Category Archives: Value-Watchlist

Special situation: Liquidation of KANAM Grundinvest fund (ISIN DE0006791809)

Disclaimer: This is not investment advice. PLEASE DO YOUR OWN RESEARCH !!!


This investment is not an original idea, but rather a “me too” investment. Ben from Wertart has a very good write up from November last year, so I spare myself to go into too much historic description.

Just the short version: Kanam Grundinvest is one of several formerly open real estate funds in Germany which have been put into liquidation. The major difference to almost all other funds is that in the Kanam case investors actually didn’t lose any money over the lifetime of the fund as the real estate seems to have been relatively high quality. As of December 31st 2016, the fund has sold 95% of its real estate and is now effectively a cash box with some remaining real estate exposure.

So let’s focus on what has changed since Ben wrote his post:

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Fossil Group (FOSL) – A great value stock with only temporary problems ? (part 1)

Fossil is a relatively well-known, US-based company which sells mostly watches and other accessories across the world, under its own brand but also under licenses from other famous labels (Michael Kors, Armani etc).

The stock has been hit hard in the last months and has lost more than 50% since its peak in 2012/2013. The Stock chart is a typical “falling knife”:

Fundamentally the stock looks very cheap, especially compared to historic profitability and growth:

Market cap: 2.660 mn USD (55 USD per share)
P/B 3,2
P/E Trailing 7,8
P/E est (2015) 10,7

10 year averages:
– P/E 17,7
– Profit margin 9,9%
– ROE 23%
– EPS growth 19,1%

So only looking at those historic numbers, Fossil looks like a high growth, capital light and highly profitable company at a bargain price. But as I have written before: Especially in an environment like now, cheap stocks are cheap for a reason.

Why is the stock cheap ?

There is a pretty decent Value Investor’s Club short thesis from late 2014 which lists a lot of the issues issues nicely. I would summarize it as follows:

1. The watch market in general is cooling down rom a high growth period
2. One of the main drivers, the Michael Kors brand (~1/4 of Fossil’s total sales) is having problems and the license agreement was expiring
3. The potential impact of Smart Watches.

I would personally add another fundamental issue which is:

4. Changes in the distribution structure & Social media branding

Let’s look Smart Watches first

Smart watches (and other wearables) are clearly a threat for established watch makers. It is hard to say if they will replace a significant share of traditional watches. With regard to Fossil one can make however the following observations:

a) Fossil is clearly NOT a first mover. They unveiled some first models in August and want to be on the market before Christmas but Sony ,Samsung, Motorola and of course Apple were much faster. Samsung now has 2 years experience and the new Gear S2 looks pretty good.

b) However the BIG question for Fossil is: If Smart Watches are succesful, will “Branding” work for Smart Watches the same way as for normal watches ? Fossil makes most of its money with branding, i.e. buying the stuff cheap in China, getting a license and putting a fancy name like Michael Kors on it and sell it expensively.

If you look at smartphones, branding for smartphones doesn’t really work. There was the Prada phone from LG but this seems to be not worked very well as I haven’t seen any new Prada phones since 2012. Most phones are sold under the name of the producer more like “regular” electronics. Why doesn’t branding work for smart phones ? I am not sure but I think it has to do with several factors such as rapid technological change. A brand like Samsung or Sony stands for technical excellence and people won’t pay more for a fancy name. If you want something fancy then you buy yourself maybe a Hermes Iphone case for 340 USD but not a Hermes branded phone.

I could imagine that Sports branding could work, as Smart Watches seem to focus on health and activity. For some reason however, adidas seems to have launched their first version of a smart watch already 2 years without the help of Fossil. So it seems that the Adidas license does not cover automatically all kind of watches.

Finally an interesting quote from the Michael Kors CEO with regard to slowing watch sales under the Michael Kors brand (from Bloomberg):

“A slowdown in our watch business, that has been significant and it happened very, very quickly. While I think many people think it is a result of the Apple Watch, it’s actually not. I think it is a result of the iPhone 6 where we did see some softening in our business when iPhone 6 was introduced. There’s clearly a younger customer, in particular, in America who is wearing watches less because they view the iPhone as something that they tell time with and watch becomes slightly less relevant.”
John D. Idol – Chairman, CEO, Michael Kors, Deutsche Bank db Access Global Consumer Conference, June 11, 2015

It could easily be that the Michael Cors CEO tries to blame the Iphone for the decline of his own brands but interesting nevertheless.

