Category Archives: Investment-Gurus

“Risk free” rates and discount rates for DCF models

In the discussion to the Piquadro valuation, I quickly mentioned that the concept of “risk free” rates is a difficult concept at the moment.

Let’s have a quick look at the “academical” world:

CAPM

If we look at the CAPM (no matter if one beliefs this or not) we can see that the risk free rate of return plays an important role there. First, it is the basis return on needs to achieve with any investment, secondly it also influences the equity risk premium.

Risk free rate of return

The definition of the risk free rate itself is quite “fishy”. Investopedia for example states:

Investopedia explains ‘Risk-Free Rate Of Return’
In theory, the risk-free rate is the minimum return an investor expects for any investment because he or she will not accept additional risk unless the potential rate of return is greater than the risk-free rate.

In practice, however, the risk-free rate does not exist because even the safest investments carry a very small amount of risk. Thus, the interest rate on a three-month U.S. Treasury bill is often used as the risk-free rate.

This is of course not really applicable for any serious long term investor. Damodaran has a nice paper about “risk free rates” here.

His major points are as follows:

The first is that there can be no default risk. Essentially, this rules out any security issued by a private firm, since even the largest and safest firms have some measure of default risk. The only securities that have a chance of being risk free are government securities, not because governments are better run than corporations, but because they control the printing of currency. At least in nominal terms, they should be able to fulfill their promises. Even this assumption, straightforward though it might seem, does not always hold up, especially when governments refuse to honor claims made by previous regimes and when they borrow in currencies other than their own.

So this is important: No default risk !!! So it is wrong for instance to use current yields of Italian Govies for valueing Italian stocks, as considerable default risk is embedded in current spreads. The “country” risk could/should be embedded into the equity risk premium, not into the risk free rate. A hypothetical Italian company with 100% of its business in Germany for example, should only get a very small country risk charge if any.

A second point is the following:

There is a second condition that riskless securities need to fulfill that is often forgotten. For an investment to have an actual return equal to its expected return, there can be no reinvestment risk.

In theory, one should discount annual cash flows with the respective annual risk free rates. With a flat yield curve, this is not so important but for steep yield curves the differences can be significant. However in practice Damodaran recommends using the duration of the cash flows of the analysed investment as proxy for the risk free rate. As the best proxy if we don’t want to do this, he recommends the 10 year rate.

For the EUR, he recommends specifically the following:

Since none of these governments technically control the Euro money supply, there is some default risk in all of them. However, the market clearly sees more default risk in the Greek and Portuguese government bonds than it does in the German and French issues. To get a riskfree rate in Euros, we use the lowest of the 10-year government Euro bond rates as the riskfree rate; in October 2008, the German 10-year Euro bond rate of 3.81% would then have been the riskfree rate.

With regards to currencies he says this:

Summarizing, the risk free rate used to come up with expected returns should be measured consistently with the cash flows are measured. Thus, if cash flows are estimated in nominal US dollar terms, the risk free rate will be the US Treasury bond rate. This will remain the case, whether the company being analyzed is a Brazilian, Indian or Russian company. While this may seem illogical, given the higher risk in these countries, the riskfree rate is not the vehicle for conveying concerns about this risk. This also implies that it is not where a project or firm is domiciled that determines the choice of a risk free rate, but the currency in which the cash flows on the project or firm are estimated.

The most common mistake with currencies is usually to use current exchange rates for future cashflows which then results in a preference for projects in countires wiht high nomnal rates.

About Inflation, he is not really clear in my opinion. He argues basically, inflation does not matter because we get the same result if we use yields of inlfation linked bonds combined with inflation adjusted growth rates.

Especially the current situation, where we see negative real yields in many markets, one could argue about his appoach. A negative real yield means for an investor, that the “risk free” nominal asset would have a guaranteed loss in real purchasing power over the investement horizon.

Consider for instance the UK: 10 year gilts run at 2.158% yield, this would be the proxy for the risk free rate. Current inflation runs at 5%, UK 10 year implied inflation from inflation linked bonds is around 3%.

So if I would use the 10 year gilt as proxy as the risk free rate, I woul dalready accept a loss of -1% p.a. in real terms p.a. or almost -3% p.a. based on current inflation rates.

