investments for 2020
My 22(+1) Investments for 2019
My 21 investments for 2018
My 27 investments for 2017
My 27 investments for 2016
My 28 investments for 2015
My 24 investments for 2014
My 22 investments for 2013

Let’s go:

1. TFF Group (Portfolio weight 7,4%, Holding period 13,0 years)

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All Norwegian Stocks Part 11 – Nr. 151-165

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And on we go with yet another 15 randomly selected Norwegian share. Despite many uninteresting or crappy companies, again 2 made it onto the preliminary watchlist. Have fun !!

151. Sogn Sparebank

With around 8 mn EUR market cap, Sogn Sparebank seems to be the smallest Sparebank so far. Maybe interesting for people who live in Årdalstangen, where it is loctated, but not for me. “Pass”.

152. Aqua Bio Technology

From the name alone, I assumed that this 5 mn EUR market cap company would be a crappy 2021/2022 IPO and ….I was wrong. Rather it seems to be a crappy company that has been around for a little bit longer. The company has little income but consistent losses. “Pass”.

153. Norsk Solar

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Lopgistec Update – “Strategic review” consideratios

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With a small delay, a few thoughts on the “strategic review process” at Logistec, a stock I had written up and added to my portfolio two months ago.

Govro has already published an excellent post about the situation in his Wintergem Blog here. He estimates that a sale at ~9xEV EBITDA could result in an offer of CAD 76 per share. However, he points out that this is just the start of a process and it could well be that there will be no sale at the end, especially as due to the high interest rates, the infrastructure sector is not super hot at the moment.

The Logistec share price has increased from around 43 CAD per share before the announcement to around 60 CAD at the time of writing. Funnily enough, this is almost exactly half way between the “undisturbed price” and Govro’s sale price estimate.

Correcting a mistake: Extra Asset

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All Norwegian Stocks Part 9 – Nr. 121-135

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And on we go, after a small break, with a fresh batch of 15 randomly selected Norwegian stocks. This time, the random number generator selected a wide variety of businesses compared to the ususal “Fsih & Ships”. 3 stocks made it onto the watch list, one of them had been in my portfolio in the past. Enjoy !!

121. HAV Group AS

HAV Group is a 32 mn EUR market cap supplier to the maritime industry. Looking at the website, they seem to focus on at least optically on “Green” technologies, for instance electric ships and hydrogen solutions.

That all sounds very good on paper and for 2021 has translated into decent profits, but 2022 looks very different, with declining sales and disappearing profits. Q4 2022 was especially bad with an EBIT margin of -16%.

Looking at the chart, we can see that the timing of the IPO in March 2021 seems to have been perfect….for those who were selling:

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My 23 Investments for 2023

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Following an annual tradition, I’ll try to review my current portfolio at least once a year by writing short summaries for each individual position.  14 of the 28 positions from last year are still in the portfolio and I have added 9 new positions. That tunover has been mainly driven by the events in 2022, which have changed fundamentals for quite a few of the old positions, but also opened up opportunities for new ones. A more comprehensive Performance review will follow in early January 2023.

A short user guide:

My style of investing mostly concentrates on 20-30 small/midcap stocks that in my opinion have a good return/risk profile over the next 3-5 years. Many of this stocks are not household names and are unlikely to make spectacular gains in a single year. Many of them look interesting only after the second or third glance. So if you are looking for a “Hot stock for 2023”, this post won’t help you much.

And always remember: THIS IS NOT INVESTMENT ADVICE. PLEASE DO YOUR OWN RESEARCH.

The summaries of the previous years can be found here:

My 28 Investments for 2022
My 21 (+6) Investments for 2021
My 20 investments for 2020
My 22(+1) Investments for 2019
My 21 investments for 2018
My 27 investments for 2017
My 27 investments for 2016
My 28 investments for 2015
My 24 investments for 2014
My 22 investments for 2013

Let’s go:

1. TFF Group (Portfolio weight 8,1%, Holding period 12,0 years)

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Panic Journal 5 – Ukraine/Russia edition: Is Europe really Toast, Energy Silver Bullets and the Weather

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It’s time after exactly 3 months for some new ramblings on Energy, Europe and of course the weather and other stuff.

Bad news everywhere:

The last few weeks felt like a new catastrophe is happening every week or so. Italian elections, the British Pound trading like a Shitcoin, Putin threatening the West with Nuclear Weapons, Energy prices for retail customers skyrocketing, potential Blackouts being a real issue in Europe this winter, steel and fertilizer companies shutting down in Europe, creating supply chain issues down the chain and in addition, rumors about regime change in China and/or preparations for an attack on Taiwan are surfacing every day.

I have been listening to some US podcasts and there seems to be consensus on that Europe is Toast. Even a comparison to the “Arab Spring” was made with the dire prediction that Governments will topple like Domino tiles. I don’t want to sound arrogant but one word of advice to my American readers: European countries are actually all Democracies and if people don’t like their leaders they will elect new ones.

The FT was just running an article about the coming Deindustrialization of Germany with the example of BASF threatening to “leave” Germany and Billionaire Ray Dalio thinks that Europeans are not working hard enough.

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