Changes in distribution & Social media branding

Historically,the distribution system of Fossil was clearly one of the competitive advantages. They did have own stores but most of their watches were sold in department stores like Macy’s or JC Penney plus Walmart. However as the department store format works less well, they have to adapt. They seem to do this by opening more and more own stores. They also clearly try to sell more online. However, as I experienced with Piquadro more than 3 years ago, moving from a more wholesale oriented model to a direct one is not easy.

Renting and running own stores is very different from delivering watches to a department store. It is riskier, you need more inventory and you need expertise in real estate.

Another threat is that the internet and social media seem to have lowered the barriers to entry. I had linked a few days ago to a story about Brandtech, the way some companies like Tesla use social media to create powerful brands.

If you go on Amazon and search for watches, the first page is dominated by “Daniel Wellington” watches. On the German site, the 20 most sold Watches are dominated either by super cheap no names below 10 EUR or Daniel Wellington. 6 of the 20 most sold watches are Daniel Wellington with an average price of 100 EUR, only 2 are Fossil watches. Amazon’s US top selling watches are interestingly allmost all very cheap models with Casio dominating the rankings.

Daniel Wellington is an only 4-year-old Swedish company which managed to go from zero to more than 200 mn USD sales in 4 years. The trick seems to be aggressive promotion via social media as outlined in the Brandtech article:

Tysander refuses to pay for traditional advertising, instead working with thousands of bloggers, celebrities, and other “influencers” worldwide. One of them, Blake Scott, 27, has been collaborating with Daniel Wellington for a little more than a year, sharing the watches with his 318,000 Instagram followers. “I first found out about Daniel Wellington via Instagram: Everyone outside the States was wearing one, and it seemed so cool,” he says. Soon after, someone from the brand reached out and said he wanted to give Scott a couple of watches to post on his feed. Eventually he negotiated a deal with the company, which paid a few hundred dollars for a multiweek campaign.

Other than that, they do exactly the same thing as Fossil:

Although DW bills itself as a Swedish company, the watches are manufactured in China, which is how the company keeps prices so low. The internal quartz movements—a battery and vibrating crystal to keep the time, essentially—come from Miyota, a Japanese supplier popular with lower-price brands, because their products are reliable and they always have a massive inventory. The rest of the components are made and assembled in Shenzhen, a manufacturing hub.

So clearly Fossil does not have anything like a moa
t, even the wholesale distribution network seems to be quite open for newcomers like Daniel Wellington. If you can build fresh brands as quickly as that, one also needs to think about how this changes the value of licenses of “famous” brands at least in the fashion category. One needs yet to see if Daniel Wellington is only a short-lived outlier or if more is to come.

What I like about the company

In general I found their annual reports pretty good and informative. If a company is in a situation like Fossil, with growth going away and cash flows still coming in, the danger is always that they do something stupid and/or incentives of management and shareholders are not aligned.

At Fossil however I found two statements which are quite impressive and indicate an above average management quality of the company.

This is a statemnt from the annual proxy statement about Kosta Kartsotis, Co-founder, CEO and 13% shareholder:

The Board believes that this structure is effective and best for the Company at this point in time for several reasons. Mr. Kartsotis joined the Company in 1988 and has been a director since 1990. He holds a significant number of shares of our Common Stock, and since 2005 he has refused all forms of compensation for his service as an executive officer, expressing his belief that his primary compensation is met by continuing to drive stock price growth.

Compared to this, Warren Buffett looks quite greedy in earning 100 K a year for being CEo. Mr. Kastsotis is basically working here for free. He has reduced his stake over time but in the last few years very little. Clearly without a salary he needs to sell some shares in order to get cash, but it would be quite easy for him to command a normal salary which could be at lest a mid single million USD number and no one could complain.