I think this topic might justify even a doctorate thesis, but in my opinion, one could go the following pragamatic way:

Proxy for risk free rate: Higher of 10 year risk free Govie Yield in currency or inflation ).

So in the case of the risk free rate for an Italian company I would compare:

a) 10 year risk free EUR rate = 10 year bunds = 1.89%
b) Inflation: Currently =3.4%

I would the use the higher of the two rates, 3.4 %. This would be a pragmatic way to avoid unnecessary country risk premium and still make sure, the risk free rate does not imply a guaranteed loss in real terms.

Magic Sixes quick check: Creston plc

Regular reader know that I run a “Magix Sixes” screening for investment idea generation.

This idea is from Peter Cundill’s book and is a very simple screen: Stocks which trade below 0.6 book, below 6 PE and have a dividend yield of > 6%.

As one could imagine, the result of this search are not really “wide moat” beauties…

However, one new entry, Creston PLC doesn’t look too bad.
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Weekly Links

Latest report of SIA advisors

Great analysis of Dart Group Plc from Valuestockinquisition

The competitive adavantage of part-time investing

Quarterly letter of Kerrisdale. 200% performance in 2011, good paragraph on struggling retailers.

Always a good read: David Merkel ranting against simplistic valuation metrics.

The new semester in Damodaran’s valuation class starts on January 30th, don’t miss it. Will this be the slow death of universities ?

Very good post from Wexboy about catalysts and activist investors

Seth Godin about an underestimated competitive advantage

Q4 letters from East Coast Management and Tweedy Browne

WMF AG – Hidden Champion part 3 – Potential catalyst and Private Company Valuation

After part 1 and part 2 I had concluded the following:

–> from a pure Asset perspective, the Stock seems currently fairly valued
–> from an EPV perspective, one could assume an upside of 25-43% if one assumes constant cash flows going forward based on 2010 results

So overall, the upside is there but certainly not “super exciting”, so why bother ? Maybe the reasons are to be found in what i would call more the “qualitative” angle ?
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European Spin-offs – Reality check part 3 (and final)

Due to overwhelming demand (ok ok, it was only wexboy asking for it), I decided to add part 3 to my series about spin-off companies (part 1, part 2) in order to focus on a longer term view.

This time I selected 143 spin offs beginning on 01.01.2001 which were completed before December 2008 in order to analyse 1, 2 and 3 year performance numbers with the goal to validate the claim that year 1 and or year 2 are always difficult for spin offs and year 3 is kind of “take off”. Again, I compared the performance to the Stoxx 600 price index.

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Book Review: Joel Greenblatt -You can be a stock market genius

This is one of the books I always wanted to read but never managed to:

When Joel Greenblatt published this book in 1997,he had a tremendous run as manager of Gotham capital.

The book is aimed towards the “average” investor and makes the case for investing in special situations.

The best special situation he recommends are spinoffs, when a usually large company is spinning off a part of its business in the form of stocks which are simply distributed to the owner of the large company. As the owner of the large company don’t really want this stock, this creates an investing opportunity, especially if the management of the spin off is incentivised correctly.

He touches a couple of other special situations (merger securities, recaps, reorganisations, companies emerging from bankruptcy), which should be well known to people having read “Margin of safety” or other value oriented books.

The case studies in the book are good, it is interesting to see that Greenblatt invests even in highly indebted companies if they are “special”.

For a European investor in our time howver, the book contains only partly directly actionable advise, as spinoffs are avery rare breed today. However it is still a very good books which shows that “special situation” investing can lead to great investment results.

Summary: I think the book is a good start for anyone who wants to have an “easy to read” entry into the world of special situation investing, although the focus of the book might not be easily applicable in current times.

Magic Sixes – “New entries”

    At the moment. there are some interesting “new entries” in my Europe based “Magic Sixes” Screen.
    New entries (non financials) at which I will have a look in the next days are:

    ESSO S.A.F (French Exxon subsidiary)
    Stora Enso (another paper company)
    Deutsche Lufthansa– CSP International (Italian underwear, firewall blocks website ;-))
    Screen Service (Italian manufactorer of television broadcasting equipment)
    Isagro SpA (Italian producer of herbicides)
    Mondadori (Italian publisher, majority owned by Berlusconi)

    It looks like an interesting time for contrarian investors…..

    Additionally i run a “magic sixes light screen” with slightly relaxed rulse (P/b 0.7, P/E 7, Div. yield 5%)

    Some interesting companies there:

    ICT Automatisering (Durch softwar company)
    Huntsworth PLC (UK PR company)
    BWG Homes (norwegian residentail house builder)

Jim Chanos zu Value Traps

Im Rahmen des kürlich stattgefundenen Value Investing Kongresses, bei dem u.a. David Einhorn seinen Green Mountain Short präsentiert hatte, kam die meines Erachtens beste Präsentation von Short Seller Legende Jim Chanos.

Für mich selber war das eine so gute Zusammenstellung, dass man das nochmal in einem Post “festhalten” sollte.

Zunächst definiert er kurz und knapp, was für ihn einen Value Stock ausmacht:

Value Stocks: Definitive Traits
• Predictable, consistent cash flow
• Defensive and/or defensible business
• Not dependent on superior management
• Low/reasonable valuation
• Margin of safety using many metrics
• Reliable, transparent financial statements

Das ist schon mal eine sehr sehr gute Zusammenfassung was eine “Value Aktie” ausmacht.

Als nächstes fasst er zusammen, was aus seiner Sicht eine “Value Trap” ausmacht:

Value Traps: Some Common Characteristics
• Cyclical and/or overly dependent on one product
• Hindsight drives expectations
• Marquis management and/or famous investor(s)
• Appears cheap using management’s metric
• Accounting issues

Eine Anmerkung: Ich interpretiere dass so, dass er diese Merkmale insbesondere auf eigentlich “billige” Aktien anwendet, also aktien die man im ersten Moment als Value Aktie einstufen würde.

Didaktisch perfekt gibt es dann die Erklärungen zu den einzelnen “Value Trap” Charakteristiken:

Cyclical and/or Single Product
• Cycles sometimes become secular (Steel, Autos)
• Fad does not equal sustainable value (Coleco,Salton, Renewable Energy)
• Illegal does not equal value (Online Poker)

Hindsight Drives Perceived Value
• Technological obsolescence (Minicomputers,Eastman Kodak, Video Rental)
• Rapid prior growth – “Law of Large Numbers”(Telecom Build-Out)

Marquis Management and/or Famous Investor(s)
• New CEO as a savior – ignoring Buffett’s maxim(Conseco)
• The “Smart Guy Syndrome” (Take your pick!)

Cheap on Management’s Metric
• EBITDA…Arrgh! (Cable TV, Blockbuster)
• Ignore restructuring charges at your own peril(Eastman Kodak)
• ‘Free’ cash flow…? (Tyco)

Accounting Issues
• Confusing disclosure (Bally Total Fitness)
• Nonsensical GAAP (Subprime lenders)
• Growth by acquisition (Tyco, Roll-ups)
• Fair value (Level 3 assets)

Als Fallbeispiele kommen dann noch u.a. Exxon und Vale aus Brasilien. Insbesondere Exxon ist schon interessant, weil es aufgrund des niedrigen PEs und der hohen Dividendenrendite immer als Value Investment gesehen wird, z.B. hier.

Fazit: Der Chanos Vortrag ist eine gute Ergänzung für jede Value Investment Checkliste. Auch meine bestehenden Investments muss ich auf jeden Fall nochmal dahingehend beleuchten

Green Mountain – Der “Einhorn Effekt”

Tja, das ist halt der Unterschied zwischen einem kleinen Blogger und einem großen Guru.

David Einhorn hat anscheinend heute auf eienm Value Kongress seinen neuesten Short vorgestellt und das ist keine andere Aktien als Green Mountain.

Der Effekt ist sehr drastisch:

Man muss wohl erst die 110 seitige (!!!) Präsentation abwarten, aber laut dem Artikel hier ist nicht wirklich was Neues dabei.

Interessant finde ich allerdings das Timing, Einhorn hat schön gewartet bis der AUfwärtstrend klar gebrochen war und auch der allgemeine Rebound keine Wirkung mehr gezeigt hat:

Das kann man glaube ich vom “Meister” lernen, erstmal “Brechen” des Ausfwärtstrend abwarten. Die Frage ist nun ob ich wie angekündigt “nachshorten” soll. Meistens geht es ja dann wie bei Netflix ganz ganz schnell nach unten.

Edit: Volle Präsentation hier

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