There was another great statement in the annual report on capital allocation and dividends:

Cash Dividend Policy.
We did not pay any cash dividends in fiscal years 2014, 2013 or 2012. We expect that for the foreseeable future, we will retain all available earnings generated by our operations for the development and growth of our business and for the repurchase of shares of our common stock

Fossil has bought back massive amounts of its own stocks in the last few years, around 1/3 of the outstanding shares have been bought back and they continue to buy more. Although part of thse stocks have been bought at 100 USD or more, I prefer this kind of capital allocation to doing stupid M&A transactions.

Summary part 1:

Fossil clearly has some fundamental issues to cope with. A general slow down in the industry combined with expiring license agreements has had direct and short-term negative effects on margins. The thread of smart watches adds further uncertainty. On top of that new competitors like Daniel Wellington seem to have no problems to enter the market and quickly gain market share.

Such a uncertain situation would normally be a clear reason NOT TO INVEST and stop researching as any margin of safety could quickly disappear.

On the other hand, Management seems to be properly incentivised and the capital allocation looks top notch. So I will digg a little deeper and try to come up with a valuation in a second post.

Vossloh (DE0007667107) – another potentially interesting “Fallen Angel” with an activist angle ?

Vossloh AG is a mid-sized German company and calls itself “a leader in the rail infrastructure and rail technology”.

Looking at the stock chart we can clearly see that not everything is going well there:

Vossloh lost almost 50% from their peak 3 years ago. If we look at some profitability measures of the past 10 years we see an interesting pattern:

EPS Profit Margin ROE
30.12.2004 3,91 6,2% 18,5%
30.12.2005 3,08 4,8% 13,3%
29.12.2006 2,98 2,0% 5,7%
28.12.2007 4,26 7,0% 18,2%
30.12.2008 6,30 11,5% 31,1%
30.12.2009 6,57 7,5% 18,5%
30.12.2010 7,32 7,2% 19,0%
30.12.2011 4,32 4,7% 11,0%
28.12.2012 4,15 4,8% 12,4%
30.12.2013 1,00 1,1% 3,1%

Vossloh showed only little impact during the financial crisis but then results deteriorated. They showed a small profit for 2013, but for the first half-year 2014, they shocked everyone with an “Accounting Bloodbath”, showing a loss of ~12,20 EUR per share, wiping out all profits for the last 3 years and some more.

So what happened ?

This is a quote from the CEO letter of the 2010 annual report:

For the years ahead, we intend to accelerate our growth while sustaining the rate of profitability. It is especially in the international markets that we will be amplifying our presence and we will be scoring in particular with the new products. For 2011, we are targeting group sales of €1.4 billion and an EBIT above €160 million.

This is from the 2011 CEO letter, where profits already declined:

Dear Stockholders:
Following a series of very successful fiscal years marked by above-average growth rates Vossloh suffered setbacks in 2011. Contrary to our expectations, Group sales and earnings declined. The chief influencing factors were the slowdown in the progress of Chinese rail projects, which only became evident as the year proceeded, the suspension of shipments for a major project in Libya and, from the summer onward, weak demand in key European rail markets. Under these circumstances, the Rail Infrastructure division’s sales, which at around 65 percent of the Group’s continued to contribute the lion’s share of revenue, dropped for the first time in years, by some 13 percent. The sales shortfall at Vossloh Fastening Systems was especially severe at the Chinese location and could not be offset by business elsewhere. The Switch Systems unit also performed below expectations due to the military conflict in Libya, which prevented the planned extensive shipments to that country in 2011. In addition, in several European countries demand slackened and price pressure stepped up.

In 2012, the outlook for 2013 was not that good but still “solid”:

However again, they disappointed, as stated in the 2013 annual report:

There were two significant reasons for the downward development in 2013: For one, we were confronted with extensive non-recurring charges that were due to expenses for the final out-of-court settlement of a dispute in the Transportation division in an amount and extent that was not to be expected. For another, there were additional expenses in this division in connection with the processing of several projects, which entailed additional and unexpected losses of earnings. In contrast, the Rail Infrastructure division performed significantly better than expected, and revenues as well as the result increased significantly. The Fastening Systems business unit primarily contributed to this positive development.

Not too surprisingly, both, the CEO and COO stepped down in February making way for a new management. Normally, CEO hate to step down even after management disasters so what happened ?

The activist angle:

Vossloh had been more or less controlled by the founding Vossloh family for more than 100 years although they only owned around 34%. Since 2011 though, another strong shareholder emerged: Hermann Thiele, the owner of German unlisted company Knorr Bremse who had built up a stake of close to 30 % from 2011 to 2013.

Although Thiele is not widely known and keeps a low profile, he is one of the most succesful German entrepreneurs of the last 30 years. He bought Knorr Bremse in 1985 as one would call it a “leveraged management buyout” and then grew the company by a factor of 15-20 times over the last 30 years. Despite being a non-listed company, Knorr Bremse issues a relatively good annual report where onr can see that the company is spectacularly profitable. Net margins of 8-9% and cash adjusted ROICs of more than 30% are clearly an indicator that this guy seems to know what he is doing. Besides that, depending on how you value Knorr Bremse, he is also one of the richest persons in Germany.

A little side story: World famous BMW AG once was the engine subdivision of Knorr Bremse until 1922 when it was sold to an investor as they didn’t find the engine business interesting enough……

In 2013, he finally succeeded in being elected as boss of the supervisory board against the explicit wish of the founding family. The founding family finally sold most of their shares in late 2013. It was him who kicked out the old management and brought in 2 new guys, among them the new CEO Hans Schabert who used to run the rail operations of Siemens.

In one of Thiele’s rare interviews in 2013 he stated that Vossloh is his private investment. Although he likes the business, he doesn’t want to take full control and leave Vossloh listed.

As a supplier to the rail industry, he knows the sector pretty well. I could imagine that long-term this might help Vossloh to get back on track. However I do not believe that he will remain a minority shareholder for ever. I do think that sooner or later he will try to take control. There would be clearly synergies between Knorr Bremse and Vossloh as both have the same clients and Knorr is even a supplier to Vossloh’s locomotive unit.

The 6 months 2014 “accounting massacre”

If you ever want to see a “how book as many losses as possible” financial report then look at the recent 6 month report from Vossloh. The new management wasted no time and did not even wait until year-end in order to write down everything they could.

Even in the investor presentation, they don’t make the slightest attempt to normalize the result.

Digging deeper into the report, you will find among others:

– goodwill write offs
– inventory write downs
– extra provisions against “risks”
– and even a charge because they did an early retirement of a higher coupon debt facility, which is clearly earnings accretive in the future.

In their outlook the state that one can expect some more losses in 2014 but from 2015 on Vossloh will be profitable again. But they did not specifc how profitable. Operationally they made already some significant changes. So overall this looks a little bit similar to the Van Lanschot story. The new CEO (with the support of the Supervisory Board) has written off whatever he could in order to show increasing profits going forward.

However there could also be a problem here. At some point in time, Thiele could decide that he doesn’t want to share the upside of a turn-around with the other shareholders and try to take Vossloh private as cheaply as possible. Other than Cevian at Bilfinger, Thiel has no track record with capital markets and many “old school” German business tycoons do not care very much about minority shareholders. This is clearly a risk to be considered

What could be a “turned around” Vossloh be worth ?

This is an overview of average margins (10/15 Years) of Vossloh and its 3 listed European “pure play” competitors:

Avg NI Margin  
  10 Y 15 Y
Vossloh 5,67% 5,19%
CAF 5,40% 6,46%
Faiveley 6,50% 5,00%
Ansaldo 5,98% n.a.

Overall, I would say a 5,5% net profit margin on average is not unrealistic. Based on 2013 1.325 mn sales and assuming no growth, this could mean that Vossloh at some point in the future makes ~ 73 mn EUR profit or ~5,5 EUR per share If we assume a 12-15 P/E range, this would mean that a target share price of 66-82 EUR would be realistic.

Based on today’s price of ~49 EUR this would mean a potential upside of 35-68%. However one should assume that this turn-around needs at least 3 years. For a turn around, I personally would require a higher return than for a normal “boring” value stock as there is clearly a risk that the turnaround does not work out as planned.

If I assume a target return of 20% p.a., i would need to be sure that the price of Vossloh is in 3 years at around 85 EUR. This is clearly at the very upper end of my target range. So I would either need to have more aggressive assumptions or I would need a lower entry price. As a value investor, I would not want to bet on growth or on a shorter time frame for the turn around, so the only alternative is to wait for a lower entry price.

Taking the midpoint of my range from above at 74, I would be a buyer at ~42 EUR per share but not before.

How does this compare to the Bilfinger case ?

A few weeks ago, I was looking at a similar case, Bilfinger. Similar to Vossloh, an activist investor (Cevian) managed to get rid of the CEO and tries to turn around the company after mutliple earnings disappointments.

At a high level comparison I like Vossloh’s underlying business better. Bilfinger clearly has some structural issues especially with its power business where the underlying market (electrictiy) is undergoing a big fundamental change whereas the railway business to me seems fundamentally intact. On the other hand, Cevian as “activist” has a very good reputation and is easier to “handicap”. They will most likely treat minority shareholders fairly and do some kind of spin off etc. So the risk of getting screwed by the activist is lower.

In a dirct comparison however I would prefer the “activist risk” at Vossloh against the fundamental issues at Bilfinger. Additionally, the real “accounting bloodbath” at Bilfinger hasn’t happened yet.


In general I think Vossloh could be an interesting turn around story, especially considering the involvement of German self-made billionaire Hermann Thiele. I do like the industry better than for instance Bilfinger. It is clearly cyclical but I don’t see any structural issues. On the other hand, the current price is too high with regard what I would expect for such a relatively high risk “turn around” investment. The “Mean reversion potential” at the current price is not high enough, I would need a ~20% lower share price to justify an investment.

Looking at the chart, this might not be unrealistic as the stock price is still in free fall and any “technical” support levels would be somewhere around 39 EUR per share if one would be into chart analysis. In any of those “falling knife” cases, patience is essential anyway.

Vossloh will therefore be “only” on my watch list with a limit of 42 EUR where I would start to buy if no adverse developments arise. Additionally I will need to check Vossloh against Alstom once

Portfolio updates: AIRE KGaA, April SA, Cranswick, Dart, Installux


For AIRE KGaA, I decided to accept the tender offer at 18.25 EUR per share. There is not a lot of upside left and I guess the stock will be really illiquid after the offer.


Whereas the built up of Poujoulat goes really really slow, For some reasons, last Friday almost 2.500 Shares have been traded. That’s almost 1% of the market cap. Interstingly, in Bloomber a new fund called “Agicam” showed up at the end of April with a 0.99% position. Due to those sales, I could now already built up a stake of 1.8% of the portfolio in Installux shares, a lot faster than I thought.

DJE Real Estate

The sell down of this position is quite cumbersome. Up to know, I could only sell half of the position so far. However prices are relatively stable.

Dart Group & Cranswick

Both shares were relatively active over the past few days, so I could establish 2.5% positions fopr both. Dart Group issued their “preliminary annual” statement as of MArch 31st, a very good write up can be found here at ExepctingValue.

For Dart I will wait for the final annual report in order to determine if I increase the position to the full amount (5%).

April SA

Since I ahve increased my buying limit for April to 11,50 EUR, I could establish a small position in the stock (0.6% of the portfolio). Of course I got punished and bought ~2% higher than today’s share price……

Cash is now down to around 16.5% of the portfolio, but taking into account the AIRE Tender Offer, Cash is around 21.5% of the portfolio. So plenty of room for 2-3 new ideas…..

Neue “Aktuelles Portfolio” Seite

Mal eine “redaktionelle” Meldung: Ab heute gibt es eine neue Version der “Aktuelles Portfolio” Seite.

Statt der veralteten Scribd Datei gibt es jetzt immer einen Link auf das letzte Excel File und die Beiträge nach Werten geordnet. Das hilft uns auch selber die Beiträge zu finden 😉

Anbei hier nochmal der aktuelle Stand:

Aktuelles Portfolio

Portfolio KW 20.

Beiträge zu den Einzelwerten:

Long Core Value

Apogee: Erstanalyse
AS Creation: Erstanalyse und Update GB 2010
Benetton: Kurzbeschreibung in unserem Eingangsposting
Bijou Brigitte: Erstanalyse
Buzzi Unichem: Erstanalyse
Einhell: Kurzanalyse
ENI: Kurzbeschreibung in unserem Eingangsposting
EVN: Kurzbeschreibung in unserem Eingangsposting
Fortum Kurzbeschreibung in unserem Eingangsposting
Frosta: Erstanalyse und Update GB 2010
Hornbach: Erstanalyse Teil 1 und Teil 2
KSB Kurzbeschreibung in unserem Eingangsposting
Magyar Telecom: Erstanalyse, Update 1, Update 2und ein Kommentar zur Dividendenbesteuerung
Medtronic: Erstanalyse
Noble Drilling: Kurzerwähnung
OMV: Erstanalyse
Nestle: Erwähnung als Pairtrade mit Green Mountain
Pargesa: Erstanalyse
Sto Kurzbeschreibung in unserem Eingangsposting
Tonnelerie: Erstanalyse und Kommentar
Total Produce Erstanalyse, Update 1 , Update 2 und Update GB 2010
Tsakos Kurzbeschreibung in unserem Eingangsposting
Vetropack: Eingangsanalyse
Westag Kurzbeschreibung in unserem Eingangsposting
WMF Kurzbeschreibung in unserem Eingangsposting

Long Opportunity

AIRE KGAA: Erstanalyse, Analyse GB 2010, 10% Meldung Grevenkamp und Q1 Bericht 2011.
Axa Immoselect: Erstanalyse, Informationspolitik, Monatsbericht März 2011 sowie noch hier und hier zu aktuellen Infos.
CS Euroreal: Kurzerwähung im Startportfolio und Update
DEGI International: Erstanalyse, Q1 Update, Bottom up Analyse und aktueller Objektverkauf
Draeger Genußschein: Erstanalyse, Gedanken zur Bewertung, Long/Sort mit Vorzügen, Balaton Kaufangebot, HV und Ausgleichszahlung und nochmal Ausgleichszahlung
HT1 Funding: Ersterwähnung im Eingangsposting, Update und Auswirkungen CoBa Kapitalerhöhung

Short Opportunity

Asian Bamboo: Erstanalyse und aufgrund der Vielzahl der Beiträge hier nur GB 2010 Analyse Teil 1 fehlerhafte EPS, Teil 2 Liquiditätslage, Teil 3 Biologische Assets, Teil 4 Operativer Cashflow Shenanigan, Frageliste an IR,
Interessante Details Einzelabschluss , Q1 Zahlen, das Baumwolle Märchen, Sperrholzplatten und noch ein kleiner Erfolg.
Green Mountain: Erstanalyse, “Aua” Update
Kabel Deutschland: Erstanalyse, Gedanken zum WACC, Updates Teil 1, Teil 2 und Teil 3
Netflix: Erstanalyse sowie Updates Teil 1 und Teil 2

Core Value: Sysco – langweilig und gut – aber leider zu teuer

Wiki: Sysco Corporation is the largest foodservice distributor in North America. It distributes frozen foods, various canned and dry foods, fresh and frozen meats, seafood and poultry, imported specialties, and fresh produce. The company also supplies various non-food items, including disposable napkins, plates, and cups; tableware, cookware, restaurant and kitchen equipment, and cleaning supplies.

Eigentlich eine absolut langweilige Geschichte: Sysco beliefert alle möglichen Restaurants, Krankenhäuser, Schulen, Mensen u.a. mit Lebensmitteln, Fertiggerichten und Zubehör. Mit einem Marktanteil von 17% ist Sysco absoluter Marktführer und beliefert rund 400.000 Kunden mit rund 400.000 verschiedenen Produkten.

Gewinn und Umsatz sind im Gegensatz zur Story alles andere als langweilig:
In der 2000er Auflage vom “Intelligent Investor” ist Sysco in den Kommentaren aufgeführt. (Internet Stock vs. langweiliger Food Support)

Auch der Aktienkurs hat sich in den letzten 20 Jahren gut verzehnfacht, in den letzten 30 Jahren gut verhundertfacht:

Sysco wurde im Buch von Pat Dorsey als eine der klassischen Firmen genannt, die bei wachsendem Kundenstamm Mehrwert erzielt (Moat durch Netzwerkeffekte) und wird von Morningstar als eine der Firmen gelistet die einen dauerhaften “Wide Economic Moat” haben. Der Mehrwert resultiert hauptsächlich daher, dass für das Unternehmen bei mehr Kunden die Routen billiger werden und die Kosten sinken. Die Produkte werden von zahlreichen Knotenpunkten aus ins ganze Land gekarrt. Je mehr Kunden pro Fahrt (Fahrtkosten als zentraler Kostenpunkt) bedient werden könne, desto günstiger kann Sysco seine Produkte anbieten. Daher kann Sysco durch jeden neuen Kunden die Preise niedriger gestalten und durch günstige Preise mehr Kunden gewinnen. Noch mehr Kunden – noch geringere Kosten – und damit in Verbindung mit der Preissetzungsmacht im Schnitt deutlich höhere Margen als andere Anbieter. Ein Anbieter der Sysco das Wasser reichen wollte müsste 1. die Knotenpunkte teuer aufbauen und 2. den Kundenstamm replizieren. Das ist zumindest ein nicht ganz unbeträchtlicher Wettbewerbsvorteil…

Das Ganze lässt sich natürlich auch an einem sehr konstanten Cashflow (operativ und Free pro Aktie) und einer stetig hohen Gesamtkapitalrentabilität (CF/Total Assets) ablesen.

Auch wenn wir Sysco daher als sehr wertvoll und daher passend für unser Portfolio empfinden, vergleichen wir immer die beiden Komponenten Wert&Preis. Der Preis ist bei einem Kurs von 28 USD in etwa wie folgt:

Market Cap: 16,3 Mrd. USD

KGV: 13,5 (ok)
KGV3: 14,5 (ok)
KGV10: 18,7 (schon recht hoch)

KCV: 10,20 (ok)
KFCF: 15,8 (schon recht hoch)

KUV: 0.40 (sogar recht angenehm)
KUV*mittlere Marge: 16 (schon recht hoch)

KBV: 4,25 (sportlich)
EV/Ebit: 8,5% (relativ niedrig)

Dividende+Aktienrückkäufe: ~5% p.a.
Das Unternehmen kauf massig Aktien zurück und schüttet gleichzeitig eine (für US-Verhältnisse) hohe Dividende aus. Dies ist auch ein hinweis darauf, dass die Zeiten “massiven” Wachstums zumindest absehbar vorbei sind. Bilanz ist trotz Goodwill und etwas Schulden halbwegs solide und da der Cashflow recht hoch und extrem stabil ist – ist die Verschuldung akzeptabel.

Mit diesen Werten ist Sysco in dem von uns genutzen Bewertungsmodellen relativ fair bewertet. KGV und KCV sind akzeptabel, KBV und der Gewinn mit Mittlerer Marge recht hoch. Wenn wir das Unternehmen als solches kaufen könnten und uns garantiert würde, dass wir zu den gleichen Kennzahlen wie oben in fünf oder zehn Jahren auch verkaufen könnten – würden wir das Unternehmen tendentiell kaufen. Da wir aber nicht wissen, ob der Markt in fünf oder zehn Jahren bereit ist, solch hohe Multiples für das Unternehmen zu bezahlen ist uns das Risiko zu groß. Das Unternehmen könnte (und die Chancen stehen sehr gut) Gewinn und Eigenkapital innerhalb der nächsten zehn Jahre verdoppeln. (Auch weil sie die Preise an die Inflation anpassen können). Wenn aber die Multiples auf ein normales oder sogar unterdurchschnittliches Maß zusammenschrumpfen – wird sich die Aktie in zehn Jahren nicht unbedingt auch verdoppelt haben.
Diesen Zusammenhang haben wir auch bei Medtronic schon einmal vorgestellt. Nur weil ein Unternehmen gute Zahlen bringt – heisst es nicht, dass der Aktienkurs partizipiert, wenn die Aktie vor zehn Jahren einfach viel zu teuer war.

Aus diesem Grund nehmen wir Sysco erstmal nur auf die “Core-Watchlist” und hoffen, dass Mr. Market und irgendwann einmal nochmal günstigere Kurse beschert, so dass wir dieses wunderbare Unternehmen auch zu einem akzeptablen Preis kaufen können.